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Preventable accidents and mishaps continue to degrade the readiness of U.S. military 
forces.  In 2006, the National Safety Council reported an annu l rate of over 30 
accidental fatalities per 100,000 Department of Defense members and estimated that 
preventable injuries and illnesses cost the department approximately $21 billion per 
year.  Reducing these occurrences was the policy mandate of th  Secretary of Defense 
in 2003.  He challenged the military service secretaries to reduce their mishap rates 
by 50 percent over a two-year period ending September 30, 2005.  While each of the 
military services formulated its own compliance strategy, none of them met the 
reduction goal.  In some cases, the mishap rate actually increased.  The purpose of 
this dissertation is to evaluate the Department of the Navy’s (DON) policy 
compliance strategy and to assess its shortcomings and areas for future 
improvements.  The Navy focused their efforts on leadership-intervention best 
practices designed to elevate the safety climate in the r high-risk units, primarily their 
  
aviation components.  These units contribute almost 90 percent of the annual mishap 
cost due to preventable accidents.  DON policy-makers theorized that certain 
leadership interventions would improve safety climate thereby reducing the 
likelihood that unit members would engage in unsafe behavior both on and off the 
job.  This dissertation evaluates the validity of that general theory, and the 
appropriateness of the specific leadership interventions cho en, in two distinct data 
collection and analysis phases.  In the first phase, statistical analysis is conducted on a 
safety-climate survey database maintained by the Naval Post-Graduate School 
containing 20,000 Navy and Marine Corps military survey respondents assigned to 
F/A-18 aircraft squadrons completed over the past 5 years.  In Phase 2, Commander, 
Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet authorized climate research in four Navy F/A-18 
squadrons located at Oceana Naval Air Station.  Upon analysis, the intervention 
methods implemented in the Navy’s mishap reduction strategy showed little 
correlation with safety climate improvement.  Phase 2 analysis identified several 
organizational programs and specific leadership qualities that correlate with elevated 
safety climate and revealed a preliminary causal relationship between safety climate 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The U.S. private sector workforce sustained almost 5,000 fatalities and 
3,700,000 disabling injuries on-the-job in 2004 costing the economy an estimated 
$142.2 billion in higher prices for goods and services and higher tax s.  Production 
time lost due to these on-the-job injuries totaled about 80,000,0  days, a 5 percent 
increase from 2003.  According to the latest final data (2002), unintentional injuries 
(both on and off the job) continued to be the fifth leading cause of death, exceeded 
only by heart disease, cancer, stroke, and chronic lower respiratory diseases (National 
Safety Council, 2006).  According to the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance’s (NCCI) Detailed Claim Information (DCI) file, a stratified random 
sample of lost-time claims in 41 states, the average cost for all worker compensation 
claims combined in 2002–2003 was $17,787, up 12% from the 2001–2002 average of 
$15,865.  Total incurred costs consist of medical and indemnity payments plus case 
reserves on open claims.  Only injuries that result in medical payments with lost time 
are included.  These numbers are often overshadowed by thesheer size of the U.S. 
workforce and the volume of domestic productivity and yet th  social and financial 
impact of preventable accidents and injuries looms large.  
According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
6,455 government employees (federal, state and local) were fatally injured while at 
work between 1992 and 2001.  During that period, the annual number fluctuated from 
a high of 780 in 1995 to a low of 566 in 1999.  Local government workers, who 
accounted for half of the labor market, incurred the highest number (3,227) of deaths 
over the period.  Federal employees, who accounted for 23 percent of the government 
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workforce incurred 1,923 fatalities and faced the highest workplace fatality rate.  The 
overall government fatality rate was 3.2 per 100,000 workers.  The fatality rate in the 
private sector for the same period was 5.1 per 100,000 workers.  Within government, 
the fatality rate was 4.1 for federal workers, 2.4 for state workers, and 3.2 for local 
government workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004). 
The majority (1,253) of federal worker fatalities occurred in the areas of 
national security and international affairs.  In addition, 146 members of the U.S. 
Postal Service and 105 workers in the environmental quality and housing sector 
suffered a fatal workplace injury over the period.  Among the total number of local 
government fatalities, almost half (1,505) worked in justice, public order, and safety 
including 1,033 in police protection and 401 in fire protection.  State government had 
the fewest workplace fatalities (1,224) within overall governmet.  Among these 
fatalities, 343 worked in the justice, public order, and safety industry; 176 in the 
administration of economic programs; 162 in educational services; and 156 in 
highway and street construction (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004). 
Despite the technical sophistication of the 21st century U.S. military, 
preventable accidents and mishaps impart similar social and economic costs.  Every 
day, some member of the U.S. armed forces is injured or killed in a non-combat 
related mishap.  A mishap could refer to an incident that occurs while the military 
member is off-duty such as a recreational boating accident or a private motor vehicle 
(PMV) accident (non-operational).  Other mishaps might be incidents during on-duty 
events that are not the result of direct combat operations (operational).  A mishap 
might be a collision at sea or an aircraft crash during a training evolution.  These 
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mishaps often involve personal injury or death and/or the damage or destruction of 
military equipment and infrastructure.  As the nation’s largest employer, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) faces enormous annual costsdue to preventable 
accidents and mishaps involving both people and hardware.  According to the 
National Safety Council (NSC), DOD had an accidental fat lity rate of 30.3 per 
100,000 people in fiscal year 1999; estimating that the annual cost of injury and 
illnesses for the department ranges conservatively from$10 billion to more than $21 
billion (Greene, 2006; National Safety Council, 2006).   
In 2001, the Department of Defense assembled an executive commission of 
government, military and labor representatives to evaluate DOD’s safety and 
occupational health management systems.  One of the panel’s major findings was the 
lack of an effective department-wide management system and that “this deficiency 
has serious consequences for the department’s mission because preventable injuries 
and illnesses absorb substantial human and financial resources that are needed for 
operational readiness” (Center for Naval Analyses, 2004).  
Military personnel continue to hurt and kill themselves prima ily due to 
improper decision-making and/or hazardous behavior, not due to faul y equipment or 
inadequate training (Neubauer, 2003).  While preventable accidents can be considered 
statistically common in the private and public workplace, th  potential for disaster 
increases exponentially when considering the world of high-risk technologies.  “As 
our technology expands, as our wars multiply, and as we invade more and more of 
nature, we create systems ─ organizations, and the organization of organizations ─ 
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that increase the risk for the operators, passengers, innocent bystanders, and for future 
generations” (Perrow, 1984). 
While the economic and social costs attributed to preventable accidents are 
well documented, intervention methods designed to improve safety performance in 
the workplace lack universality and consensus among planners, practitioners and 
researchers.  Despite great strides in improving the training and equipment of the 
potentially most at-risk group of public servants (i.e. th military), much could be 
done to further understand how the environment of the workplace contributes to 
organizational safety and productivity.  Of particular interest is to what extent and 
under what circumstances certain human resource management practices might 
influence individual and/or group behavior. 
Study Background  
Using the Department of the Navy (DON) as the organization of study, Tables 
1.1 and 1.2 depict summaries of both operational and non-operati nal class A 
mishaps and fatalities between 2001 and 2005.  A class A mishap i  one that involves 
equipment damage costs that exceed $1 million, or involves a fatality or permanent 
disability.  A class B mishap involves an injury that results in permanent partial 
disability, or hospitalization of five or more personnel, or the total cost of damage is 
$200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000.  A class C mishap involves an injury that 
results in one or more lost workdays, or the total costof damage is greater than 
$10,000 but less than $100,000 (OPNAVINST 3750.6R, 2001).  These mishaps are 
unplanned, non-combat related events and are considered “preventable” according to 
DOD policy (DOD Instruction 6055.7, 2000). 
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Aviation 98 46 3 3 9 
Afloat 45 15 4 0 11 
Ashore 47 41 0 5 0 
Operational 
Motor Vehicle 
15 12 0 1 4 
Total 
Operational 
205 114 7 9 24 
Source:  http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/statistics/navy/t bles.htm 
1 Includes both Navy and non-Navy federal civilians. 
2  Includes civilian contractors, bystanders, etc. 
 









PMV1 341 329 2 
Other Non-
Operational 
108 104 0 
Total Non-
Operational 
449 433 2 
Source:  http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/statistics/navy/t bles.htm 
1 PMV: Privately Owned Motor Vehicle 
 
While the financial costs attributed to these mishaps are significant, the human 
costs are alarming.  For the Navy, the tables above reveal a non-operational 
accidental fatality rate four times that of the operational rate (433 versus 114) over the 
same five-year period.  Within all branches of the military, the largest non-operational 
cause of accidental death has been historically due to privately-owned motor vehicle 
mishaps (cars, motorcycles, quads, etc.).  Statistics how that 284 service members 
died in private motor vehicle crashes in fiscal year 2003.  Though 82 of those deaths 
came from crashes involving motorcycles, many deaths were linked simply to 
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impaired driving and the failure to wear safety belts.  Yet, the military has made 
inroads since the 1980s, when as many as 700 uniformed and civilian personnel died 
every year in private automobile crashes.  The Marines, for example, now enforce 
standardized safety belt regulations and teach driver-improvement classes to new 
recruits, while the Army seeks to identify soldiers who are most inclined to drink and 
drive, reaching out to them with educational materials and briefings. 
Despite a consistently downward annual trend, the PMV fatal crash rate for 
the military services has remained above the national average.  Though all types of 
people drink and drive, researchers say a common drunk driveris the younger man, 
aged 18 to 29, who takes risks and is a “sensation seeker” ─ exactly the kind of 
person pursued by military recruiters.  According to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (2007), automobile crashes are the leading cause of death nationwide 
for all people ages 18-34 years old.  Moreover, the military employs large numbers of 
men aged 18 to 34, which is the age group most likely to be involved in alcohol-
related crashes.  Using the latest national data, the traffic crash fatality rate in 2004 
for the U.S. was 14.6 deaths per 100,000 population compared to 19.5 deaths per 
100,000 members for the Army; 19.0 for the Navy; 27.2 for the Marine Corps; and 
16.1 for the Air Force (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2007).    
Regarding operational mishaps, fiscal year 2003 was a particul ly nsafe 
year for the Department of the Navy.  For example, th class A flight mishap (FM) 
rate was the highest since fiscal year 1998 (26 class A mishaps) and the Marine Corps 
had the worst year on record for ground class A operational mishaps (34 class A 
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mishaps).  Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the data for the most recent year on record (fiscal 
year 2005) for both operational and non-operational DON mishaps.  















Aviation 15 7 0 0 0 
Afloat 12 6 0 0 0 
Ashore 9 7 0 1 0 
Operational Motor 
Vehicle 
2 2 0 0 0 
Total Operational 38 22 0 1 0 
Source:http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/statistics/navy/tables.htm 
1 Includes both Navy and non-Navy federal civilians. 
 









PMV1 60 58 2 
Other Non-
Operational 
22 21 0 
Total Non-
Operational 
82 79 2 
Source: http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/statistics/navy/tables.htm 
1 PMV: Privately Owned Motor Vehicle 
 
Considered by many to be the most hazardous and high-risk component of the 
naval service, the naval aviation flight mishap rate has markedly declined over the 
past 50 years.  The FM rate just 20 years ago stood at nearly ten class A FM’s per 
100,000 flight-hours and now has dropped steadily to about two.  Despite this 
downward trend in mishap rate, the cost per mishap has continued to climb.  This can 
be attributed in large measure to the rising cost of aircraft, weapons and equipment.  
While the cost per mishap in fiscal year 1984 was about $6 million, it steady rose 
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over the last two decades to about $31 million per mishap (Neubauer, 2003).  Due to 
the nature of the tactical mission and operating environment, the F/A-18 aircraft 
Strike Fighter community is arguably the most high-risk aviation community within 
the DON.  F/A-18’s operate at high speed, low altitude, in all-weather, in close 
proximity to both aircraft and terrain, deliver high explosive ordnance, and have the 
highest landing speed aboard the aircraft carrier.  The following table shows mishap 
data for the F/A-18 Hornet aircraft (Navy and Marine Corps) since its inception. 
Table 1.5 Class A Flight Mishaps, F/A-18, Fiscal Years 1981-20041 




FY 81 2,555 2 78.28 
FY 82 8,458 0 0.0 
FY 83 20,165 1 4.96 
FY 84 44,736 2 4.47 
FY 85 63,356 2 3.16 
FY 86 99,019 2 2.02 
FY 87 137,745 8 5.81 
FY 88 138,360 6 4.34 
FY 89 179,106 7 3.91 
FY 90 207,760 7 3.37 
FY 91 248,367 12 4.83 
FY 92 247,047 13 5.26 
FY 93 253,882 7 2.76 
FY 94 259,249 5 1.93 
FY 95 283,224 9 3.18 
FY 96 282,499 10 3.54 
FY 97 267,112 5 1.87 
FY 98 273,479 9 3.29 
FY 99 270,447 3 1.11 
FY 00 249,187 9 3.61 
FY 01 262,978 7 2.66 
FY 02 305,189 6 1.97 
FY 03 298,367 12 4.02 
FY 04 274,181 14 5.11 
1  Source: http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/aviation/aviationdata/aircraftinfo/f18/hornet%20_rates.doc 
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While the mishap rate for the F/A-18 aircraft community varies from year to 
year, the number of class A  FM’s, the percent of these due to human factors, or 
human error, has remained at a relative consistent rate of 80% (Neubauer, 2003).  
Much attention has been paid over the past few years to understanding human error in 
complex systems, including issues related to faulty cockpit design, poor judgment, 
and communication breakdowns.  Relatively little attention has been paid to the 
impact of organizational influences (including leadership) on aircrew performance 
and safety, that is, what organizational factors might serve as antecedents to mishaps.  
Furthermore, even less attention has been paid to maintainers and maintenance error, 
despite their involvement in flight, flight related or ground mishaps.   
While this doctoral research focuses specifically on the Department of the 
Navy, other military aviation components have experienced similar trends in 
preventable mishaps.  According to Army statistics maintained to track their aviation 
units, data reveals fewer aviation related fatalities but a greater number of serious 
accidents in fiscal year 2006, making it one of the unsafest years in Army history.  
According to an Aerospace Daily computer analysis of fiscal year 2006 Army 
accident records, serious accidents (class A) led to 24 deaths, two below the three-
year historical average of 26 and five below the fiscal year 2005 total of 29 fatalities.  
This positive trend is overshadowed by a significant rise in class B mishaps.  Class B 
mishaps rose to 52 in fiscal year 2006, twelve higher than t e fiscal 2005 total and 79 
percent higher than the three-year historical average of 29.  This is the largest Army 
mishap rate increase since records were collected starting in 1972.  Class B mishaps, 
which have historically represented less than 1 percent of the service’s total, 
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accounted for about 25 percent of the mishap total in fiscal year 2006.  Since 1972, 
class C mishaps have represented about 97 percent of the total.  Class C mishaps 
accounted for only about half of the Army’s total in fiscal year 2006 (Fabey, 2006). 
DOD Mishap Reduction Policy  
In a report submitted in 2002, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
concluded that the 50-year DOD trend of consistent preventabl  mishap reduction had 
finally stagnated and that the fiscal year 2002 mishap data showed some alarming 
numbers.  That year, DOD mishaps resulted in more than 550 active duty fatalities, 
308 were PMV accidents (1 military death every 16 hours).  82 personnel died in 
aviation accidents, 17 more than the 65 aviation flight-related deaths in fiscal year 
2001.  In 2002, there were over 1,474,000 military injury cases including 348,683 
cases with duty limitations, 31,631 cases resulting in hospitalization or quarters, and 
91,448 lost workdays (168 active duty military injuries every hour).  Almost doubling 
from the previous year, the class A aviation accident rate for fiscal year 2002 was 
1.95 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours resulting in hardware losses valued at almost 
$2 billion dollars (1 aircraft destroyed every 5.5 days).  That year, 63 aircraft were 
destroyed compared to 46 destroyed aircraft in the previous year.  The National 
Safety Council estimates the indirect costs of accidents (workers compensation, lost 
workdays, etc.) to be four times the direct costs (replacing/repairing hardware and 
infrastructure, etc.) (Angello, 2006).    
On May 19, 2003, in an effort to address this rising accident rate among the 
armed forces, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld issued a 
memorandum to all military service secretaries challenging them to reduce their 
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mishap and accident rates by at least fifty percent over a two-year period (ending 
September 2005). 
“World-class organizations do not tolerate preventable accidents.  Our 
accident rates have increased recently, and we need to turn this situation around.   I 
challenge all of you to reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least 
50% in the next two years.  These goals are achievable and will directly in rease our 
operational readiness.  We owe no less to the men and women who defend our 
nation” (Rumsfeld, 2003). 
Department of the Navy’s Policy Approach 
From 2003 through 2005, the Department of the Navy committed 
considerable effort and resources to achieve SECDEF’s goal. Of primary focus was 
leadership’s role in energizing a more vibrant safety climate within Navy and Marine 
Corps units.  The DON implemented a comprehensive plan to reduce mishaps by 
improving organizational safety attitudes through a variety of leadership 
interventions.  In general, they were in broad areas such as reward and incentive 
programs, accountability processes and operational risk management.  Substantial 
emphasis was placed on the presumption that certain leadership practices, such as 
implementing innovative award programs, would improve (elevate) safety climate.  If 
safety climate improved, unit personnel would behave more prudently leading to a 
subsequent decline in preventable accidents and mishaps.   
Following the release of the SECDEF policy memorandum, the DOD Safety 
Oversight Council (DSOC) was chartered in June 2003.  Chaired by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USDP&R), the DSOC was 
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established to provide governance of DOD’s accident reduction eff rts (USD P&R, 
2003).  Developing initiatives to meet the SECDEF’s mishap reduction goal was first 
on their agenda.  At the core of these initiatives wasa leadership “call to action”.   
On 14 Nov 2003, Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England signed the charter 
for the Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council (NMCSC).  This flag-level council 
(membership restricted to military rank of rear admiral, brigadier general or higher) 
was charged to oversee the implementation of the Naval Safety Strategic Plan and 
provide governance of current and future safety initiatives and improvements (Naval 
Safety Center, 2005).   
On July 15, 2003, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) issued an ALNAV 
“All Navy” message outlining a three-tiered strategy to meet SECDEF’s safety 
tasking:  
“Commanders at all levels will: 
a. First, assume there may be a smarter way to do business and empower your 
best minds to develop and implement it.   Ensure a sound approach using effective 
processes, best practices, and available technologies. 
 b. Second, ensure solid resources for safety.  Safety programs are not 
discretionary.   Fully funding them should be a priority.  To move forward, it is also 
imperative that we resource promising safety initiatives and new system safety 
technologies. 
 c. Third, align support and infrastructure for safety.   Leadership must be 
involved at all levels, ensuring senior supervision is present during high-risk 
evolutions and risk management is integrated into all endeavors, additionally, 
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leadership must ensure safety officers possess sufficient experience to assist the 
command, and they must have access to the commander on all safety issues.  
Commanders should consider the following essential to success: awards and 
recognition; accountability; partnerships and coalitions both internal and external to 
the command; and mechanisms to monitor progress” (Secretary of the Navy, 2003). 
 In November 2003, after 3 months of little safety improvement, SECNAV 
issued another message further amplifying his safety policy:  
“My safety policy for the Department of the Navy is quite simple.  Ev ry 
command, every work center, every unit will have a safety culture b ilt on three 
principles: leadership commitment, leadership courage and leadership integrity.  
Today's leaders for safety must exhibit a solid commitment to communicate safety 
policy and to personally abide by it.  They must verbalize a belief in the value of 
safety and create an environment that encourages open, frank communication.  They 
must have the courage to set and enforce tough and sometimes-unpopular standards, 
to allocate safety resources (the right people and sufficient funding), and to provide 
quality training to ensure their personnel learn correct safety practices.  Today's 
leaders must have the integrity to hold themselves and their people accountable for 
violations of safety standards and to admit their own safety failures so others will do 
likewise.  An effective leader must also openly praise and celebrate safety 
accomplishments. 
While the CNO, CMC and I are leading this mishap reduction effort for the 
Department of the Navy, we know that, in the end, success or failure depends on you. 
The CMC and CNO are establishing comprehensive mishap reduction plans to guide 
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the department in achieving the SECDEF 50 percent reduction goal by the end of 
FY05. These plans will require leadership and resources -- we must be committed to 
both. We will develop and track metrics to accurately measure our performance, and 
our level of success will be shared with you. 
I pledge to you my full support and commitment. Through our collective 
leadership efforts we will dramatically elevate the safety culture h oughout the Navy 
and Marine Corps. It will take a decisive and targeted level of effort to achieve a fifty 
percent mishap reduction in two years, but if the effort saves your life or the life of a 
shipmate, fellow Marine or co-worker, there is no better time spent ” (Secretary of 
the Navy, 2003). 
 In both of SECNAV’s messages, he outlined several leadership interventions 
that should be important to and potentially constructive for, the commander focused 
on reducing preventable mishaps.  Without offering specific imple entation 
guidelines, SECNAV considered the following areas vital comp nents of a leader’s 
ability to shape the safety culture of his or her organization: 
• Reward and incentive programs (safety specific) 
• Open, frank communications 
• Safety performance measurement/accountability 
• Quality safety training 
• Senior supervision 
• Risk management  application/training  
The Aviation Committee, one of four committees of the NMCSC (afloat, 
aviation, ground tactical, and shore) emphasized some recent and near-term 
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leadership initiatives that were considered key components of the mishap reduction 
strategy (NMCSC, 2005).  For the Navy they include: 
• Near Term - Achieving the Goal 
o Operational Risk Management (ORM) & Fundamentals Campaign – 
Navy & USMC Aviation. (ORM is a method used to manage/control risk 
consisting of five basic steps) (Naval Safety Center, 2007):  
 Identify hazards 
 Hazard assessment 
 Make risk decisions 
 Implement controls 
 Supervise 
o 100% ORM Fundamentals Trained 
o Community ORM Review Boards 
o ORM Assessment of Each Type/Model/Series (TMS) Community 
o Community ORM/Safetygrams 
o Mandatory Culture Workshops & Safety Surveys 
• Leadership Initiatives 
o Mandatory Command Safety Assessment (CSA)/Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey (MCAS) 
• Long Term - Sustaining Mishap Reduction 
o Institutionalizing ORM 
o Complete installation of Ground Proximity Warning System 
(GPWS)/Target Acquisition Weapons Software (TAWS) 
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o Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) 
o Data Mining Initiatives for Mishap Leading Indicators 
o Consider Spatial Awareness Technologies 
o Refocus Crew Resource Management 
In addition to the leadership initiatives mentioned above, additional resources 
were committed to assist in the mishap reduction effort.  In a statement before the 
Senate Defense Appropriations Committee on March 16, 2005, the Secretary of the 
Navy emphasized his aggressive pursuit to meet the Secretary of Defense’s two-year 
goal to reduce preventable mishaps by 50 percent, from the fiscal year 2002 baseline.  
According to then Navy Secretary England, over $54.5 million, across the Future 
Years Defense Plan (FYDP) was added in the fiscal year 2006 budget for military 
flight operations quality assurance; a process to help refine the use of recorded flight 
data to reduce aircrew error and to achieve greater efficiences in aircraft 
maintenance: 
  “The Department is pursuing Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) status and has 
achieved significant reduction in lost workdays due to injuries at key installations.   A 
professional safety community and safety intern program for our civilian personnel 
has also been established.   The DON has embraced safety as a readiness multiplier. 
The Naval leadership team (Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commandant of the 
Marine Corps (CMC) and Secretary of the Navy) emphasized safety and mishap 
reduction as one of our published top ten 2005 objectives for the Department” 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2005)  
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Operational Guidance 
It is common for defense policy to go through clarification and refinement as 
it filters its way down the chain of command to the operational unit level for 
implementation.  In the case of the Navy’s aviation mishap reduction policy, the 
Commander of Naval Air Forces (COMNAVAIRFOR) released a message on April 
27, 2004 to all his aviation unit commanders with a subject line of: “Leadership 
Intervention Best Practices”.  This Fleet Response Plan (FRP) message (272254Z 
APR 04) was formulated from the processing of feedback solicited from aviation unit 
commanders in the field when asked to provide inputs on leadership-intervention best 
practices.  COMNAVAIRFOR asked his subordinate commanders to provide their 
assessment of what best practices seemed to work for them as they considered their 
most successful efforts in mitigating the burgeoning mishap rate amongst their 
aviation units.  The total number of Navy class A FM’s had increased from 21 in 
fiscal year 2002 to 26 in fiscal year 2003 along with an annual mishap rate increase 
from 1.76 to 2.28 class A mishaps per 100,000 hours flown (Naval Sfety Center, 
2006).  COMNAVAIRFOR’s staff synthesized the inputs and provided guidance to 
the fleet (all Navy components) on what were collectiv ly considered the most 
valuable and effective measures currently in use to reduce prev ntable injuries and 
mishaps.  It is at this level of operational detail that this researcher will focus on 
evaluating the efficacy of the Navy’s mishap reduction strategy. 
COMNAVAIRFOR’s operational guidance was organized into three 
overarching themes that emerged from the fleet input.  It was his conclusion that 
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these three themes reflected the root causes of the Navy’s recent increase in mishaps 
and personal injuries.  The themes he outlined were: 
1. Complacency 
2. Change and uncertainty 
3. Personal behavior and taking care of Sailors 
Each theme was followed with a series of leadership “best practices” intended 
for immediate unit implementation and designed to mitigate the behavior that was 
causing these negative safety trends.  Evaluating this policy and implementation 
strategy is at the core of this doctoral research effort.  
DOD Report Card 
Based upon each service’s mishap/incident data and the summary repo t 
provided by the Defense Safety Oversight Council in 2005, the mishap reduction 
policy mandate of the Secretary of the Defense was not met. Surveying a variety of 
metrics, there is conclusive evidence none of the uniformed services were able to 
meet the 50% reduction target by the end of fiscal year 2005.  Safety data was 
collected from all 4 military services components covering a variety of categories 
including both civilian and military employees.   
Figure 1.1 shows the summary data for civilian lost work days for each of the 
military components compared with the 50 percent reduction goal.  On average, the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force reduced the civilian lost work day rate by about 15 
percent over the three year implementation period while t e Marine Corps reduced 
the rate by almost 30 percent.  Despite a general downward trend for each service, the 
 
  19 
 
overall civilian lost day rates (measured as lost days/100 employees per year) never 
met the 2005 reduction goal.  
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Figure 1.2 shows the data for private motor vehicle fatality rates for all 
uniformed members of the military (measured in fatalities p r 100,000 members).   
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Army private motor vehicle accidents went up during the second and third 
year of the policy implementation period.  Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force fatality 
rates trended down although all fell short of the policy target.  The Air Force can be 
credited however, with an almost 40 percent reduction.   
A third safety performance metric is the military injury case rate which tracks 
the number of injuries requiring hospitalization and quarters p  100 military 
members.  Figure 1.3 summarizes this data. 
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 All four branches had injury case rates that declined initially from the fiscal 
year 2002 baseline in fiscal year 2003 but increased above the baseline in the final 
two years of the policy implementation time frame.   
Figure 1.4 depicts the overall class A flight mishap ratefor DOD from fiscal 
year 2002 through fiscal year 2005. 
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The overall DOD class A flight mishap rate showed a modest decline from 2003 to 
2004 but increased in 2005; falling well short of the 2005 50 percent eduction goal. 
Naval Aviation Report Card 
 Figure 1.5 shows the class A aviation mishap rate data for each of the four 
uniformed services  
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Each service had at least one annual class A flight mishap rate increase.  The 
Army finished fiscal year 2005 with a rate higher than the fiscal year 2002 baseline 
while the Air Force finished fiscal year 2005 just slightly below the baseline (1.4 vs. 
1.5).  Specific Navy and Marine Corps numbers are outline in Table 1.6. 
 Table 1.6 USN/USMC Aviation Mishap Data, Fiscal Years 2002-2005 
 FY02  
(baseline) 
FY03 FY04 FY05** FY05  
(goal) 
Mishap rate* (Navy) 1.76 2.28 1.19 1.42  .88 
Total mishaps 21 26 12 12  11 
Mishap rate* (Marines) 3.89 2.91 5.18 2.36  1.94 
Total mishaps 15 11 18 8  8 
Source: http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/statistics/aviation/statistics.htm 
* Mishap rate based upon number of Class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. 
** FY05 ended 30 Sep 2005.   
 
For the Navy, the fiscal year 2005 rate of 1.42 (12 mishaps) wa  worse than 
the goal of .88 (11 mishaps).  For the Marine Corps, the fiscal year rate of 2.36 (8 
mishaps) was worse than the goal of 1.94 (8 mishaps).  While the Marine Corps met 
their total mishap target (8) in fiscal year 2005, their rate was still above the goal 
because they flew fewer hours.   
Research Problem 
Since all four uniformed services failed to meet the mishap reduction policy 
mandate of the Secretary of Defense, this researcher concludes there is a legitimate 
public policy requirement to investigate where the failures occurred.  To accomplish 
this investigation, several research challenges exist.  Isolating the failure to a specific 
phase of the policy process is the first challenge in any research initiative.  Was the 
policy realistic or achievable?  Was the reduction target (50 %) equally achievable by 
all services given their unique tactical missions, operating environments, funding 
 
  23 
 
levels, resources, equipment, etc?  Was there sufficient top-level guidance provided to 
the services in relation to implementation priorities, milestones, assessment metrics 
and inter-service coordination.  Did each service design an i tervention strategy 
focused on the same or combination of the same organizational component, i.e., 
people, training, infrastructure, funding, etc.?  Did non-operation l safety receive the 
same focus as operational safety?  Were there environmental/co textual variables 
outside of the policy intervention that may have contribu ed to the preventable 
accident and mishap rate such as adjustments in recruiting standards, unusual 
weather, changes in the state of the economy, shifts in patriotism, etc?  The research 
problem is vast and controlling for the myriad variables influencing the safety 
performance of an entire military component is impractic l.  Therefore, a reasonable 
analytical approach to this significant public policy failure must start with a more 
limited group, analyzing a specific policy cohort and evaluating the design, 
implementation and efficacy of their intervention strategy.    
Research Question 
In 2003, the Navy designed an intervention strategy to reduce preventable 
mishaps based upon leadership’s ability to influence safety climate in Navy and 
Marine Corps units.  The policy was based upon the presumption that leadership was 
the lever that could bring about improvements in how people perceive their safety 
environment; an improvement that would ultimately influence individual behavior 
and safety performance.  Once this policy was announced, it became the task of 
subordinate organizations to put this high-level leadership strategy into operational 
terms and implement an effective mishap reduction initiative.  By the end of the 
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policy implementation period, the Navy failed to meet SECD F’s mishap reduction 
target (50 percent reduction in preventable accidents and mishaps by 2005).   
This doctoral research endeavors to answer the first of many important 
questions generated by this policy failure.  The foundation of the Navy’s approach to 
mishap reduction was linked to the presumption that certain le dership best practices 
could positively elevate an organization’s safety climate. The policy was designed to 
apply leadership practices to certain safety programs, thereby improving safety 
climate and consequently reducing preventable mishaps.  Why did it not work?  To 
unravel such a broad-reaching and consequential policy failure, this researcher starts 
with challenging the basic assumption under which the policy was designed.  Do 
certain leadership best practices improve safety climate in high-risk military 
organizations?   
Until this question is answered, DOD might continue to waste manpower and 
infrastructure on ineffective or counterproductive attempts to reduce preventable 
mishaps.  The consequences of such actions seem hopelessly dangerous and wasteful.  
Policy specific intervention strategies should be based upon empirical proof 
determined through scientific inquiry, not intuition, anecdote or tradition. 
High Reliability Organizations 
 This research project focuses on a specific type of military organization 
(Naval Aviation) that manages a high level of risk to both personnel and 
infrastructure in the delivery of services.  This type of organization is referred to as a 
“high-risk” or “high-reliability” organization.  A High Reliability Organization 
(HRO) is an organization that operates in a hazardous environment, yet has a very 
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low rate of accidents and incidents (Roberts, 1990).  HRO’s have less than their “fair 
share” of failures despite: 
• Managing complex and demanding technologies 
• Meeting peak requirements & time pressures 
• Routinely handling significant risks & hazards 
• Executing dynamic/intensely interactive tasks 
Some common HRO’s are commercial nuclear power companies, NASA 
(space shuttle operations), and the airline industry.  HRO’s in the military would be 
those units that perform high-risk tasks; having critical operation or maintenance 
procedures that have a high potential for performance shortfall and a corresponding 
adverse impact on overall system performance if personnel are not trained to perform 
the tasks to standard.  These tasks are typically difficult to train because they are 
exceptionally complex and require a high degree of skill, have either a high frequency 
of inadequate performances, or any combination of the above (J int Publication, 
DOD 1-02).  The focus of this research will be specifically on F/A-18 strike-fighter 
squadrons of the Naval service; units that meet the aformentioned HRO criteria. 
Personnel  
 Describing the people who typically serve in HRO’s is well b yond the scope 
of this research.  However, a brief description of the typ s of people who choose 
military service might be helpful in evaluating effective mishap prevention strategies 
and/or understanding the effectiveness of certain leadership best practices. 
No single scholar has ever been able to paint a complete picture of the military 
conscript.  Arguably the most famous study ever done on American enlisted men, The 
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American Soldier (1949), based on extensive interviews with the troops during World 
War II and the product of sophisticated analysis by a team of outstanding scholars, 
was promoted for its breakthrough in social scientific method and for its revelation 
about human behavior (Kohn, 1981).  The Professional Soldier: A Social and 
Political Portrait (Janowitz, 1960) and The American Enlisted Man (Moskos, 1970) 
are seminal works that profiled Cold War military servants.  Janowitz (1960) asserts 
that the life of the military professional produces a pattern of mental traits which are 
blunt, direct and uncompromising.  The Postmodern  Military (Moskos et al. 2000) 
evaluated the social determinants of military service in the postmodern period (after 
the Cold War) defined by a society whose aspects include: 
• Lack of absolute values 
• Relativism 
• Ambiguity 
• Permeability of institutions 
• Erosion of national sovereignty 
Today’s postmodern military is more diverse than their Cold War counterparts 
regarding race/ethnicity, religion, gender and sexuality leading to greater 
opportunities for friction and fewer unifying factors.  There is becoming less and less 
in common between leaders and led (Williams, 2004).   
Regarding specific demographics of today’s wartime recruits, there remains a 
continuous battle over the types and quality of personnel volunteering for service with 
many researchers claiming minorities and underprivileged are sharing an undue 
burden of sacrifice in the military.  The continuous focus on military recruiting goals, 
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personnel surges and the potential reinstitution of the draft raises the question of 
where the bar is, or where the bar should be, regarding the qualifications of potential 
enlistees.  A report published by the Heritage Foundation in November 2005 analyzed 
military enlistees between 1999 and 2003 and could not substantiate any degradation 
in troop quality.  In a report that updates these findings using data on U.S. recruits 
during 2004 and 2005 supports the previous finding that today’s youths joining the 
military are more similar than dissimilar to the general population (Kane, 2006).  The 
slight differences are that today’s recruits: 
• have a higher percentage of high school graduates 
• have higher representation from Southern and rural areas 
• come primarily from middle-class areas 
• are underrepresented in poor areas 
• have a proportional representation of racial groups 
Relating these socio-economic demographics to mishap propensity among 
today’s youthful military volunteers is debatable considering the previous research 
that suggests the modern military closely resembles the larg r civilian population.  
Are there personality traits common to today’s recruit that makes them more likely to 
engage in unsafe behavior (particularly non-operational)?  Controlling for the 
confounding effects of age, experience, sex, and accident risk, Hansen (1988) 
concluded that the personality traits of extroversion, l cus of control, impulsivity, 
aggression, social maladjustment, and some aspects of neur sis are related to the 
occurrence of accidents.  Are these the types of traits hat appeal to military 
recruiters? 
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The Army Recruiting Command defines personal courage, one of the Army’s 
seven core values, as “the ability to face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral).  
Personal courage has long been associated with our Army.  With physical courage, it 
is a matter of enduring physical duress and at times risking personal safety” (Army 
Recruiting Command, 2007).  Attributing some of these personality traits to today’s 
military conscript might be fair considering contemporary recruiting strategies solicit 
potential candidates with a strong desire for adventure, opportunity, and those who 
seem attracted to the warrior ethos.  While remaining inconclusive for the purposes of 
this dissertation, there does seem to be some correlation between the personality traits 
of today’s military conscript, and the propensity to engage in risky or potentially 
unsafe behavior.     
Unit of Analysis 
 The F/A-18 “Hornet” tactical aircraft squadrons of the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Marine Corps are the smallest deployable aviation war fighting component of each 
service.  Each squadron operates a variant of the F/A-18 “Hornet” aircraft and 
deploys as a component of a larger operational aviation gr up.  The F/A-18 "Hornet" 
is a single and two-seat, twin engine, multi-mission fghter/attack aircraft that can 
operate from either aircraft carriers or land bases.  The F/A-18 fills a variety of roles: 
air superiority, fighter escort, suppression of enemy air defenses, reconnaissance, 
forward air control, close and deep air support, and day and night strike missions.  
The F/A-18 Hornet replaced the F-4 Phantom II fighter and A-7 Corsair II light attack 
jet, and also replaced the A-6 Intruder as these aircraft were retired during the 1990s.  
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Following a successful run of more than 400 A and B models, the U.S. Navy 
began taking fleet deliveries of improved F/A-18C (single seat) and F/A-18D (dual 
seat) models in September 1987.  These aircraft carry the Advanced Medium Range 
Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the infrared imaging Maverick air-to-ground 
missile.  Two years later, the C/D models came with improved night attack 
capabilities.  The new components included a navigation forward looking infrared 
(NAVFLIR) pod, a raster head-up display, night vision goggles, special cockpit 
lighting compatible with the night vision devices, a digital color moving map and an 
independent multipurpose color display. 
The multi-mission F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" strike fighter is an upgrade of 
the combat-proven night strike F/A-18C/D.  The Super Hornet provides the battle 
group commander with a platform that has range, endurance, d ordnance carriage 
capabilities comparable to the retired A-6.  The F/A-18E/F aircraft are 4.2 feet longer 
than earlier Hornets, have a 25 percent larger wing area, nd carry 33 percent more 
internal fuel which effectively increases mission range by 41 percent and endurance 
by 50 percent.  The Super Hornet also incorporates two additional weapon stations, 
allowing for increased payload flexibility by mixing and matching air-to-air and/or 
air-to-ground ordnance. The aircraft can also carry the complete complement of 
"smart" weapons, including new joint weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM) and the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW). 
The E/A-18G Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) system was selected by the 
U. S. Navy to replace the EA-6B Prowler aircraft.  A variant of the U.S. Navy F/A-
18F two-crew strike fighter, the E/A-18G combines the F/A-18F strike fighter with 
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the proven Improved Capability III (ICAP III) AEA avionics suite.  Boeing and the 
U.S. Navy signed a five-year System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
contract on December 29, 2003.  The SDD contract runs from 2004 through early 
2009 and encompasses all laboratory, ground and flight tests from component level 
testing through full-up E/A-18G weapons system performance flight testing.  Boeing 
plans to fly the first production E/A-18G in October 2007, with Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC) for the E/A-18G expected in 2009 (Boeing, 2006).  
Navy F/A-18 squadrons deploy as part of a Carrier Airwing (CVW) embarked 
on an aircraft carrier (CV or CVN) and Marine squadrons deploy as part of a land-
based Marine Air Group (MAG).  A notional CVW is comprised of nine squadrons 
including four F/A-18 squadrons, one VAQ electronic attack squadron, one VAW 
airborne early warning squadron, one HS multi-mission helicopter squadron, one VS 
(fixed-wing) or HSL (rotary-wing) anti-submarine warfare squadron, and a C-2 
personnel/cargo transportation detachment.  Each of the ten CVW’s currently in 
operation, operate with a slightly different aircraft nd/or squadron mix based upon 
readiness factors and operational considerations (Tailhook, 2005). 
 Marine F/A-18 squadrons are assigned to Marine Air Groups (MAG’s) and 
deploy in support of marine operations ashore.  Each MAG is home-ported at a 
specific geographic location and their operational deployment schedules are driven 
primarily by world events as opposed to the Navy units which are tied to an aircraft 
carrier’s deployment schedule.  There are some Marine F/A-18 squadrons 
permanently assigned overseas as part of the Unit Deployment Plan (UDP).  
Recently, as a part of a formal integration plan betwe n the Navy and Marine Corps, 
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a schedule exists that has some marine squadrons deploying with Navy CVWs and 
some Navy squadrons in the UDP rotation.   
 The Marines structure their aviation commands a littlediff rently than the 
Navy.  In aircraft squadrons, the number of aircraft varies from 4 up to 24, depending 
on the type of squadron.  A MAG typically has three or m e squadrons and is 
usually all helicopters or all fixed-wing (MAG-36 in Okinawa h s a KC-130 
squadron attached).  A Marine Air Wing (MAW) consists of three or more aviation 
groups.  For example, 1st MAW has 1 fixed-wing MAG (MAG-12) and two 2 
helicopter MAG’s (MAG-36 and the Aviation Support Element, Kaneohe).  2nd & 
3rd MAW each has 2 fixed-wing groups and 2 helicopter MAGs.  4th MAW 
(Reserves) has 4 mixed MAGs.  Today, the U.S. Marines fly two types of fixed-wing 
tactical aircraft, the F/A-18 Hornet and the AV-8B Harrier (Mersky, 1997). 
Figure 1.6 depicts the organizational chart of a notional F/A-18 squadron: 
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There is no set size (number of troops) assigned to any specific Marine 
element although there are some notional guidelines.  The size of an element depends 
primarily upon the type of unit and mission.  For example, an aviation squadron 
would have a different number of troops assigned than an infatry company because 
it has a different mission, different equipment, and therefore different requirements.  
In general, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons have approximately 280 personnel 
assigned including 40 officers and 240 enlisted personnel.   
An F/A-18D/F squadron (the two-seat variant) will have slightly more 
personnel than the single-seat variant, F/A-18 C/E.  Approximately 200 of the total 
240 enlisted personnel serve in the maintenance department as maintenance 
technicians ranging from the most junior enlisted (E-1) to the Maintenance Master 
Chief (Navy) or Maintenance Master Gunnery Sergeant (Marine Corps), both of 
whom are typically E-9’s (the most senior enlisted rank).  The primary mission of the 
aviation squadron is to fly aircraft therefore the unit is organized to prepare and repair 
aircraft.  Most officers are pilots or naval flight officers (80 percent) and most serve 
in either the maintenance or operations department.  The non-flying officers are either 
administrative, intelligence or maintenance experts.  Officers fill collateral billets in 
addition to their flying duties and these assignments are rotational and exist 
throughout the four departments.    
The Commanding Officer (CO) and Executive Officer (XO) have the rank of 
either Commander (O-5) in the Navy or Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) in the Marine 
Corps.  These officers are assigned to a squadron on average fo  three years serving 
initially as the XO for 15-18 months and then rotating intothe CO billet for the 
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remainder of their tour.  Department Heads (DH) are either Navy Lieutenant 
Commanders (O-4) or Marine Majors (O-4) and are assigned to their billets, as is the 
case for all subordinate officers and enlisted personnel, by the CO.  The tour length 
for officers is typically three years while the tour length for enlisted personnel varies 
from three to five years. 
Both Navy and Marine F/A-18 squadrons are manned, trained and equipp d to 
provide all the services necessary to launch, recover and epair their assigned aircraft.  
Most squadrons have 10-12 aircraft assigned although this number can vary based 
upon operational demands and aircraft modification schedules.  Squadrons operate on 
a “tiered readiness” plan.  This plan requires each unit to methodically increase their 
readiness status until they are tasked to fulfill an operational obligation like 
embarking on a carrier or deploying to a land-based site abroad.  Therefore, a 
squadron’s operational tempo varies in pace and intensity given the context of their 
training preparedness.   
Managing safety (avoiding preventable accidents) under a “tiered readiness” 
construct can be quite challenging for squadron leadership for a variety of reasons: 
• Manpower and equipment fluctuations (tiered readiness) 
• Variations in operational intensity (war, turnaround, cold weather, etc.) 
• Changes in organizational climate (new leadership, post-mishap) 
• Schedule accelerations/delays/modifications (surges, extensions, etc.) 
Assessing risk, and implementing organizational controls to mi igate such 
risk, is the challenges to all who have served in positions of authority in these high-
risk organizations.  Military aviation remains inherently risky regardless of 
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operational context and it is often not until an accident occurs that organizational 
factors come under close scrutiny (i.e. mishap investigation).  Reverse trends in 
historical safety rates also provide motivation for institutional action, as was such the 
case in 2003.  Chapter 2 provides a theoretical overview of many of the institutional 
factors that might influence safety performance such as cultural context, human 
resource management practices, organizational climate and follower behavior; factors 
that will be evaluated in subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspective 
 Overwhelming data suggests that the majority of fatalities, injuries and 
mishaps that occur in today’s military are the result of poor decision-making 
(behavior) primarily due to complacency, inattention or negligence (Neubauer, 2006).  
The focus of an effective intervention (i.e. mishap reduction) strategy to mitigate 
hazardous behavior must consider the theories of recognized behavioral scientists and 
then operationalize and test the efficacy of such theories in modern organizations 
using applicable techniques.  Readily acknowledging the field of organizational 
psychology is vast, the focus of this dissertation is to draw on scholarship that 
provides an understanding of what it takes for “leaders to have great effects on their 
followers” (Bass, 1985).   
What do we know about the relationship between management strategies and 
organizational behavior that might lead to mutually-valued outcomes between leaders 
and followers?  Of principal interest to this researcher ar  the concepts of leadership 
style, motivation and organizational climate and how they relate to follower behavior.  
It should be noted, this dissertation is primarily interested in the area of follower 
behavior that translates directly to organizational performance as measured by 
personal injury and mishap statistics, as opposed to other perfo mance measures such 
as fiscal efficiency, operational output (quality) or personnel retention.    
The following sections examine several leading theories n organizational 
behavior focusing specifically on the dimensions that might reveal tangible insights 
into how certain leadership interventions might favorably influence follower safety 
behavior. 
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In light of the mishap data presented in Chapter 1, influe cing the behavior 
(safety performance) of military members has become a priority for DOD policy 
analysts and planners.  Like most industrial managers, the military’s determination to 
find effective ways to reduce or eliminate preventable mishap  is an essential 
ingredient to improving organizational productivity and service delivery.   Safety 
performance in high-tech, high-risk military organizations might be viewed as a 
subset of the “Cause-Effect equals Stimulus-Response” th ory of human behavior.  In 
this theory, behavior is a direct function of rewards and punishments, or the 
expectation of them (McGregor, 1966).  Although there are a gre t many variations 
on the theme, the prevailing theory of cause and effect is a simple stimulus-response 
theory.  It has to do with what forms of reward and punishment (actual or promised) 
lead to what behavior.  Safe behavior is essentially no different than productive or 
honest or hard-working behavior.  If one behaves safely, one is rewarded for such 
performance.   
This is not to suggest that all day-to-day decisions made by military members 
regarding personal conduct and behavior are based solely on this theory.  Behavior is 
affected by many other considerations including an individual’s intelligence, social 
and economic status, values, personality, and so on.  Nevertheless, the primary causal 
relationship underlying attempts to control or induce change i  b havior is almost 
universally conceived in simple stimulus-response terms, with rewards and 
punishments as the primary stimuli.  It is not surprising that he majority of 
organizational factors designed to influence and improve safety performance in 
today’s modern military are designed around these very factors. 
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First and foremost, is the timeless military management approach based upon 
close supervision and the strict enforcement of behavioral n ms.  Regimentation, the 
system of uniformity, strict discipline and rigid order captures the persona of 
historical and even modern military organizations.  Rigid or er, perceived as closely 
monitored and supervised behavior of unit personnel remains the hallmark of a world-
class military machine, harkening imagery of Kim Jong Il’s million strong army 
marching on display in Pyongyang or a ceremonial parade performed by the 8th and I 
barracks of the U.S. Marines.  In these ideologically different, yet thoroughly military 
systems, compliant behavior is rewarded and indifferent or eglectful behavior is 
punished.  The stimulus (rewards/punishments) produces the respons  (behavioral 
compliance). 
Despite attempts to control personal behavior through this simple cause and 
effect arrangement, military personnel continue to make decisions that lie outside the 
expectations of supervisors and managers.  Other organizational factors must be 
influencing behavior besides the lure of rewards or the fear of reprisal.  In view of 
continuing efforts to improve occupational safety in U.S. industries for example, 
some researchers have examined the construct of safety climate (shared perceptions 
of managerial safety policies, procedures and practices) and leadership focusing on 
how the association of these two organizational concepts might influence employee 
behavior (Zohar, 2002).   Despite these modest efforts, little agreement exists over 
how these two factors relate or interact.  Leadership qualities, particularly leader style 
remain context dependent while safety climate is typically self-reported and difficult 
to quantify.  What remains undiscovered is a potential wealth of management insight 
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into methods of influencing workers’ shared perceptions and behaviors in ways that 
might improve workplace safety and organizational output.  Large-scale industrial 
accidents, such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, raised public awareness 
regarding the social and economic costs of what were considered by many experts to 
be preventable mishaps and yet these calamities remain outside the realm of 
mainstream management research (Fahlbruch and Wilpert, 1999; Hofmann et al., 
1995; Shannon et al., 1997).   
Organizing Framework 
This dissertation research endeavors to examine the relationship between 
certain leadership practices and safety climate.  Schneider (1990) reviewed the 
organizational behavior, psychology and leadership scholarship and concluded that 
few studies exist that have documented changes in organizatio al climate that result 
from changes in human resource management practices.    
An orienting framework for understanding the relationship between culture, 
climate, and productivity is depicted in the model in Figure 2.1:
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Deferring a more in-depth discussion of climate and culture until Chapter 3, 
suffice it for now to consider culture as something an organization has (Smircich, 
1983), a system of shared meanings, assumptions and underlying values (Schein, 
1985).  Schein further explains culture as a series of learned responses to situations 
that challenge an organization’s survival or internal integration.  Climate tends to be 
temporal and refers to shared perceptions about the way things are right now or the 
meaningful interpretations of a work environment by the people in it (Schneider, 
1990).  Culture and climate are similar concepts although climate has a referent such 
as “service” or “safety”; thus, organizations can have more than one climate.  
Schneider points out that climate can be understood as a manifest tion of culture and 
that culture has a deeper, less consciously held set of meanings than climate. 
Schneider’s model distinguishes between societal culture and organizational 
culture.  “Organizational leaders must be aware of the fact th t there are many aspects 
of their social environment over which they have little or no control that nevertheless 
have a significant influence on their ability to achieve organizational goals” (United 
States Military Academy, 1988).  While both organizational culture and climate can 
be influenced or changed, culture responds more slowly to organizational influences.  
Culture represents common understandings, habits and acceptble ways of doing 
business that characterize an organization, not unlike those associated with tribes, 
nationalities or ethnic groups.  While most high-tech, modern organizations have 
rapidly changing environments (climates), it takes time, en rgy and a cause-effect 
mentality to bring about cultural change.  “Change is always difficult.  However, 
changes in culture can only be driven by the organization’s leaders” (Bertels, 2003).    
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Cultural Context 
Schneider’s model posits that organizational productivity and member 
behavior are products of societal and organizational cultures and that the latter is 
nested within the domain of the former.  It is important to point out that differences 
between the human resource management practices of similar organizations operating 
in different countries could potentially stem from cultural differences.  For example, 
employee participatory policies such as work hours, work ethic, parenting priority 
and the value of leisure are just a few of the myriad cultural differences that may exist 
between a U.S. company and an international counterpart.  An example might be the 
societal norms for female or youth employees in the textile industry in China 
compared to workers in a similar industry in Sweden or in the United States.  
Schneider’s model suggests that while organizations might have their own 
organizational culture, they tend to mirror the broader environmental component and 
that variance in human resource management is more broadly attributed to societal 
rather than organizational cultural differences.   
Human Resource Management Practices 
 Schneider’s model indicates that what leaders do to increase organizational 
productivity is influenced by the culture within which their organization is embedded.  
Though not limited to those depicted in the model (hiring, placing, rewarding, 
monitoring, developing and promoting) these human resource pra tices in turn shape 
what workers perceive (climate) and influence decision-making across the gamut of 
employee behavior.  Common human resource practices designed to increase 
production, for example, include fiscal incentives, leisure time, supervisory feedback, 
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awards, participatory decision-making processes, organizational realignments and a 
host of reformed or reengineered programs and processes.  Th  list of human resource 
practices is endless and the efficacy of certain choices to target specific organizational 
outputs (e.g. productivity, efficiency, unit cost, pollution, safety, etc.) provides 
adequate uncertainty to keep social scientists interested in his topic.  Research on 
these practices leads some to conclude that much of the correlation is subject to 
varying degrees of influence based upon changes in operational context, work 
environment and personnel differences to name just a few (Guzzo, 1988). 
 Schneider’s model offers an explanation for why certain human resource 
practices increase productivity through their influence on organizational climate.  
Perhaps the most common practice used to raise production is an increase in 
employee’s pay.  If workers receive an increase in pay, they tend to interpret their 
work environment (climate) differently.  In this example, a worker gets a raise which 
in turns shapes a variety of perceptions about how he or she views the people he 
works for and the company that pays them.  In most cases, n employee who receives 
a raise perceives their employers as being more appreciativ  and views the 
environment as one that values his or her contribution to the work process.  Feeling 
valued, an employee may work harder, longer and perhaps with fe er mistakes or 
injuries because they have a different (theoretically more favorable) view about the 
world in which they work.  This explanation seems theoretically plausible.  What 
remains unresolved is the degree to which one can attribute an increase in 
productivity to a specific human resource practice or to the linearity of this influence 
over several employees and over different time frames.   
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 Despite the intuitive nature of this cause and effect construct, few studies exist 
that have documented changes in climate that result from changes in human resource 
management practices.  Climate as a behavior modifier is rarely used perhaps because 
it is difficult to model empirically or because most researchers are interested in the 
influence of human resource management practices on productivity, not climate 
(Schneider, 1990).  Likert (1961) illuminated the difficulty of tracing the effects of 
causal variables like human resource management practices on end-result variables 
such as productivity without considering how intervening variables like climate might 
influence worker behavior.  In addition to quantifying the anticipated influence of a 
specific management practice on productivity, there is the challenge of identifying 
how much behavioral variance can be attributed to an intervening variable such as 
climate.  For example, a practice that makes organizational decision-making more 
participatory might positively shape the environment of al w-ranking employee 
(elevated self-worth, increased sense of empowerment), and yet such a practice might 
negatively affect the perceived environment (climate) of a l ng-term mid-level 
supervisor who views the policy as conciliatory or threatening.  Not all human 
resource practices influence workers with the same magnitude or direction and many 
variables in this model are, and will remain, unaccounted for.  The model merely 
suggests some organizational measures of production can be attri uted to changes in 
climate influenced by certain human resource practices.  
Organizational Climate 
  Organizational climate has different dimensions and many are in play 
simultaneously when leaders choose to implement a human resource practice 
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designed to influence worker behavior.  Schneider’s model suggests climate is 
functional in nature and serves as a basis for employee int rpretation and ultimately 
guides worker decision-making and behavior.  Climate is the psychological process 
that mediates the relationship between the organizational policies, processes and 
procedures and employee attitudes and behavior (Indik, 1965).  Therefore, climate is 
neither environment nor individual behavior; rather, it is a perceptual medium 
through which the effects of the environment on attitudes and behavior pass 
(Schneider, 1990).  Schneider’s model depicts five climate dimnsions that apply 
across a variety of work environments. 
1. Goal emphasis: the degree to which emphasis is placed on work standards and 
organizational output (goals).  Goals affect an individual’s expectation of 
organizational outcomes and outline the details necessary for positive self-
evaluation.  Simply, if one knows what it takes to be successful, then one can feel 
fulfilled when that level of performance is achieved.  In addition, goals serve to 
create benchmarks for individuals developing capabilities and self-efficacy 
expectations (Bandura, 1986).  
2. Means emphasis: the extent to which emphasis is placed on the proper 
techniques, processes and procedures needed for workers to get their jobs done.  
Complementing the self-efficacy contribution of goal emphasis means emphasis 
clarifies how a given level of performance may be achieved.  Schneider (1990) 
points out that means emphasis, like the other climate dim nsions may not always 
provide a positive organizational influence.  For example, organizations that focus 
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on rules enforcement and strict procedural compliance may achieve efficiency at 
the expense of worker frustration or job dissatisfaction. 
3. Reward orientation: the degree to which rewards are commensurate with merit
and achievement.   
4. Task support: the degree to which management provides workers with the 
necessary tools, resources, training and equipment to get the job done. 
5. Socio-emotional support. The extent to which a worker feels like their best 
interests and personal welfare are valued by management.   
Schneider (1990) notes that while the preceding dimensions may be common 
across a variety of work environments, their prominence and emphasis may vary.  
This explains the variation in emphasis among a variety of similar industries such as 
those focused on profit, productivity, image, safety or servic .  While the construct of 
climate is often measured as an individual perception (self-reported), there is ample 
evidence to conclude that climate is often widely shared in organizations for a variety 
of reasons.  First, workers are commonly exposed to the same organizational stimuli 
(policies, processes and procedures) and second, most organizations recruit and retain 
similar people who respond to the organization’s environment as evidenced by 
Schneider’s Attraction-Selection-Attrition framework.  Schneider (1987) asserted that 
“the people make the place” and that organizational culture, climate and practices are 
determined by the people in the organization, not “the nature of external environment, 
or organizational technology, or organizational structure”.  
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Cognitive and Affective States 
Schneider’s model identifies two simple variables (work motivation and job 
satisfaction) as factors influencing worker decision-making a d behavior.  While a 
more detailed description of several cognitive theories advancing the concept of 
worker motivation is deferred to Chapter 3, suffice it for n w to presume that workers 
will be more motivated to perform a certain activity if they perceive a high-valued 
outcome based upon their performance.  Additionally, motivation is influenced by 
worker potential or self-efficacy; the ability to achieve what is assessed to be within 
an individual’s potential.   
In addition to various cognitive sources of motivation, followers simply 
behave based upon how they feel about their job, environment, leadership and 
cohorts.  Job satisfaction is an affective state that influences worker performance, the 
extent to which remains inconclusively debated among behavioral scientists and 
industry experts.  Several studies exist that predict a positive relationship between job 
satisfaction and worker absenteeism (Muchinsky, 1977), job satisfaction and 
employee turnover rate (Muchinsky & Tuttle, 1979), and job satisfaction and 
citizenship behavior (Organ, 1988).  While Schneider highlights the e two influences 
on employee behavior, this list should not be considered comprehensive or complete 
nor should the importance of these factors be overestimated.  Technology is just one 
example of an organizational factor whose behavioral influence is a long way from 
being assessed or understood.   
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Organizational Behaviors 
 Safety performance, like other measures of organizational productivity (e.g. 
physical output, labor costs, etc.) is influenced by three boadly categorized 
organizational behaviors: attachment, performance, and citizenship-related behaviors.  
Attachment behaviors are those individual actions that reflect a desire or conversely, 
a disinterest in remaining a part of a specific organization.  These behaviors would 
include actions designed to improve retainability such as volunteering for a difficult 
assignment or pursuing advanced education or work training to improve one’s 
organizational stock.  To the contrary, certain behaviors such as tardiness, 
absenteeism or quitting are attachment behaviors that can influence organizational 
productivity in unique and potentially significant ways. 
 Performance behaviors are broadly defined and include thos  actions that 
would be typically included in an employee’s job description or on a performance 
appraisal.  In many work environments, some performance behaviors directly relate 
to organizational output such as a pothole repairman while other employees might 
seemingly contribute less to the production equation such as a supply clerk or security 
guard.  This behavior-production calculus varies from individual to individual and 
from production measure to production measure.  In the previous example, a supply 
clerk may contribute more to production measured in terms of employee satisfaction 
than in physical output while a security guard’s contribution o production measured 
in terms of physical security would far exceed their contribution to production 
measured by customer satisfaction or product quality.   
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High reliability organizations (HRO’s) present a unique case if assessing 
safety performance as the focus of organizational productivity.  The performance-
productivity relationship, when it comes to the safety consequences of individual 
behavior, remains exceedingly high for every unit employee.  There are no peripheral 
players when operating high-performance aircraft from ships at sea.  Every unit 
member’s job description includes a performance task that if executed improperly, 
could potentially lead to a catastrophic injury or accident.  Unique to these types of 
military units is an organizational construct that requires all unit members to 
participate in most evolutions directly related to the maintenance, servicing, 
movement, arming, launch and recovery of jet aircraft.  This is primarily due to 
embarked space limitations and the necessity to have all unit members fill a multitude 
of collateral duties.  While few of the unit members actually fly the aircraft, every 
squadron member is equally capable of behavior that could causea preventable 
accident or mishap due to their direct involvement in flight operations.   
Finally, citizenship behaviors are those that are not typically included in a 
formal job description but those that contribute favorably to the productivity of an 
organization.  As the name implies, these behaviors are positive or “pro-social” 
voluntary actions that contribute in some way to organizational performance.  Katz 
(1964) suggests cooperating with others, protecting the organization from unexpected 
dangers, or suggesting organizational improvements are examples of these types of 
behaviors.  These behaviors tend to be subtle and become m re significant in the 
aggregate such as a continued pattern of assisting co-workers by p oviding spare 
supplies or offering work-related advice.  Schneider (1990) suggests that citizenship 
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behaviors serve to maintain the contributions of attachment and performance to 
productivity. 
Productivity 
The concern for organizational productivity runs deep in American society. 
Productivity is synonymous with growth, the accumulation of capital (wealth), and 
ultimately an organization’s success or failure.  While the causes, consequences, and 
measures of productivity are continually debated, the effici ncy ratio of outputs to 
inputs remains central to its conceptual understanding (Guzzo, 1988).  Inputs and 
outputs can be expressed in a variety of ways and no single formula exists to assess 
productivity for all types of organizations.  Economists tend to study how all factor 
inputs are transformed into outputs while industrial-organization l (I/O) psychologists 
focus more on how select inputs relate to outputs.  Additionally, the economist’s unit 
of analysis tends to be nations, states or definable industries uch as farmers, miners, 
etc. whereas a psychologist tends to focus on local productivity at the individual or 
work group level (Mahoney, 1988).  Mahoney (1988) concludes that the 
psychological focus might be better described as a concern for performance, rather 
than productivity.  Therefore, it seems important for policy-makers to define 
productivity as an efficiency concept and to acknowledge that there can be no single, 
ultimate measure of productivity (Campbell, 1988). 
 A major contribution of the psychology perspective is in the measurement of 
work performance and the recognition that individual output is but one component of 
productivity (Schneider, 1984).  Categories of productivity measures common to 
research in I/O psychology are (1) output (including quantity, quality, and value), (2) 
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withdrawal from work (chiefly through absenteeism and turnover), and (3) 
disruptions (such as accidents, strikes, and grievances) (Katzell et al, 1977).  This 
categorization is consistent with the notion of productivity as a ratio of outputs to 
inputs (Campbell, 1988).   
 Factors such as those mentioned above are only partial measures of the overall 
productivity of an organization.  Although only a few productivity factors might be 
assessed in any particular research effort, there exists a presumption that any 
favorable change in one or more of these factors will result in a discernable 
improvement in overall productivity.  In a military unit for example, it seems logical 
to assume that an increase in retention or a reduction in workplace absenteeism would 
improve overall organizational productivity.  While this asociation seems logical, it 
is extremely difficult to attribute empirical evidence to the contributory component of 
each factor.  This research focuses specifically on preventable accidents and mishaps 
as the productivity factor of interest. 
 Organizational productivity is also influenced by individual behavior outside 
the walls of the traditional workplace.  In the military context, non-operational 
injuries and accidents have a direct impact on operational readiness.  As military 
members become more specialized, and as security requirements become more 
stringent, it becomes less and less likely an injured service member could be 
adequately replaced to meet unit deadlines and operational commitments.  Non-
operational accidents (primarily private motor vehicle mishaps) in the Navy account 
for four times as many fatalities as compared to accidents that occur during actual 
military operations (Tables 1.1 and 1.2).  This workforce reduction has an enormous 
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impact on organizational output and productivity and must be considered a principal 
motivation for any leadership intervention designed to reduc  preventable mishaps.   
Safety Performance 
 Along with technical malfunctions and faulty equipment, military accident 
investigators search for the individual or group behavior that may have caused or 
contributed to the mishap.  These investigations strive to detail the organizational 
factors that may have contributed to unsafe behavior.  In many cases involving 
complacency, dereliction of duty, or failure to follow approved procedures (pilot 
error), leadership often bears broad institutional blame in the resultant mishap report.  
When individual behavior or improper decision-making is considered a causal factor, 
investigators look to assess the correlation between leadership and safety climate.  
Following this type of mishap, it is not uncommon for investigators to conclude that 
leadership allowed a climate to exist (or develop) that facilitated, reinforced or 
condoned the unsafe act.  When people are injured or equipment is destroyed, 
leadership often shares the blame with causal factors such a  pilot error, maintenance 
malpractice and or complacency.  Investigators focus on the operating environment at 
the time of the accident and look for organizational influences shaped by leadership 
that may have had a negative effect on safety climate.  Th  leadership practice under 
scrutiny is often the predominant behavior in place at or nea  the time of the mishap.  
What was the operating environment like at or near the tim of the mishap?  This 
applies to organizational factors that might influence individual behavior both on and 
off the job.   
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Considering the above, several factors now point to an assessment of climate 
as the focus of this research and not culture.  Climate tends to be the focus of most 
military mishap investigations.  Climate implies the dominant social and 
organizational forces in play at the time of the mishap occurrence.  Rarely do military 
accident investigators have the time or the training to analyze the complex historical, 
societal or organizational factors that may have influenced culture.  In most 
investigative cases, the dimension under scrutiny (e.g. safety, service, profit, etc.) is 
presumed to be consistent with the broader societal/organizational culture and 
becomes the de facto focus of a mishap investigation (climate).  Additionally, the 
focus of a mishap investigation typically starts with a review of the conduct of the 
organization’s leader and works down the chain of command until culpability can be 
established for decision-making errors or if an unhealthy safety climate can be 
attributed to a flawed leadership practice.  It is difficult to reconstruct the myriad of 
leadership influences (at all levels of the organization) in the aftermath of an accident.  
Often this reconstruction is subject to a variety of institutional flaws and biases. 
Suffice it say, mishap investigators will interview enough people to 
corroborate a correlation between a certain leadership practice and the resultant 
degradation in the unit’s safety climate.  This downstream analysis does little to prove 
the influence leadership has on safety climate.  Therefore, an important objective of 
this dissertation research will be to examine the relationship between leadership and 
safety climate in an effort to formulate interventio strategies that could be 
implemented before the preventable mishap occurs.   
 
  52 
 
With the previous theoretical perspective in mind, this researcher is motivated 
to examine the relationship between certain leadership interventions (best practices), 
organizational climate, and safety performance, with a particular focus on members 
of a specific type of high-risk military unit.  The research project reported on in this 
dissertation relies on a broad understanding of the leadership scholarship presented in 
Chapter 3 with a particular emphasis on theoretical leadership models, organizational 
behavior, and safety climate research.     
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Accident Investigations 
Accident investigations, particularly in catastrophes involving large-scale loss 
of life and substantial destruction of high value infrastructure and assets, often focus 
on leadership in determining causation.  Following the loss of the space shuttle 
Columbia on her return to earth on February 1, 2003, the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (CAIB) spent six months investigating the cause of the mishap.  
In their first report issued on August 26, 2003, the CAIB concluded: 
 “Management decisions made during Columbia’s final flight reflect missed 
opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels, flawed analysis, nd 
ineffective leadership.  Perhaps most striking is the fact that management ─ i cluding 
Shuttle Program, Mission Management Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Flight 
Director and Mission Control ─ displayed no interest in understanding a problem 
and its implications.  In fact, their management techniques unknowingly imposed 
barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting views, and 
ultimately helped create “blind spots” that prevented them from seeing the danger 
the foam strike posed”  (CAIB Vol.1, 2003). 
The CAIB report concluded the physical cause of the mishap was due to a 
breach in the thermal protection system of the leading edge of the left wing cause by 
insulating foam impact damage incurred during lift-off.  The organizational causes of 
the mishap were attributed to a variety of factors including the Space Shuttle 
program’s history and culture, resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule 
pressures and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight.  Cultural traits 
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and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop. Some 
included: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engi e ring practices; 
organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety 
information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated 
management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of 
command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization’s 
rules.  In the report’s executive summary, members concluded: 
 “It is the Board’s opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to adapt 
to new realities.  NASA’s culture must change and the Board intends the following 
recommendations to be steps toward effecting this change” (CAIB Vol.1, 2003).  
While none of the report’s Return-To-Flight (RFT) recommendations took on 
the linkage between leadership and safety climate, they did offer Opinion 10-12.1 
regarding leadership training for NASA executives and managers:   
“Managers at many levels in NASA, from GS-14 to Associate Administrator, 
have taken their positions without following a recommended standard of training d 
education to prepare them for roles of increased responsibility. While NASA has a 
number of in-house academic training and career development opportunities, the 
timing and strategy for management and leadership development differs across 
organizations. Unlike other sectors of the Federal Government and the military, 
NASA does not have a standard agency-wide career planning process to prepare its 
junior and mid-level managers for advanced roles. These programs range from 
academic fellowships to civil service education programs to billets in military-
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sponsored programs, and will allow NASA to build a strong corps of potential 
leaders for future progression.”  
Opinion 10.12-1: “NASA should implement an agency-wide strategy for 
leadership and management training that provides a more consistent and integrated 
approach to career development.  This strategy should identify the management and 
leadership skills, abilities, and experiences required for each level of advancement.  
NASA should continue to expand its leadership development partnerships with the 
Department of Defense and other external organizations” (CAIB Vol.1, 2003). 
 It is not surprising that the CAIB would recommend the military model of 
leadership training, considering the chairman, Hank Gehman is a retired four-star 
admiral and four of the remaining twelve members included three Air Force Generals 
and a Navy Admiral.  Despite many sound and comprehensive change 
recommendations, the CAIB failed to explain what aspects of he military leadership 
model could have prevented, or might potentially prevent in the future, a similar 
occurrence.  While many of the management shortfalls and remedies are addressed in 
the report, there is an over-supply of leadership criticism and an under-supply of 
leadership prescription.   
Little research has been done examining the correlation between a particular 
leadership practice or intervention and its effect on safety climate; the very climate 
that allowed many of the organizational ailments to develop in pre-Columbia NASA.  
Yet in the business of operating highly complex and potentially d ngerous systems, 
the military model of leadership is held in high regard.  Following the accident at the 
Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 
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March, 1979, the Kemeny Commission was appointed by President Carter to 
investigate the cause.  Technical experts readily determined the physical cause of the 
accident included clogged condensate polisher lines, moisture n instrument air lines, 
false signals to the turbine, and emergency feed water pump valves set closed, instead 
of open.  
Members of the commission battled unsuccessfully to determine an 
organizational cause.  Many industry representatives of the commission argued that 
high-risk systems did not have to be operated any differently than low-risk systems.  
Harry C. McPherson, an influential Washington lawyer and reputed power broker in 
the Lyndon Johnson administration argued nuclear power plants should do no more 
than a General Motors plant; there is no difference.  The commission could not reach 
consensus in determining if high-risk industries required a unique model of 
organizational management and leadership.  In what many analysts consider a polite 
concession, Harry McPherson commented on how any difference might be handled: 
“There is a model of a nuclear system different from the one we have in our country, 
in our commercial power system.  That’s the naval reactor program, run with an iron 
fist, every decision made at the top, nobody budging down below, intense training, 
and intense discipline on the operators” (Perrow, 1984). 
These two historical examples describe mishaps in highly technical and 
complex organizations.  In both cases, the physical and organizational causes of the 
accidents were thoroughly investigated and their results were highly publicized.  In 
both accidents, investigators recommended many changes including incorporating 
traditional military leadership models to correct ailments attributable to poor safety 
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climate.  Despite the effort that went into the Kemeny Commission and the CAIB, 
neither report explains why they conclude military leadership correlates positively 
with safety climate.   
Leadership Accountability 
As technology increasingly pushes the lethality and potential risk of operating 
complex military hardware, the success or failure of these units continues to be 
attributed to the leaders who are expected to manage a myri d of environmental and 
organizational forces.  “In industrial, educational and in m litary settings and in social 
movements, leadership plays a critical, if not the most critical role, and as such, is an 
important subject for study and research” (Bass, 1990).  
Leaders get the blame when bad things happen in the organizatio s they lead.  
This blame can be rightfully justified if a leader makes a poor decision or makes no 
decision at all and the unfortunate outcome can be linked to the leader’s action or 
inaction.  It remains crucial for governments, and the indiv duals who constitute 
them, to continue their search for innovative mechanisms for making government 
work better and to serve society better (Peters, 2001).  At all levels, leaders in 
government are often blamed when the organization they lead fails to deliver the 
expected service or the level of service delivery is less than either published standards 
or the public’s expectations.  During and after Hurricane Katrina, many leaders 
(federal, state, and local) were highly criticized for providing inadequate leadership 
during a time of national emergency.  When governmental services are inadequate or 
tardy, leadership often gets the blame.  In cases such as government’s failed response 
to a natural disaster, establishing the linkage between the cause (poor leadership) and 
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the outcome (unnecessary fatalities, property loss, slow evacuations, etc.) becomes 
the investigative focus.  These disasters get international attention because of the 
sheer cost to people and property.  Table 3.1 reveals almost $100 billion in property 
losses alone due to Hurricane Katrina.    
Table 3.1 Hurricane Katrina, Estimated Damage1 
Category  Damage 
Housing  $67 billion 
Consumer durable goods $7 billion 
Business property $20 billion 
Government property $3 billion 
Total $96 billion 
1Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Feb 2006. 
 
When the water from Katrina had finally receded and the fed ral investigation 
ran its course, the final report included specific leadership recommendations designed 
to prevent future occurrences of flawed federal, state and local responses to disaster 
victims.  These recommendations included improved inter and intra-agency 
communications, diligent leadership oversight, and strict performance accountability.   
During times of public crisis, leaders are often held brutally accountable when 
their actions fail to maintain the public trust.  Heads should and do roll when public 
leaders fail those they are supposed to serve.  Katrina served as a remarkable example 
of how emotional and serious assigning blame can be.  Accountability in government 
should be insensitive to party, position or public sentiment.  It is common for 
leadership to shoulder the blame when bad things happen during regular operations 
that involve high-risk.  Many government agencies face enormous risk as they go 
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about their routine.  NASA, DEA and FEMA are just a few xamples of federal 
agencies expected to conduct flawless operations in extremely dangerous 
circumstances.   
Perhaps no agency is perceived as being any more high-risk than the armed 
forces.  When bad things happen in the course of routine, yet high-risk military 
training, leaders must be held accountability for both their own actions and the 
actions of their subordinates.  In addition to shouldering the blame for preventable 
injuries and mishaps, military leaders are expected to imple ent the organizational 
changes that will prevent future occurrences.  
Distinguishing between Management and Leadership 
Surveying the literature on leadership is daunting.  It is interdisciplinary 
(reflected in literature, science, theology, philosophy, and medicine) and dates back to 
the oldest known literary texts and texts handed down by oral tradition.  Little 
consensus has been reached on a definition of leadership that suits all areas of study 
in all occupational or professional contexts.  Leadership tudies cut across business 
administration, social and behavioral science, politica , theological, and historical 
studies and the more contemporary, “new science” (Wheatley,1999).  Defining 
military leadership is equally elusive.  Complicating matters is the confusion over 
what management is and what leadership is.  This distinction is important.  It is not 
surprising that a variety of business management and public management scholars 
have effectively addressed this distinction. 
Ronald A. Heifetz, Director of the Leadership Education Project at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, offers a practical distinction between management 
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and leadership by focusing on output: technical work (management) versus adaptive 
work (leadership) (Heifetz, 2003).  Technical work is employed in the types of 
situations where the problem can be identified and the solution can be readily 
implemented.  Technical work is prominent within the military profession.  Service 
members are trained to be knowledgeable of their technical profession and to be 
prepared to solve complex problems with precision and accury.  Heifetz contrasts 
technical work with the more challenging circumstances where the problem, and quite 
possibly the solution, requires a certain level of learning on the part of the leader and 
the followers.  This is what he calls adaptive work; the essence of leadership.  It is in 
these types of situations that the center of responsibility for work shifts from the 
leader to the group; the learning process that can identify problems and formulate 
remedies must yield to the provisions of adaptive work. 
Richard Danzig, the former Secretary of the Navy (appointed in 1998), has 
written broadly on the subjects of law, national security and military leadership, 
especially leadership during crises.  A Yale law school graduate and Rhodes Scholar, 
the Secretary discovered the story of Sir Ernest Shackleton, the great Antarctic 
explorer, after reading Alfred Lansing’s Endurance.  The Secretary says he used the 
Endurance story to illustrate the kind of leadership he wanted to ncourage in the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  For him, the Shackleton model works n many levels: 
leadership in response to danger and adversity, working in extreme environments, 
surviving unforeseen challenges, flexibility in planning, and gaining and retaining the 
loyalty of those in your command.  Trapped during an Antarctic expedition and 
through great danger and under tremendous pressure, Shackleton kep  his crew 
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together, maintained morale, and improved on his escape plans until he got everyone 
to safety.  Mr. Danzig believes Shackleton had some flaws.  “He is not the complete 
leader,” he says, “but he is an exceptional example of a set of traits in a leader that we 
highly value.  Warfare constantly requires adaptation and in ovation, and he was 
extraordinary in that.” (Morrell, 2001) 
John W. Gardner, an author, activist, advisor to four presidents, and winner of 
the Presidential Medal of Freedom, wrote extensively on the subject of leadership.  
According to Gardner (1990), the word manager usually indicates that the individual 
holds a directive post in an organization, presiding over the process by which the 
organization functions.  This includes allocating resources and making the best 
possible use of people.  While suggesting that even the most visionary leader is often 
faced with common managerial tasks, he says leaders and le der/managers 
distinguish themselves from the general run of managers in at least six respects: 
1. They think longer term—beyond the day’s crisis. 
2. They understand the unit they are heading in relation to a larger reality. 
3. They reach and influence constituents beyond their jurisdict ons and boundaries. 
4. They put heavy emphasis on vision, values and motivation—understanding 
intuitively the non-rational and unconscious elements in leader-constituent 
interaction. 
5. They have the political skill to cope with the conflicting requirements of multiple 
constituencies. 
6. They think in terms of renewal.  The leader seeks the revisions of process and 
structure required by the ever-changing reality (Gardner, 1990). 
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 John P. Kotter, the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of Leadership at the 
Harvard Business School, is a prominent author and speaker on the subject of 
management and leadership.  According to Kotter (1999), leadership is different from 
management, but not for the reasons most people think.  Applied in a fundamentally 
business styled context, Kotter suggests management and leadership are two 
distinctive and complementary systems of action.  Leadership complements 
management; it does not replace it.  Management is about coping with complexity.  
Its practices and procedures are largely a response to one of the most significant 
developments of the 20th century; the emergence of large organizations.  Without 
good management, complex organizations tend to become chaotic in ways that 
threaten their very existence.   
 Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change.  Kotter suggests the 
pace of technological change and the volatility of markets has made leadership so 
important in recent years.  Major changes are more and more necessary to survive and 
compete effectively in this new environment.  Kotter uses a simple military analogy 
to make his point, “coping with complexity and coping with change—shape the 
characteristic activities of management and leadership.  A eacetime Army can 
usually survive with good administration and management up and down the 
hierarchy, coupled with good leadership concentrated at the very top.  A wartime 
Army, however, needs competent leadership at all levels.  No one yet has figured out 
how to manage people effectively into battle; they must be led.”(Kotter, 1999)  
Using the Kotter framework, the following figure identifies the types of 
activities associated with each system of action.   
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Table 3.2 Management and Leadership Activities, (Kotter, 1999) 
Management (coping with complexity) Leadership (coping with change) 
Planning and budgeting Constructive change 
Setting targets and goals Developing vision of future 
Allocating resources Strategies to achieve vision 
Organizing and staffing Aligning people 
Control and problem solving Motivating and inspiring 
  
 Applying business models to management and leadership training is 
extremely relevant in today’s modern military.  The Navy is altering its tradition-
bound corporate culture to deal with modern issues.  In orderto modernize various 
strategies within the organization, the Navy established a new position, Executive 
Learning Officer (ELO), to initiate customized learning programs for senior naval 
leadership.  For most of the Navy's history, high-ranking officers were selected 
according to how well they operated their particular weapon system, whether it was a 
surface ship, submarine or airplane, said retired Adm. Phil Quast, the first person to 
serve as the Navy's ELO.   “That's all-important when you're operating submarines 
and airplanes, but when you get to the admiral level, only about 19 jobs out of the 230 
actually involve the operational Navy,” Quast said. “The rest are in a support 
function, and running the business that supports the acquisition, the training and all 
the other things associated with building a huge organization like the Navy.  So we 
have to develop those skills at a senior level.”  The ELO provides FLAG/SES-level 
leaders, made up of between 500 and 600 admirals and their civilian counterparts, 
with a blended learning program. “It's business-savvy-type instruction,” Quast said. 
“We try to take the business practices that are being utilized in the private sector.”  
“The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has articulated a set of enduring corporate 
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competencies required of all Navy senior leaders,” Deputy ELO Jeffrey Munks said. 
“They include resource allocation, human capital management, change or 
transformation management, information technology management and leadership. 
What Admiral Quast has done is created a very rigorous and intensive residential 
learning experience for Navy senior leaders, called the executive business course 
(EBC) that builds on those five core competencies.”(Summerfield, 2004)  
Modern theory often complements traditional doctrine.  Command At Sea, 
originally published in 1943, has become a required reference source for the naval 
community.  Widely regarded as the most important guide for any officer taking over 
their first command, this book, written by the very officers who commanded a variety 
of naval vessels in World War II, makes the distinction between management and 
leadership quite clear.  Leadership falls into six easily identifiable categories: 
personal characteristics, moral behavior, personal reltions with seniors, personal 
relations with juniors, proper counseling and communications, a d the responsibility 
to train.  Management deals directly with the maintenance, upkeep, seaworthiness and 
combat readiness of the vessel under your charge (Stavridis & Mack, 1999). 
Defining Leadership 
Examining the distinction between management and leadership could continue 
indefinitely.  This author is satisfied that although the two functions are 
complementary, they can be evaluated and assessed independently based upon an 
examination of an individual’s organizational influence, role and the operating 
environment (context).  Let us now move to the topic of defining leadership. 
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 The early literature on leadership was dominated by attempts to define its 
essential characteristics.  This exercise has generated much debate and difference in 
perspective.  According to Bass (1997), leadership has been conceived as the focus of 
group processes, as a matter of personality, as a matter of inducing compliance, as the 
exercise of influence, as particular behaviors, as a form of persuasion, as a power 
relation, as an instrument to achieve goals, as an effect of interaction, as a 
differentiated role, as an initiation of structure, and as many combinations of these 
definitions. 
 Among the different definitions of leadership found in the literature are: 
1. Leadership as personality:  This literature focuses on discovering the leadership 
personality and examining what it is about the character, underlying motivations, 
and basic behavioral styles that make an individual a leader.  Writers were drawn 
to the obviously exceptional, and at times extreme, personalities of particular 
leaders (Alexander the Great, Abraham Lincoln), and thus so ght the explanation 
of leadership in the similarities among these personalities (Bogardus, 1928). This 
line of inquiry has not been supported by the results of empirical research. 
2. Leadership as an outcome of group process:  This line of research focuses on 
group dynamics and defines leadership as an outcome of this dynamic, rather than 
as a separable phenomenon in its own right (Cooley, 1902).  Research has 
confirmed that group dynamics are an important determinant of leader behavior, 
but that leadership also has a separable effect on groups (Bas , 1981). 
3. Leadership as influence:  In contrast to the group dynamics perspective, other 
writers have defined leadership as the process of exerting individual influence on 
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followers’ behaviors.  This literature defines leadership as the power to persuade 
(Stogdill, 1950), both through the control over resources (rewards and 
punishments), and via the exercise of charisma and argument.    
4. Leadership as a pattern of activities and focus of attention and effort:   This 
research focuses on what leaders do when providing leadership.  Kotter (1999), 
Laurie (2000), and Heifetz (1994) emphasize the set of responsibilities that 
leaders must meet and the type of focus and actions needed to accomplish them.  
Both Laurie and Heifetz emphasize leaders’ important role in stepping outside the 
day-to-day crises to provide a broader perspective on the challenges and 
opportunities facing the organization to improve their effectiv ness in setting the 
context, framing the problems, and mobilizing the staff to work on those 
problems.  A significant subset of this literature identifies the creation, 
management, and, when necessary, transformation of organizatio al culture as the 
essential functions and key competency of leadership (Schein, 1999).  
Paul Bartone (2003), Director of the Leader Development Rsearch Center at 
the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, suggests military leadership is leadership in a 
military context.  The previous discussion about management and leadership offers 
ample evidence that leadership is correlated directly to the context of the operational 
environment under which the construct of leadership is manifested.  Leadership has 
as many definitions as people have opinions.  There are almost as many definitions of 
leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept (Stogdill, 
1974).  
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Arriving at a definition of leadership that captures all social influences in all 
specialized roles is unnecessary.  Broadly defined, leadership is both a social 
influence process as well as a particular, specialized rol  of the “leader” (Bartone, 
2003).  Understanding that leadership is the synthesis of personality, interpretation, 
influence, choice and action is satisfactory enough to move to a deeper examination 
of the leadership frameworks that help explain the leadership process. 
Leadership Theories 
There exists a multitude of theories and metaphors designed to explain the 
leadership process.  The “endowment theory” or “great-man theory”, although largely 
dismissed by contemporary scholars, explained leadership throug  the personality and 
characteristics of some of the world’s most notable leaders.  Leadership, seenas a 
quality of greatness, was manifested in a heroic persona (traits).  The rise to power 
and influence was determined by physical qualities and personal talents and skills.  
Although traditionally considered to be value free, endowment theorists placed 
extraordinary influence as its highest principle (Heifetz, 1994).  
Xenophon, the author of the famous book of adventure the Anabasis (or The 
March Up Country), tells his personal account of participating in the expedition led 
by Cyros the Younger against his older brother, the emperor Artaxerxes II of Persia, 
in 401 BC.  Using primarily mercenaries left unemployed after the Peloponnesian 
War, Cyros fought and defeated Artaxerxes in the Battle of Cunaxa.  Cyros was killed 
during the battle and the other Greek general, Clearchos of Sparta, was betrayed and 
executed after a peace conference. The mercenaries, known as the Ten Thousand, 
found themselves without leadership deep in hostile territory and elected Xenophon as 
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one of their leaders.  Xenophon's record of the entire expedition against the Persians 
and the journey home is one of the first written accounts of an analysis of the 
character traits of a leader.   It is an example of a type of leadership analysis that has 
come to be known as “Great man” theory.  In the Anabasis, Xenophon describes the 
character of the younger Cyros, saying, "Of all the Persians who lived after Cyros the 
Great, he was the most like a king and the most deserving of an empire” (Rouse, 
1964).  Chapter six describes the character traits of five def ated generals who were 
turned over to the enemy. The Greek general Clearchos is quoted as saying that "a 
soldier ought to be more frightened of his own commander than of the enemy."  
Menon is described as a man whose is motivated to acquire great riches while Agias 
the Arcadian and Socrates the Achaian are remembered for their courage and their 
consideration for friends (Rouse, 1964).  
Leadership theorists, reacting to the weaknesses in the “endowment theory” of 
leadership argued that history was much more than the effects of these men on their 
times.  “Situationalists” disputed a common set of objectiv  traits and pursued an 
explanation that suggests leadership emerges from the unique circ mstances faced by 
people with varying talents, personalities and styles.  From the unique challenge of 
the times, emerge people with the talent, insight and depth to lead based upon the 
situation.  According to Heifetz, the times produce the person and not the other way 
around.  This behavioral theory explains why some people exc l at certain tasks and 
fail at others.  The value at the heart of the “situatonalist” view is preeminence and is 
not radically different from the great-man theory.  Both theories focus on the value of 
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influence, a concept that fits nicely with the traditional methods of leadership training 
employed in classrooms filled with prospective military leaders.   
“Contingency theory” is a modern approach that blends the great-man (trait) 
approach with the “situationalist” view.  Rather than rejecting the legitimacy of these 
rather short-sighted explanations, there are situations hat call for different 
personalities and different behaviors; in essence, a combination of the two traditional 
views.  This notion expands the realm of action and calls for an appropriate style of 
leadership contingent on the particular situation.  Great leaders can still emerge 
although it is not necessary in times of great challenge.  There exists a variety of 
behaviors that can meet extraordinary challenges and the lead rship quality that 
emerges is contingent on the scope and novelty of the task.  This theory explains the 
utility in a variety of leadership styles that might be required to accomplish certain 
tasks.  An autocratic approach might be more effective than a democratic or 
consensus approach in certain situations and visa versa.  Influence and control remain 
the values at the heart of this theory.  Heifetz (1999) acknowledges that influence is 
the common reference point for understanding leadership in a military context.   
Contemporary leadership theories like the “attribution theory” look for a cause 
and effect relationship as a means to determine the proper leadership type (style).  
The cause of poor performance can be attributed to something internal to the follower 
(e.g. lack of ability or effort) or to external problems beyond the follower’s control 
(e.g. lack of resources, information, or training).  There are two stages to the 
attribution theory: (1) leader tries to determine the cause of performance inadequacy, 
(2) leader tries to select an appropriate response to fix the problem. 
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The “transactional theory” (Bass, 1985) describes leadership as a series of 
transactions between leaders and followers.  This “transactional approach” is rooted 
in reciprocal arrangements between leaders and followers and describes a leader’s 
rise to authority based upon sustaining relationships.  Transactional leadership 
provides a foundation of exchange of something of value between the leader and the 
follower as a means to generate action.  A transactional leader gains influence and 
authority by justifying action and eliminating their followers cause for uncertainty.  
Bargaining and persuasion are the essence of authority.  Although based on a “value-
free” set of pseudo-economic principles, influence remains at the very center of the 
transactional model.  Transactional leaders: focus more on stability than change, 
emphasize normal, work-related activities and foster motivation by appealing to 
followers’ self-interests.  Styles of transactional leaders are:  
1. Contingent/reward: leader contracts exchange of rewards for effort, promises 
rewards for good performance, recognizes accomplishments. 
2. Management by exception (active): leader watches and searches for deviations 
from rules and standards, takes corrective action.  
3. Management by exception (passive):  leader intervenes only if standards are not 
met. 
 “Transformational leadership” arranges leaders and followers in a mutual 
process of raising one another to higher levels of morality and motivation (Burns, 
1978).  Considered the most important perspective on leadership in recent years 
(Bartone, 2003), transformational leaders raise the bar by ppealing to higher ideals 
and values of followers.  In doing so, they may model th  values themselves and use 
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charismatic methods to attract people to the values and to the leader.  Some scholars 
consider transformational leadership to be a modern derivative of Max Weber’s 
original discussions of charismatic leadership who described it as a form of social 
authority based on perceived exceptional and inspirational qualities of the leader, 
rather than to rational-legal authority or authority based on tradition (Weber, 1947).  
Transformational leadership occurs when leaders promote awareness and acceptance 
of the purposes and the mission of the group and then motivate employees to look 
beyond their own self-interest for the good of the group.  Burns' (1978) view is that 
transformational leadership is more effective than transactional leadership, where the 
appeal is to more selfish concerns.  An appeal to social values thus encourages people 
to collaborate, rather than working as individuals (and potentially competitively with 
one another).  Burns also views transformational leadership as an ongoing process 
rather than the discrete exchanges of the transaction l approach.  Transformational 
leaders focus on a collective vision and seek to communicate it effectively to those 
being led.  Proponents of transformational leadership clam it: increases the 
organization's productivity, generates higher commitment, increases follower trust in 
management, enhances employee satisfaction with both their job and the leader and 
reduces employee stress and increases well-being. 
 Transformational leadership advocates suggest superior leadership 
performance is seen when leaders broaden and elevate the interests of their 
subordinates, when they generate awareness and acceptane among the subordinates 
of the purposes and mission of the group, and when they move their followers to go 
beyond their own personal interests for the good of those they lead (Burns, 1978).  
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Transformational leaders motivate followers to do more than they may have expected 
or were told to do.  These leaders elevate the awareness about the significance of 
organizational outputs and the ways of achieving them, and subseq ently get 
followers to place the interests of the unit above their own.  This motivation tends to 
raise the confidence of workers and expand their needs.  The heightened level of 
motivation is linked to three empirically derived factors f transformational 
leadership (Bass, 1985; Avolio & Bass, 1988; Bass & Avolio, 1989; Hater & Bass, 
1988).   
1. Charisma and Inspiration.  Transformational leaders have great power and 
influence over followers, inspire loyalty to the organization, command respect, 
and have an ability to see what is, and what is not important (Yammarino, 
Spangler & Bass, 1989).  These qualities in their leader give followers a sense of 
mission and inspire an increased work ethic and commitment.  People who serve 
transformational leaders tend to develop a close connectio  or feeling about their 
leader based upon trust in their abilities and confidence in their behavior, 
particularly organizational decision-making.  Charismatic leaders excite, arouse, 
and inspire their subordinates (House, 1977).  
2. Individualized Consideration.  People who work for transformational leaders 
are inspired to work hard and are likely to be committed to their organization.  
Transformational leaders go beyond the importance of gettin  the job done and 
focus a significant amount of their effort in servicing a follower’s need for self 
improvement and growth (both personal and professional).  This is the 
transformational quality of this leadership style.  Subordinates’ needs and abilities 
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are transformed or elevated to higher levels.  More specifically, this quality is 
viewed operationally as mentoring or coaching programs that focus on individual 
worker improvement including feedback and appraisal systems that provide 
performance feedback and follow-up.  A critical factor in this dimension is a 
leader’s ability to connect or link an individual’s needs to the organization’s 
mission making the two dimensions compatible and complementary (Bass, 1985). 
3. Intellectual Stimulation.  Transformational leaders retain the capacity to make 
followers feel like they are connected to the organization in more than just a 
physical, productivity oriented sense.  Followers are challenged intellectually to 
engage workplace problems balancing professional knowledge with the r own 
personal beliefs and values.  This leadership quality motivates worker creativity, 
inspires individual awareness, and promotes a broader more effective approach to 
workplace problem-solving.  This dimension is a potential source of 
organizational evolution, adaptation, and change (Bass, 1985). 
Variation in Leadership Style 
 To this point, it has been satisfactory to describe leadership in a broad, 
theoretical sense focusing both on what leaders are, and what leaders do.  Describing 
leadership in terms of personal qualities, process or group performance only deepens 
the curiosity for an understanding of what variables might influence the development 
or application of alternative leadership styles.  While social and behavioral scientists 
have studied personality, cognitive ability and problem-solving ability as predictors 
of leadership style, even Bass (1998) admits that little is known about how leaders 
develop to be transformational, versus transactional (Bartone, 2003).       
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 Research has been conducted on both cognitive and non-cognitive var ables 
that might explain the difference between effective and ineffective leaders.  Fiedler 
developed a model aimed at uncovering the contribution of two cognitive resources: 
intelligence and experience (Fiedler, 1986).  Intelligence tends to improve leader 
performance in situations that are complex; the predominant style being very 
directive in nature.  Conversely, intelligence wanes i  relevance in highly stressful 
situations and a leader’s performance is improved relative to their level of practical 
experience.  The implications in a military context are keen.  In related research, 
isolating problem-solving ability as a predictor of leadership performance has yielded 
modestly consequential results.  The difficulty lies in task definition (simple versus 
complex) and is compounded by the interrelatedness of problem-solving with other 
cognitive and non-cognitive variables.  
 Practical intelligence or “tacit knowledge” is another cognitive variable that 
has recently received much interest by military researchers.  On the job experiences 
provide opportunities for officers to not only apply the leadership doctrine they 
learned in the classroom, but also provides a context for acquiring new knowledge 
about leadership not well supported by doctrine or formal training.  The tacit 
knowledge for military leadership project is aimed at understanding the role of 
operational assignments in the development of effective leaders.  An example might 
be the tacit knowledge an individual gains in the process of olving practical 
problems.  It represents the ability to learn from performing poorly-defined, context-
specific practical tasks that do not necessarily have clear answers.  Based upon a 
survey of over 1,500 army officers, an inventory of questions and problem scenarios 
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was developed to measure tacit knowledge.  Results showed that tacit knowledge for 
military leaders was a better predictor of leadership effectiveness (as measured by a 
variety of organizational assessments) than verbal ability, or rank. (Johnson, 2001) 
 Non-cognitive factors such as personality continue to emerge as a focal point 
in modern research on the subject of leadership studies.  Conceptually, personality 
traits are generalized consistencies in styles of thinking, feeling and acting, and thus 
can be expected to affect many aspects of vocational behavior including leadership 
(Bartone, 2003).  Acknowledging the influence of situational context and 
organizational arrangements in the formulation of a leader’s strategy to succeed, one 
cannot dismiss the relevance of personality in determining how well these plans are 
formulated and pursued.  One of the long-held goals of psychology has been to 
establish a model that can conveniently describe human personality with the intent of 
improving general understanding and research.  One of the mor  prominent models in 
contemporary psychology is what is known as the five-factor model of personality.  
This theory incorporates five different variables into a conceptual model for 
describing personality.  These five different factors are oft n referred to as the "Big 
5": Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness.  The five-factor theory is among the newest models developed for 
the description of personality, and this model shows promise to be among the most 
practical and applicable models available in the field of personality psychology 
(Digman, 1990).   
 As it became evident to many psychologists that, mathematically, 
combinations of five factors were useful in describing personality, there was a need to 
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clearly define what these factors were. As could be expected, there was some 
disagreement.  One dissenter from the five-factor theorists was renowned 
psychologist H. J. Eysenck.  Eysenck felt that due to overlaps in the five factors and 
their correlates, in fact a three-factor model was more appropriate and accurate.  His 
theory is called the PEN model (which stand for psychotiism, extroversion, 
neuroticism) (Eysenck, 1998), or sometimes is even shortened to the two factor E-IN 
model (extroversion-introversion, neuroticism) (Eysenck, 1998).  According to 
Eysenck, factor analysis has improved the situation but the problem of naming factors 
remains unresolved (Eysenck, 1998).  Many psychologists support Eysenck's PEN 
model.  However, of the major "factor-analytic models”, the Big Five dominates the 
landscape of current psychological research.  Through extensive debating and 
experimenting, there is currently a general consensus in the realms of scholarly 
psychology as to the identity of the five factors, and their basic interpretations and 
values to analysis of personality. 
 Several longitudinal studies of the five-factor model have been conducted 
among military units yielding fairly consistent results.  In a study conducted among 
cadets at West Point, conscientiousness and agreeableness wer  correlated with high 
leadership aptitude and performance (Bartone, Snook & Tremble, 2002).  High 
conscientiousness and high openness along with low extravrsion seemed to predict 
leader performance among Australian Army officers (McCormack &Mellor, 2002). 
 With the increase in interest on transformational le dership, the five-factor 
model has been expanded in an attempt to capture those elements of personality that 
might not be captured by the “big five”.  Personality hardiness has been determined to 
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be a significant predictor of leadership performance and has been the focus of a 
variety of studies using military subjects.  Defined in a military context, hardiness 
(sometimes referred to as dispositional resilience) refers to a cognitive personality 
variable reflecting the typical way soldiers interpret po entially stressful events.  
Hardiness is thought to consist of three sets of cognitive styles – characteristic ways 
people interpret the world (Maddi, 1990).  Commitment reflects ones’ tendency to 
find meaning and purpose in potentially stressful events.  Control refers to the 
tendency to believe that one is capable of managing the response to a stressful event.  
Challenge describes the tendency to see potentially threatening events as 
opportunities for personal growth.  Thus, more hardy soldiers are thought to be more 
resilient to the potential demands of stressors becaus they tend to see meaning in 
their lives, tend to feel in control of events which might affect them, and prefer 
challenging environments over safety and security (Sinclair & Oliver, 2003). 
 In a study of West Point cadets, hardiness was the most consistent predictor of 
military grades (formal grades assigned to each cadet at the end of every semester).  
Analysis of the same cohort revealed that although hardiness is not significantly 
correlated with transformational leadership, the facet of commitment is moderately 
correlated with transformational leadership style (Bartone, 2003).  Developing 
subordinate commitment is a fundamental tenet of transformational leaders and these 
results seem to substantiate the tendency of transformational leaders to develop 
subordinates who can make sense of highly stressful situations.  This notion of 
“sense-making” is rooted in how followers interpret and ultima ely strengthen their 
commitment to an organization or unit. 
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Another interesting variable in assessing the difference i  leadership style and 
performance is gender.  The most recent class (Class of 2008) to enter the service 
academies included 20.1% (250) women at Annapolis and 16.2% (198) women at 
West Point. (USNA/USMA, 2004)   While Bass (1998) concluded that women tend 
to be more transformational in their leadership style whn compared to men, Bartone, 
Snook & Tremble (2002) determined that women cadets at West Point scored higher 
in agreeableness and hardiness than their male counterparts.  These results would 
suggest that female cadets would tend to be more transformati nal in their leadership 
style than their male counterparts because of increased agr eableness, and also be 
capable of more effectively moderating the stress of military service because of their 
increased hardiness. 
 Much has been accomplished in the field of leadership studie .  While 
psychologists and sociologists have assessed many of the personal variables that 
might influence leadership style development and leader performance, much research 
still remains.  Although personality, experience and gender remain at the heart of 
contemporary military research, many situational factors or conditions have yet to be 
considered as possible direct or interacting effects on leader development and leader 
performance.  Assessing the impact of contextual variables under the cognizance of 
military planners and policy makers and their influence on leader development is of 
keen interest to this author.  Examples might include promotion, awards and/or 
personal evaluation policies, or technology, infrastructure and/or equipment 
differences.  
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Models of Leadership 
 Explaining organizational behavior is at the heart of leadership modeling 
efforts.  The majority of these efforts consider easily measurable, first-order 
explanations for personnel stimulation and motivation o work.  Research has focused 
primarily on short-term, readily observable leader-follower arrangements and failed 
to assess the influence of some of the qualities and characteristics of today’s most 
charismatic leaders (McCall, 1977).  Typical research fouses on antecedent 
conditions, such as work environment, leader personality, power arrangements and 
information flow, along with leader decision style versus the orientation of leader-
follower relations.  Organizational outputs measurements typically include member 
job satisfaction and unit productivity or effectiveness.  These measures tend to 
explain only a small percentage of the variance attributable to leadership and its effect 
on organizational performance.  In this doctoral research, identifying some of the 
unexplained variance in leader-follower relations and safety performance begins with 
an overview of the major theories of leadership.    
Transactional Leadership Model 
 The principal behavior of the transactional leader is to motivate follower 
behavior through a series of exchange relationships facilitated by trading awards and 
incentives for services rendered.  A broader concern for the individual actualization 
of subordinates is overshadowed by an immediate interest in unit objectives and short 
term goals.  According to Bass (1985), the transactional leader can be described in his 
relations with subordinates as follows: 
 
  80 
 
• Recognizes and supports worker desires if it is merited by worker 
performance. 
• Exchanges rewards and promises of reward for individual effort. 
• Responds to worker immediate self-interest if compatible with getting work 
done. 
Figure 3.1 displays the simplified transactional leader and follower 
relationship detailing how the follower’s needs and roles ar  managed by the leader 
and how ultimately the follower is motivated to achieve th  leader’s expected 
outcomes when these two interests are in balance. 




The transactional model shows how expected effort and performance is 
influenced by a leader’s assessment of worker’ role and worker’s need fulfillment.  
L:  Recognizes what F must do to 
attain designated outcomes 
L:  Clarifies F’s role 
F: Confidence in meeting role 
requirements 
(Subjective probability of success) 
L:  Recognizes what F needs 
L:  Clarifies how F’s need fulfillment 
will be exchanged for enacting role to 
attain designated outcome 
F: Confidence in meeting role 
requirements 
(Subjective probability of success) 
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Two important leader functions are being performed simultaneously.  One, the leader 
recognizes and clarifies the role the follower must play in order to achieve the 
outcomes desired by the leader.  Second, the leader assures the follower their needs 
will be satisfied in exchange for satisfactory effort and performance.   
According to Zaleznik (1983), transactional leaders are just “managers” by 
another name.  Broadly speaking, managers focus on the proc ss, not the substance of 
issues and tend to assume their followers maintain a steady state of motivation to 
implement their plans.  Zaleznik uses such adjectives as “m nipulative”, 
“inscrutable”, and “detached” to describe the behavior of transactional leaders in his 
manager construct.  The manager, like the transactional leader seeks an exchange 
relationship with followers to meet both their current material and emotional needs in 
return for specified services rendered.  
Transformational Leadership Model 
In the transactional model, workers’ needs are assessed by the leader as those 
rewards or incentives the worker expects to receive for an agreed upon level of effort 
or performance.  Workers’ needs are specifically tied to the exchange relationship 
between work and reward, the quid pro quo of expected payoff for level of effort.  In 
the transformational model, the leader’s focus on needs is broadened based upon 
Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs.  
Maslow (1954) created a simplified hierarchy of individual needs and used the 
symbol of a five-layered pyramid to add visual salience to the concept of basic needs 
forming a person’s base with sequential layers of needs resting above.  The basic 
concept is that the higher needs in this hierarchy only come into focus once all the 
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needs, that are lower down in the pyramid, are mainly or entirely satisfied.  This does 
not mean the needs are independent.  Each level can overlap the prior with many 
needs being mutually dependent of each other. 
  At the bottom are the biological necessities a person needs to live such as air, 
water, and food.  Higher needs lose priority if these basic needs are not met.  The 
second level reveals an individual’s need for safety and security; safety from threats 
to personal well-being such as violence, crime or illness and the security of pay, 
resources, and protection from unemployment.  After physiological and safety needs 
are fulfilled, the third layer of human needs is social.  This involves emotionally-
based relationships in general, such as friendship, personal intimacy and family.  
Humans generally need to feel belonging and acceptance, whether it comes from a 
large social group (clubs, office culture, professional organizations, and sports teams) 
or small social connections (family members, intimate partners, mentors, close 
colleagues, confidants).  They need to love and be loved (sexually and non-sexually) 
by others. 
According to Maslow, all humans have a need to be respected, to have self-
respect, and to respect others.  People need something like a profession or hobby to 
keep them busy and make them feel socially relevant.   A lack of this esteem can 
cause a person to feel defeated or depressed while an overabundance can make a 
person seem self-righteous or arrogant.  There are two levels to esteem needs.  The 
lower level relates to elements like fame, respect, and glory while the higher level 
(self-actualization) is contingent to concepts like confidence, competence, and 
achievement.  Maslow (1949) describes self-actualization as “the intrinsic growth of 
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what is already in the organism, or more accurately, of what the organism is.”  He 
describes self-actualizing people as those who: 
• Embrace the facts and realities of the world, rather tan denying or avoiding 
them.  
• Are spontaneous in their ideas and actions.  
• Are creative.  
• Are interested in solving problems; this often includes the problems of others. 
Solving these problems is often a key focus in their lives.  
• Feel close to other people, and generally appreciate life.  
• Have a system of morality that is fully internalized and independent of 
external authority.  
• Judge others without prejudice, in a way that can be termed obj ctive.  
• In short, self-actualization is reaching one's fullest potential. 
  
Burns (1978) considered Maslow’s construct to be fundamental to 
understanding the transformational process and core to motivating followers to 
recognize the need for sacrifice and extra effort. 
The model in Figure 3.2 starts with an original follower effort expectation 
based upon their original confidence in reaching a desired or designated performance 
outcome.  The transformational leader elevates followers’ efforts by raising their 
confidence and by increasing the value of the possible outcomes.  The first tier of the 
model shows how this can be done by:  
• Expanding the follower’s needs 
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• Transcending the follower’s self interests (placing the group above the 
individual) 
• Elevating/altering or widening the follower’s level of needs on Maslow’s 
scale    
Figure 3.2 Transformational Leadership and Extra Follower Effort  (Bass, 1985)  
 
This model suggests that the work of a transformational leader is to tap into an 
existing pool of motivation that lies latent within the formal workforce.  Many 
L:  Expansion of F’s 
portfolio of needs 
L:  Confidence-building F 
 
L:  Elevation of F’s 
subjective probabilities of 
success 
L:  Transcending of F’s 
self-interests 
L:  Elevation of value of 
designated outcomes for F 
F: Heightened motivation 
to attain designated 
outcome (extra effort) 




L:  Elevation of F’s need 
to a higher Maslow level 
L:  Change in 
organizational culture 
F: Current state of 
expected effort 
F: Expected performance 
 
 
From Figure 3.1 
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unmotivated workers will continue to comply with their current state of expected 
effort and perform at the level outlined in the transactional model without a leader 
providing some release mechanism or trigger.  The transformational leader elevates 
worker confidence by believing they are capable of achieving higher lev ls of success 
and by elevating the value of worker effort.  A worker is more likely to successfully 
accomplish a valuable organizational task if he believes he has an increased 
probability of success and if he feels his effort will he p contribute to, or satisfy a 
higher personal need.  These two leader influences help change organizational 
culture; the basic philosophy and core values that shape an org nization’s shared 
interpretation of events, maintains the organization’s boundaries, and provides 
members with a sense of community, loyalty and commitmen  (Siehl & Martin, 
1982). 
Figure 3.3 adds a layer of individual consideration to the transformational 
model depicted in Figure 3.2.  Mentoring increases worker confidence and fosters 
organizational loyalty.  Individuation means one to one contact in a way that is 
honest, sincere and perpetuates the transfer of accurate communications.  This leader 
action enhances a follower’s self-image and organizationl empowerment. 
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Figure 3.3 Individualized Consideration by Leader and Follower Effort  (Bass, 1985) 
 
 
Organizational Risk  
 To understand safety climate in high-risk military organizations, one must 
start with a broader understanding of organizational risk and the uncertainty posed by 
known and unknown hazards.  Most safety programs focus on hazard identification 
and hazard elimination.  Organizational hazards are oftenunique to the operating 
environment but most typically fit within the following categories (Bahr, 1997): 







F: Fulfillment of 
unique needs 
L:  Attention to 
individual 
differences in need 






integration of needs 
and visibility 




From Figure 3.2 













F: Extra effort 
 
 
From Figure 3.1 F: Expected effort 
 








• Human factors 
• Physiological factors 




Not all hazards apply to all industries and production processes, with the 
exception of human factors.  Irrespective of their mission or purpose, the human 
factor remains an inherent element of all organizations.  The most well-intentioned 
human often stands between believing and achieving the “zero” accident goal.  
Humans are the reason most accidents still occur.  James Reason (1990) asserts: 
• Fallibility is part of the human condition 
• We cannot change the human condition 
• We “can” change the conditions under which people work. 
People are fallible because we have certain limitations and physiological 
frailties.  We can suffer from fatigue, complacency, poor judgment, spatial 
disorientation, optical illusions, panic, distractions, depression and a whole host of 
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other symptoms that make us susceptible to accident-prone behavior.  A leadership 
intervention designed to improve safety performance must start with the fundamental 
knowledge that humans are at the intersection of behavior that causes and/or prevents 
accidents. 
Organizations are made up of fallible individuals.  One person can adversely 
effect an organization by accepting improper risk.  We coexist with risk individually 
and corporately, requiring our careful concern.  An important element of risk 
management is to accept risks at the appropriate level of management to ensure only 
risks that are acceptable to the corporate body are allowed.  Organizationally, there 
are three major levels of risk acceptance (Alston, 2003): 
• Strategic level 
• Operational level 
• Individual level 
 Strategic decisions are made by senior leaders and affect the corporate 
mission, types of products, methods of production, and promote safety policy, 
structure, culture and climate.  These types of decisions are mindful that success or 
failure still rests with the actions of individuals.  The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 
have often been credited with a “can-do’ attitude.  Strategic decision makers must 
consider this phenomenon when pushing the operational forces to the maximum.  
Individuals may say yes to commitments that might be beyond an acceptable risk 
when viewed from a strategic level.  The strategic component must promote a safety 
policy that empowers both the operational and individual levels of risk managers and 
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risk takers to know that they can back away from unnecessary risks without being 
viewed or labeled as weak. 
 The operational level of risk acceptance is unique to the rganization based 
upon supervisory structure but can be generalized to fit a very basic design.  A 
director of operations operationally manages risk that can cause the loss of life, 
jeopardize operations or cause potential damage to equipment and/or infrastructure.  
In a DON tactical strike-fighter squadron, this person would be the squadron 
Commanding Officer or detachment Officer in Charge (OIC).  Mid-managers like 
squadron department heads render risk acceptance or avoidance decisions at a lower 
operational level focusing more on their specific area of expertise and in areas under 
their supervisory control.  Line supervisors such as divisional Chief Petty Officers 
(CPOs) or Leading Petty Officers (LPOs) are rarely required to accept unnecessary 
risk.  Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and established tec nical procedures 
and/or checklists control their sphere of decision-making.  The individual makes risk 
decisions that effect their daily operation but should not compromise their well-being 
for the sake of the operational mission. 
 In the high-risk business of launching jet aircraft from an aircraft carrier, 
operational effectiveness remains the summation of individuals making decisions 
regarding risk at a consistently high rate.  Organizationl leaders must consider this 
individual component of risk acceptance very seriously because all it takes is one 
individual’s poor decision to cause the most catastrophic and tr gic of accidents to 
occur.  Individuals need detailed training on their responsibilities regarding risk and 
safety.  Sailors and Marines should know how to protect themselves during their daily 
 
  90 
 
routine and how to preserve their personal well-being while accomplishing this 
routine.   They must know how to make risk decisions that avoid placing people and 
equipment in danger.  Decision-making training should pay off when the unexpected 
situation or risk arises.   
 If individuals make up an organization and ultimately make all of the risk 
acceptance decisions, then leaders (both operational and str tegic) must understand 
that some people are more likely to accept risks than others are.  Risk taking is not 
inherently bad; in fact, some risk taking is required for organizational success.  
Tactical aviation squadrons require risk tolerance to accomplish their mission.  
Nevertheless, how well do leaders understand the variation in individual propensity to 
take risks?  Perceptions that may influence risk acceptance vary from one person to 
another.  Slovic et al (1979) determined there are certain factors that affect how 
people perceive risk (Bahr, 1997). 
• Is the risk voluntary or involuntary?  People more readily accept risks they 
chose.  If a risk is forced upon them, people often oppose the risk, even if the 
risk is low. 
• Are the consequences catastrophic?  Perceived or real, catastrophic 
consequences raise the concern for risk. 
• Are the consequences dreaded or common?  Dreaded consequences raise ri k 
perceptions.  Common consequences are more readily accepted.  Nuclear 
contamination from a mishap (dreaded/uncommon) versus a chemical mishap 
(more common). 
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• Are the consequences certain death or uncertain?   Certain death is less 
tolerated as opposed to uncertain death.  An example would be risk associated 
with driving on a steep cliff versus an icy road. 
• Are the consequences immediate or delayed?  The chronological nearness of 
the risk affects capacity to tolerate.  (Risk delay in smoking) 
• Are the risks technically controllable?  Does an individual feel they can 
personally control the risk?  (Hang gliding versus bungee jumping)   
• Is the risk new or old?  Traditional risks are more easily accepted. 
 Organizations such as the military need risk takers.  They need prudent risk 
takers who do so at the appropriate time to optimize mission effectiveness, and who 
avoid unnecessary risks.  While much accepted risk comes from individuals, risks 
also come from other sources.  Organizations are faced with risks across the spectrum 
of activity, and must consider all avenues of risk.  Environmental risks and 
organizational risks that include structure, behavior, culture and climate can present 
risks to an organization (Ginley, 2002).   
 Elements that exist outside of the boundaries of an organization that might 
influence production are considered environmental factors.  These factors might 
include the economy, government, suppliers, customers, geography, and weather to 
name just a few.  When environmental factors change, they can put pressure on an 
organization to adjust.  Adjustment can bring complacency, distraction, worry, 
concern, and unrest, all factors that can influence human behavior and decision-
making in varying and potentially dangerous ways.  Naval aviation commands 
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operate in highly dynamic environments providing an abundance of potential risky 
environmental factors.  
 Like environmental factors, internal factors present risk that must be 
effectively managed.  These include command or corporate philosophies, 
organizational culture, safety policies and work ethic.  All can contribute favorably to 
a healthy attitude towards risk management.  The organizational structure can harbor 
hidden risks based on poor policies and weakly written guidance.  Some 
organizations like the U.S. Navy are quite complex with components organized by 
mission, country, region, division, and many other variables.  Communications 
become intangible hazards when people in complex organizations do not receive 
hazard information or safety guidance.   
 Organizational processes must allow effective communication and a well-
organized safety training program for new personnel, annual refresher training, and 
safety training for supervisors.  Organizational leaders should clearly define roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities for all members.  Formal rules in the form of 
written policies, regulations, procedures and guidelines shape te organization’s 
structure.  A clear safety structure will positively affect safety behavior (Alston, 
2003).  To manage risks, safety must be embedded in the key dim nsions (Nelson and 
Quick, 2000) of the organizational structure.  
• Formalization:  Official rules, regulations and procedures. 
• Centralization:  Degree to which safety decisions are made at the top of the 
organization. 
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• Specialization: Safety occupations should be narrowly defined and require 
unique expertise/training. 
• Standardization: The degree to which safety is accomplished in a routine 
fashion. 
• Complexity: How safety interfaces with different types of activities within 
the organization. 
• Hierarchy of Authority:  Vertical safety chain across levels of management. 
 Organizational behavior defines the stability of the corporation, unit, entity or 
squadron and can be the source of risk.  Nelson and Quick (2000) define th  
organizational behavior as the study of the individual behavior and group dynamics in 
organization settings.   Organizations are comprised of individuals who must work 
together to achieve the mission.  Factors that internally inf uence an organizations 
behavior are: 
• Personal needs of members 
• Personal goals 
• Goal congruence for the organization and its members 
• Organizational incentives 
• Cooperation 
• Conflict 
 A myriad of other associate factors also apply, but risk to an organization 
depends on the health of the above list.  If individual needs are not met, risks surface 
from distraction, depression, complacency and lack of dedication.  Divergent goals 
lead to disunity.  When organizations lack incentives, people l se focus and loyalty.  
 
  94 
 
If cooperation is lacking, resentment may cause internal pressures that pose risk.  
Conflicts present distrust, disloyalty, unhappiness; factors that distract people from 
their assigned tasks and influence behavior.  Organizational behavior is a product of 
the organization’s general health, and a by-product of its cul ure and climate. 
Safety Culture and Climate 
Organizational culture is a pattern of basic assumptions that are considered 
valid and that are taught to new members as the way to perceiv , think and feel in the 
organization (Nelson and Quick, 2000).  Cultural strengths and restraints help to keep 
the culture stable.  Cultural strengths are habits of thoug t and behavior that have 
served and will continue to serve the organization, if not threatened by change.  
Cultural restraints are deeply held assumptions that conditi  and restrain thinking 
about the future.  People are content with the present.  The overall culture depends on 
the levels of cooperation, individual development, and group commitment to 
organizational goals.  Organizational risks that affect safe operations can rise from 
poor function, ambiguous policy, disjointed processes, undefined rol s, unclear 
responsibilities and inconsistent accountabilities.  These risks affect the overall safety 
culture of the organization.  
 The term “safety culture” gained recognition following the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) initial report on the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 
1986.  Most of the definitions developed for safety culture have been derived from 
the more general notion of organizational culture as used throughout the social and 
management sciences, and given prominence by organizational theorists such as 
Rohner (1984) and Schein (1985) in the early 1980s (Cox and Flin, 1998).  One of the 
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most widely used definitions of safety culture was proposed by the Human Factors 
Working Group of the Advisory Committee on Safety in Nuclear Installations 
(ACSNI) (HSC 1993: 23):   
“The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine 
the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and 
safety management.” 
 Wiegman, et al. (2002) proposed a global definition of safety culture: 
“Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public 
safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organization.  I refers to the 
extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for 
safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively 
learn, adapt and modify (both individual and organizational behavior based on 
lessons learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent wth these 
values.” 
 Colonel Greg Alston (2003), USAF (retired), a 28-year fighter pilot in the 
U.S. Air Force and former Deputy Chief of Safety in the Pentagon, synthesized the 
myriad of safety culture definitions into a working set of c mmonalities: 
• Safety culture is a concept defined at the group level or higher, which refers to 
the shared values among all of the group or organization’s members. 
• Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization, and 
closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory 
systems. 
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• Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level of an 
organization. 
• Safety culture influences members’ behavior at work. 
• Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward systems 
and safety performance. 
• Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and 
learn from errors, incidents and accidents. 
• Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change. 
 According to Alston (2003), there are five global indicators that help measure 
safety culture within an organization: 
• Organizational commitment 
• Management involvement 
• Employee empowerment 
• Reward systems 
• Reporting systems 
 The level of depth that these components are engrained into an organization 
reveals the overall culture of safety.  Leadership clearly contributes to the depth.  
Organizational well-being depends on strong, healthy organizational and safety 
cultures.  While these cultures are enduring, an organization is also affected by the 
temporal impacts of the organizational safety climate. 
 Organizational climate differs from culture in its lack of permanence and 
stability.  The safety climate in particular is a “snapshot” of employees’ perceptions 
of the current operating environment or prevailing conditions which impact upon 
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safety (Mearns et al. 2000).  Based upon common themes in various definitions of 
safety climate, Wiegmann, et al. (2002) derived the following definition of safety 
climate: 
“Safety climate is the temporal state measure of safety culture, s bject to 
commonalities among individual perceptions of the organization.  It is therefor 
situationally based, refers to the perceived state of safety at a particul  place at a 
particular time, is relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on features of 
the current environment or prevailing conditions.”  
 Safety professionals and organizational leaders cannot overlo k the 
importance of safety climate within their organizations.  The safety climate can 
fluctuate with real-time influences, such as new leadership, organizational changes, 
and environmental impacts.  Safety managers must be vigilant for climate changes 
realizing the constant fluctuation.  They must become exp rts on measuring and 
assessing the influence of these organizational influences and be prepared to advise 
leadership on appropriate intervention techniques.  Through dilience and effort, the 
climate can be controlled with incentives, training and participative processes. 
Behavioral Influence and Analysis 
 Leadership interventions are designed to place key influences on mployee 
attitudes through a variety of motivational factors such as peer influence, pressure 
from informal groups, whether the job is meaningful or important, and how much 
recognition is given for good performance.  These insight come from the thinking of 
Frederick Herzberg, Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert and other influential management 
theorists (Petersen, 1980).   
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Conflict Theory 
 Argyris’s theory provides safety mangers with insights ino why people 
commit errors.  Argyris takes human nature as a starting point and analyzes the 
process of growing up and maturing.  Mature adults must adjust to the grown-up 
world of subordination and control.  As children, these adults were comfortable 
viewing older persons as controllers because they lacked certain self-awareness.  As 
adults, most people view themselves as equals in most relationships because of their 
evolved self-awareness.  This creates tension for many in formal organizations.  
According to Argyris, all organizations are structured under certain principles: 
• They have a chain of command: creates senior-subordinate rel ionships 
• The span of control is small: creates dependency, restricts freedom 
• There is a unity of command: only one boss 
• Characterized by specialization: small simple task, leads to lack of interest 
 These principles cause “management pyramiding” and cause many workers to 
become dependent on their supervisor or minor-boss and consider themselves very 
unequal.  Argyris says that these principles of management ar  in conflict with the 
needs of individuals.  He suggests this conflict can cause people to become apathetic, 
complacent, lack motivation, form informal groups, or quit.  It can cause accidents 
because of inattention, disregard of safety rules and poor attitudes toward the 
company.  Most managers react to this phenomenon by adding more rules, layering 
bureaucracy, exercising more control, or applying more pressure. 
 To remedy this cycle of conflict, Argyris proposed, “leveling” an organization 
which means to distribute decision-making more evenly and/or to involve people 
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more in the decision-making process.  His emphasis was on the extent to which 
people’s perception of the problem were sought, their ideas on alternative solutions 
were cultivated, and their thoughts on implementing decisions which were already 
made were solicited (Argyris, 1957).   
Motivation-Hygiene Theory 
 Herzberg called certain factors that influence behavior “hygiene factors” and 
other factors “motivation factors”.  Hygiene factors can be improved to increase a 
worker’s job satisfaction although this might not necessarily increase the worker’s 
motivation.  Motivation factors have to do with the job itself while the hygiene 
factors are peripheral to the job (Herzberg, 1966). 
 The following factors determine the worker’s level of satisfaction: 
• Money 
• Status 
• Relationship with boss 
• Company policies 
• Work rules 
• Working conditions 
 The following factors determine the worker’s level of motivation: 
• Sense of achievement 
• Recognition 
• Job satisfaction 
• Possibility of promotion 
• Responsibility 
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• Chance for growth 
 Leadership interventions targeting a worker’s level of satisfaction will never 
motivate people to be truly excited about their job and will probably lead to boredom 
and complacency. 
Likert’s Theory 
 Likert’s studies investigated the effect of the supervisor-employee relationship 
on productivity.  Among Likert’s findings relevant to leadership and safety climate 
are (Likert, 1961): 
• The tighter the supervisor’s control over the employee, th  lower the 
productivity. 
• The more the supervisor watches and supervises the worker, the lower the 
productivity. 
• The more punitive the supervisor is when the employee makes a mistake, the 
lower the productivity. 
 Do any of the three previous behavioral theories square in th  face of the 
contemporary work ethos and/or the culture of a high-risk industrial organization like 
a commercial nuclear power plant, NASA, or the military?  Isn’t a typical military 
unit subject to management pyramiding; the very organization l structure Argyris 
suggests causes worker apathy?  Aren’t the preponderance of military incentives 
targeting pay and promotion, the “hygiene factors” Herzberg concludes will fail to 
motivate followers and ultimately lead to boredom and complacency.  Can a military 
leader’s need to control (and be accountable) be reconciled w th a follower’s desire to 
exercise a certain level of autonomy?  Likert’s theory suggests that less control over 
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employees equates to more production.  An important part of this doctoral research 
will be to investigate how these theories of behavior sh uld weigh in the formulation 
of safety policies and leadership intervention strategies designed to reduce 
preventable mishaps. 
Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC) Analysis 
 An essential tool of safety management is discovering and addressing the 
cause of accidents.  In heavy industry (and the Navy is no exception), it is well known 
that 80-95% of accidents are caused by unsafe behavior (Krause et al, 1990).  All 
leadership interventions that improve industrial safety performance are effective in 
large measure because they influence employee behavior.  Ironically, most 
organizations have behavioral influences that indirectly favor unsafe behavior.  These 
influences are such things as short fused schedule changes, i creased productivity 
targets, or extended work hours.  Behavioral analysis can help an organization to 
assess the factors that are really driving its safety eforts.  In terms of ABC analysis, 
an antecedent is an event which triggers an objectively observable behavior.  For 
example, a ringing doorbell (antecedent) triggers a (behavior) answering the door to 
see (consequence) who is at the door.  Managers tend to identify the antecedent as the 
most powerful stimulus to behavior, in this case, answering the door.  However, in his 
pioneering work in behavioral science, B.F. Skinner showed that consequences are 
more powerful determinants of behavior than are antecedents.  ABC Analysis 
involves the following principles (Krause et al, 1990): 
• Both antecedents and consequences control behavior 
• But they do so very differently 
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• Consequences control behavior powerfully and directly, and 
• Antecedents control behavior indirectly, primarily to predict consequences. 
 Many well intended safety programs fail because they rely too much on 
antecedents—things that come before behavior—safety rules,procedures, meetings, 
etc.  In most cases, these antecedents have no powerful consequences backing them 
up.  Some consequences are stronger than others are and some consequences push a 
worker towards a certain behavior and other consequences push a worker away from 
a certain behavior.  Three features determine which consequences are stronger than 
others: 
• Timing:  A consequence that follows soon after a behavior controls behavior 
more effectively than a consequence that occurs later. 
• Consistency: A consequence that is certain to follow a behavior controls 
behavior more powerfully than an uncertain or unpredictable consequence. 
• Significance: A positive consequence controls behavior more powerfully than 
a negative consequence. 
Safety Climate Research 
 Organizational climate describes an area of research rther than a specific 
organizational measure (Zohar, 1980).  Broadly defined, organizational climate can 
refer to either specific properties of organizations such as size, shape and complexity 
or employees’ shared perceptions about certain dimensions of the work environment 
(James & Jones, 1974).  It is within this broad construct that specific climate 
measures such as Litwin and Stringer’s (1968) motivation climate, Taylor’s (1972) 
creativity climate, or Schneider’s (1990) service climate have emerged for field 
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research.  The common reference being that workers tend to share similar perceptions 
regarding the specific environmental aspect and that theseperc ptions guide or 
influence employee behavior.  Workers respond to cues in the environment by 
behaving according to an expected set of outcome contingencies (Dieterly & 
Schneider, 1974; Litwin & Stringer, 1968).   
Attempting to refine the organizational climate concept and in an effort to 
develop a general, theory-based approach to organizational safety factors, Zohar 
(2000) tested a group-level model of safety climate derived from the organizational 
model.   Based upon a study of 534 production workers, divided into 53 work groups 
in a metal-processing plant an anonymous safety climate questionnaire was 
administered and analyzed.  Safety climate perceptions provided significant 
prediction of sub-unit injury records over the 5-month period after climate 
measurement.  Also, the effect of overload on personal injury was significantly 
reduced in subunits with a high safety action supervisor.  These results suggest that 
safety climate perceptions can develop at the subunit level of organizations in parallel 
to their development at the organizational level. 
 A particular type of organizational climate is a climate for safety.  In what is 
considered by many to be the first journal article on the subject, Zohar (1980) 
attempts to: define the dimensions of safety climate and to assess the concept’s 
relevance in understanding occupational behavior when operationalized and 
validated.  He designed a questionnaire based upon the organizational characteristics 
extracted from a review of the literature on industrialized companies and 
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organizational safety practices.  Upon analysis, the dimnsions that distinguished 
low-rate from high-rate accident companies included: 
• Top management was personally involved in safety on a routine basis 
• The rank and status of safety officers 
• Open communication links and frequent contacts between workers and 
management 
• Frequent safety inspections by appropriate personnel 
• Stable work force with less turnover and older workers 
• Successful companies had distinctive ways of promoting safety using 
guidance and counseling, rather than enforcement and admonition 
Based upon his research of 20 factories (over 500 workers in one of four 
industries: metal fabrication, food processing, chemical industry and textile industry), 
Zohar concluded: (a) safety climate can be regarded as a char cteristic of industrial 
organizations, (b) safety climate is related to the general safety levels in these 
organizations, and (c) production workers have a unified set of cognitions regarding 
the safety aspects of their organization.  The two climate dimensions most influential 
in determining safety climate level is the perceived rlevance of safety to job 
behavior and the perceived management attitude toward safety.  Zohar was unable to 
correlate safety climate scores with standard safety m asures such as accident-
frequency rate and accident-severity rate due to a lack of reliability of these measures 
(reports were used for worker’s compensation purposes and considered biased).   
Zohar’s work verifies Schneider’s (1975) theory that workers’ perceptions 
regarding climate dimensions and behavior-outcome expectations can guide 
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employee behavior.  A worker’s cognition regarding safety is largely related to how 
they perceive their manager’s attitude toward safety and the organization’s production 
process.  Zohar suggests that a genuine change in management’s attitudes and an 
increased commitment are needed to improve the safety climate in an organization.  
Reward campaigns, contests or improved safety regulations are impotent 
organizational initiatives without first securing a renewed safety commitment from 
management. 
While organizational climate research primarily focuses on the individual, the 
predictive benefit of unit analysis relies on the aggregation of individual climate 
assessment scores to provide explanatory power.  Climates b sed upon perceptual 
agreement are termed collective climates and do not necessarily overlap formal 
organizational units, divisions or work groups (aggregate climates).  Presumed in 
previous research, Joyce & Slocum (1984) set out to establish  consistent basis for 
the aggregation of individual climate perceptions.  The usefuln ss of an aggregate 
climate concept could potentially yield an understanding of how individuals 
understand and ultimately respond to environments (James, 1982). 
Several challenges face the researcher.  There has been a notable lack of 
agreement regarding criteria to assess the validity of aggregated climate data with the 
following most commonly used: (1) discrimination, or demonstrable differences 
between mean perceptions between climates; (2) predictable relationships to 
organizational or individual criteria; and (3) internal consistency, or agreement in 
perceptions within aggregate climate (Joyce & Slocum, 1984).  Beyond the lack of 
consensus regarding methodological criteria, most hypothesis testing presumes 
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homogeneity of psychological climate perceptions for many social groups and then 
does means comparison to test differences.  The validity of this procedure relies on 
the researcher’s ability to hypothesize where agreement on climate perceptions are 
most likely within an organization (James, 1982).   
In a study where all three methodological criteria were met, Jones and James 
(1979) evaluated the aggregate climate scores of divisional personnel onboard 20 
Navy warships operating at sea.  In total, 233 divisions were evaluated and their 
climate scores met all methodological criteria, which cannot be said of the same 
analysis conducted by ship or ship department.  Among those Navy divisions, their 
study concluded patterns of climate dimensions were systematically and predictably 
related to job satisfaction and job performance.  Joyce and Slocum (1974) tested these 
findings by surveying employees within three plants operated by a heavy duty truck 
manufacturer.  Their tests verified that membership in climates, formed on the basis 
of similarities in perceptions (collective climates), were significantly related to 
measures of individuals’ job performances and job satisfactons.  
Research conducted to assess the source of climate perceptions can be 
categorized as either the structural or selection-attraction-attrition approach 
(Schneider & Reicher, 1983).  As the name implies, the structural approach proposes 
that it is the organization’s structure that influences climate perceptions such as size 
and span of control.  While acknowledging individuals can shape climate perceptions, 
their focus is on structural factors and how these factors can influence climate as they 
change from setting to setting.  The selection-attraction-attrition approach explains 
the source of climate perceptions as the bi-directional exchange between worker and 
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work seeking a person-organization match.  The match is on tantly improved 
through attrition (termination or transfer) and the congruence of similar perceptions 
and meanings are expressed as climates due to the decrease of individual differences.   
The Joyce & Slocum (1984) study provides support for both the structural and 
selection-attraction-attrition argument.  
Industrial researchers have focused significant attention on evaluating certain 
organizational factors as antecedents to accidents or theaccident sequence.  Wright 
(1986) investigated the causes of several fatalities involving oil workers on off-shore 
facilities in the North Sea.  Several themes emerged from his review including the 
development of informal work methods to handle situations where there were no 
formal procedures; a strong pressure to complete the work as quickly as possible; and 
defective communications regarding safety-related issues. 
After a thorough review of over 100 accidents involving merchant marine 
traffic in the 1980’s Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) determined two organizational 
factors had significant relevance in determining the mishap’s cause.  Human decision-
making was flawed in the presence of high situational stres  meaning more 
information processing errors occurred under these conditi s.  Additionally, they 
determined that social pressure influenced job performance mor than formalized 
rules. Communication channels and safety culture are two of several factors that 
influence how a worker perceives the technical and social systems within an 
organization; factors that are important influences on safety performance (Hofmann 
& Stetzer, 1996).    
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In their research on factors influencing unsafe behaviors and acci ents, 
Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) hypothesized three group-level factors (gr up process, 
safety climate, and intentions to approach other team mebers engaged in unsafe 
acts) and one individual-level factor (perceptions of role overload) influenced the 
frequency of reported unsafe activities.  Collecting data from 222 people on 21 teams 
in a Mid-western chemical processing plant, both the indiv dual and group-level 
variables were significantly associated with unsafe behavior.  Role overload, defined 
as the degree to which role performance was affected by inadequate time, training and 
resources, was significantly associated with unsafe behavior.  Perceptions of group 
processes (e.g., performance monitoring, freedom to question others) were found to 
influence the frequency of unsafe behaviors within teams.  Perceptions of safety 
climate were also significantly associated with unsafe worker behavior.  Teams that 
perceived and reported higher safety climate assessment had higher safety 
performance measures.  
Safety climate survey data from 18 companies with 2,680 respondents were 
used to evaluate a model associating safety climate with self-reported injuries (Ho, 
2005).  The association of four climate dimensions: (1) management commitment, (2) 
return-to-work policies, (3) post-injury administration a d (4) safety training were 
tested against 3 objective injury rate measures and the results confirmed safety 
climate’s association with self-reported injury.  This association disappeared when 
the analysis controlled for industry hazard differences.  In a study of 66 U.S. Air 
Force squadrons consisting of 7,029 survey respondents, Capps (2000) determined 
organizational climate has a predictive capability with job satisfaction and 
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performance perceptions at the three levels studied (i.e. individual, unit and cross-
level).  Climate perceptions failed to correlate with anyobjective measure of 
operational unit performance with the exception of flying schedule effectiveness 
(higher climate perceptions led to higher sortie completion rates).     
Leadership, as an organizational factor, has been studied as a potential 
determinant of safety climate and thus, an antecedent to i dividual behavior and 
safety performance.  Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) studied the relationship between 
group leaders and their superiors theorizing the quality of his relationship predicted 
injury statistics in the respective workgroups highlighting he mediating effect of 
safety communications (in their study it was the frequency of raising safety concerns 
with a supervisor).  This study along with Zohar’s (2000) research suggests a 
leadership-climate-injury mediation model.  When a person’s performance has direct 
safety implications, the leader’s concern for an employee’s well-being (leadership 
style), has direct bearing on the group’s safety climate perceptions (climate) and 
ultimately the group’s behavior (injury mediation) (Zohar, 2002).  Leaders express or 
operationalize their concern for an employee’s safety through their supervisory 
practices.  This climate perception for safety implies there are certain aspects of a 
supervisor’s behavior that infer the leader’s priority for safety and the importance of 
performing one’s task in a safe manner.  These perceptions inform workers of the 
consequences of working safely.  Zohar (2002) concluded, based upon role theory 
(Katz and Kahn, 1978), social learning (Bandura, 1986), and expected utility 
constructs (Lawler, 1971), there should be a positive relationship between safety-
climate level and behavior. 
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In a study of 411 production workers in a metal processing plant divided into 
42 work groups, safety climate and leadership questionnaires wer administered 
during work hours.  Safety data was collected at the infirmary for a period of six 
months following the initial data collection phase.  The study’s intent was to examine 
the two complimentary models (transformational vs. transactional) of the leadership-
safety relationship.  Theoretically, the relationship betwe n the two is that of 
augmentation.  Transformational leadership predicted injury rate while transactional 
leadership provided indirect, conditional prediction.  Leadership effects were 
moderated by assigned safety priorities (1-5 scale) and mediated by safety climate 
variables (preventive action, reactive action and prioritizat on).  The results suggest 
that transformational and transactional leadership provide complimentary modes of 
(mediated and moderated) influence on safety behavior of group members (Zohar, 
2002). 
Alarcon (2005) examined the relationship between law enforcement officers’ 
ratings of their leaders’ leadership style and their ratings of job satisfaction.  373 
officers of the Bexar County Sheriff’s office in San A tonio, Texas were surveyed 
using standard instruments to assess supervisor’s leadership style and the 
respondent’s level of job satisfaction.  Multiple regr ssion analysis and analysis of 
variance revealed transformational leadership had statistic lly significant results on 
overall job satisfaction and all facets of satisfaction except for present pay.  The 
results were consistent between two separate groups of employees including both 
detention officers and law enforcement officers.   
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Lindell and Brandt (2000) studied whether climate quality (aver ge climate 
ratings) and climate consensus (the variance of climate ratings) are related to 
organizational antecedents and outcomes.  Data from over 1,000 members in 180 
organizations (Local Emergency Planning Committees) were coll cted and analyzed 
revealing that while climate quality and consensus both had significant correlations 
with organizational antecedents and outcomes, climate quality w s more strongly 
related.  The results were stronger for internal structu al antecedents and individual 
outcomes than for external contextual antecedents and organizational outcomes.    
Implications for Organizational Interventions  
  Considering the growing body of research examining antecedents to unsafe 
behavior and accidents, scholars have turned to interpreting these results offering 
valuable insight into possible organizational interventions aimed at mitigating these 
undesirable events.  Safety interventions designed to reduce accidents and/or injuries 
focus on individual-level factors such as: training, goal setting, feedback, and/or 
incentives (Sulzer-Azaroff, Harris, McCann, 1994).  Hofmann nd Setzer (1996), 
suggest the disproportionate emphasis on individual-level interventions reflects an 
assumption that safety problems exist at the individual level.  Investigators searching 
for clues to a mishap often stop after they find what they ave been looking for 
(Rasmussen, 1990).  One cannot dismiss the contribution of ndividual behavior to 
accidents; however it is important to consider the contextual influence on behavior 
uniquely attributable to the organization (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995).   
 Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) suggest safety practitioners engage in more 
systematic organizational diagnosis using several approaches to determine potential 
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causes.  In addition to individual level factors (micro), they recommend a focus on 
broader organizational factors (macro) such as communication, coordination and 
safety climate contributing to a cross-level (meso) assessment of organizational safety 
performance.  It is through this effort that leaders will ultimately be able to identify 
all the relevant organizational variables influencing safety p rformance in their 
particular organizations.   
In a recent study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), they 
concluded that in order for the Navy to create and foster a culture of safety, they 
needed to increase elements of management and leadership similar to many corporate 
industry safety models (Dolfini-Reed & Streicher, 2004).  These interventions include 
commitment, accountability, defining roles and responsibilities, defining policies and 
objectives, planning and self-assessment, and annual evaluations.  It is only until 
these factors are known that applicable and appropriate interventions, which address 
both micro and macro factors such as group processes, saf ty climate and socio-
technical relationships, can be developed (Hofmann & Setzer, 1996). 
 Attribution error plays a significant role in identifying the underlying cause of 
work-related accidents.  The tendency to blame an individual rather than determine 
the full nature of an accident has clear implications for the implementation of change 
interventions and for organizations trying to learn from negative events (Reason, 
1994).  The preponderance of attribution in serious military accidents remains solely 
on the shoulders of the individual.  In fiscal years 1994 and 1995, human error, as a 
contributing factor, ranged from a high of 76 percent in Army mishaps to 
approximately 71 percent in Air force mishaps.  The Naval Safety Center showed that 
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human error was a causal factor in 80 percent of Navy and Marine Corps Class A 
flight mishaps for fiscal years 1990 through 1994 (GAO, 1996).   
According to a research study conducted by Hofman & Stetzer (1998), 
fundamental attribution error is the tendency of investigators to overestimate the 
influence of personal factors and underestimate the influe ce of situational factors 
while the defensive attribution bias influences workers who are situationally or 
personally similar to accident victims to attribute mishap cause to external factors. 
In their study, it was hypothesized that safety climate would influence a worker’s 
causal attribution about an accident.  In negative safety climates (those defined by 
management’s tendency to respond to accidents in a blaming and punitive manner), 
mishap observers would tend to attribute cause to external factors.  Conversely, 
external attributions made by mishap observers in a positive afety climate would be 
less and cause would more likely be attributed to an individual if indeed this was the 
case.  Surveying 2,566 workers from the outdoor division of a large utility company, 
the main effects of safety climate and safety communication on accident attributions 
were analyzed.  The results indicated that supervisors tended to make more internal 
attributions about worker accidents than workers, and that safety communication 
significantly moderated the relationship between information l cues and causal 
attributions.  In general, large organizational factors such as safety climate and safety 
communications can influence the interpretation of information obtained in 
investigations intended to explain the causes of negative events such as industrial 
mishap (Hofmann & Setzer, 1998).   
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Understanding the influence of these organizational factors has important 
implications for organizational learning, the interpretation of negative events, and the 
subsequent development of effective interventions.  Managers in high risk 
organizations must carefully balance the requirement for pr cess output in dangerous 
conditions with the natural tendency for frontline production workers to 
underestimate the occurrence likelihood of a rare, but catastrophic event.  Using 
simple cost-benefit analysis, workers might tend to unsafe behavior because the 
expected short term utility (speed and efficiency) outweighs the cost of slower pace, 
extra effort or personal discomfort.  When managers assign higher value to short-term 
results, the tendency to choose unsafe behavior among action lternatives is 
reinforced (Herrnstein, Lowenstein, Prelec & Vaughan, 1993). 
Zohar, (2002) developed a leadership-based intervention model designed to 
modify supervisory monitoring and rewarding of workers’ safety performance.  The 
theory was to provide workers with safety related information when there was a 
priority conflict with competing goals such as speed or schedule.  Using group 
leadership or supervision as the relevant construct, two primary attributes of effective 
supervision were exploited: performance-based monitoring and timely 
communication of consequences (Komaki, 1998).  The intervention entailed the 
evaluation of supervisors who monitored work in progress, particularly through work 
sampling and direct observation, as opposed to conventional intervention methods 
dependent on external observers and other appointed officials to provide feedback 
and deliver incentives. 
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The participants in the study included 381 line workers and 36 supervisors in 
a regional maintenance center specializing in repair and upgradin  of heavy-duty 
equipment.  36 work groups were formed where half served as the experimental 
group and the other half served as the control group.  Safety data was collected during 
the 8-week intervention period during which feedback was given w ekly to 
supervisors and their immediate superiors.  The cumulative frequency of reported 
episodes between supervisors and their subordinates in which safety was the criterion 
for supervisory approval or disapproval was collected.  At the core of the intervention 
was the concept that modifying facet-specific supervisory practices (as opposed to 
facet-free supervision which monitors all facets of subordinate’s performance) will 
induce concomitant change among workers.  Results indicate th  supervisory safety 
practices (increased frequency of safety-oriented interaction with subordinates) 
changed over a short period from a baseline of 9 percent to almost 58 percent.  This 
increase resulted in a significant decrease in the micro-a cident rate and a parallel 
increase in safety related practices and safety climate ass ssment (Zohar, 2002).  In 
general, intermittent safety related interviews used to communicate high safety 
priority information and provide worker feedback seemed to turn safety priority into a 
tangible performance goal. 
Summary  
The relevant leadership literature and applied safety climate research suggests 
the relationship between what leaders do, and how followers b have, is far from 
being thoroughly understood.  To most people, the importance of leadership is 
apparent no matter what the context.  Van Wart (2003) suggets that “in any 
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organization, effective leadership provides higher-quality and more efficient goods 
and services; it provides a sense of cohesiveness, personal development, and higher 
levels of satisfaction among those conducting the work; and it provides an 
overarching sense of direction and vision, an alignment with the environment, a 
healthy mechanism for innovation and creativity, and a resource for invigorating the 
organizational culture.”  It seems fair to conclude thatorganizations have ample 
opportunity to influence their member’s decision-making and behavior although it is 
not completely clear what leadership interventions cause what performance.     
Furthermore, public-sector leaders are expected to interven when specific 
organizational outputs such as quality, service or safety ar  not being held to a set 
standard.  Regarding an organization’s commitment to reducing preventable mishaps 
among employees both on and off the job, it appears thee is only a modest amount of 
research that corroborates the efficacy of specific leadership best-practices.  While 
most of the research has been conducted with the private-sec or workforce, there is 
some analytical evidence that: individual safety climate perceptions can be 
aggregated; safety climate assessment positively correlates with safety performance; 
leadership style predicts injury outcomes; and safety climate quality correlates with 
organizational antecedents and outcomes.  Determining if specific l adership best-
practices will elevate safety climate amongst a high-rsk military aviation cohort, and 
assessing if this climate change causes improved safety performance, will be 
evaluated in the remainder of this dissertation. 
Based upon this literature review regarding leadership theories, models of 
leadership, behavioral analysis and safety climate research, Chapter 4 will present 
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several testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between leadership 
interventions, safety climate, and follower behavior.  
 
  118 
 
Chapter 4: Hypotheses 
 As emphasized in Chapter 1, Navy planners responding to SECDEF’s 
direction to initiate a mishap reduction strategy placed high priority on the 
presumption that certain leadership best practices would elevat  safety climate in 
high-risk military organizations.  Their inclination was that the proper leadership 
interventions would elevate organizational safety climate in a way that would get 
people to “do the right thing” both on and off the job reducing preventable mishaps 
and personal injuries.   
This research effort is focused in two phases using two uniquely different sets 
of data.  The first phase is a secondary analysis of safety climate survey data collected 
by the Naval Post-Graduate School at Monterey California between 2001 and 2005.  
The data was obtained for every Navy and Marine Corps Strike-Fighter squadron that 
participated in the survey process over that five-year period.  These Command Safety 
Climate Assessment Surveys (CSCAS) were designed specifically or command level 
use and consist of two separate survey instruments.  The Command Safety 
Assessment (CSA) survey is designed specifically for the officer/aviator cohort and 
assesses an organization’s operational practices from a safety perspective.  The 
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) is design d for the enlisted cohort 
and assesses an organization’s safety practices from a maintenance perspective.  In 
Phase 1, statistical modeling is conducted assessing the relationship between certain 
leadership interventions and a respondent’s safety climate assessment.   
Phase 1 allowed the researcher to evaluate secondary data collected when the 
mishap reduction initiative was created in 2003.  Theoretically, this data would have 
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been available to policy makers at the time the mishap reduction strategy was 
implemented.  Phase 1 hypotheses are limited in scope because they were shaped by 
an existing database that was generated from a survey instrument, not specifically 
designed to evaluate the research question presented in Chapter 1.  However, it is 
constructive to ascertain whether there was enough empirical evidence resident in the 
CSA/MCAS survey repository to inform policy makers regarding the potential 
efficacy of their mishap reduction strategy.  Phase 1 evaluates correlations between 
certain personal demographics and responses to individual assessment  of safety 
climate.  Additionally, Phase 1 examines the potential rel tionships between certain 
organizational practices and safety climate although it is impossible to determine 
causality given the limitations of the data.  
For Phase 2 analysis, this researcher designed two safety climate survey 
instruments designed for military unit data collection.  The officer survey and enlisted 
survey are both 86 question surveys formatted in seven sections: demographic data, 
safety climate, safety program, squadron programs, leadership style, and program 
assessment.  The surveys vary only slightly regarding co tent and wording 
appropriate to the respective cohorts.  The survey instrument was administered to four 
separate strike fighter squadrons at NAS Oceana, Virginia from August 6-12, 2006.   
Phase 2 was designed to allow the researcher to evaluate specific relationships 
between a variety of organizational predictor variables and safety climate.  Of 
primary interest to this researcher are those leadership best practices outlined in the 
Navy’s mishap reduction plan and those potential interventions not specifically 
highlighted as recommended “best practices”.  Additionally, the Phase 2 survey 
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instrument was designed so that a causality relationship between safety climate and 
safety performance as measured by individual and cohort inju y rates and unit mishap 
rates could be assessed.   Finally, Phase 2 allowed the researcher to conduct 
individual and group interviews focused on evaluating the preferenc s and 
particularities of leadership practices in four Navy Strike Fighter squadrons. 
 Operational versus Non-operational Context   
  Chapter 1 emphasized the significance of non-operational activities, 
attributing the preponderance of preventable mishaps involving U.S. service members 
to PMV accidents.  Equally significant is the researcher’s challenge in collecting 
accurate injury, accident, and mishap data to be used as a sttistical benchmark for 
organizational safety performance analysis; particularly safety data regarding 
individuals outside of work.  The non-operational component of Phase 1 analysis is 
nonexistent and the Phase 2 component is superficial giventhese limitations.  The 
Phase 2 survey instrument is designed primarily to assess leadership, organizational 
climate, and safety performance in the operational context although the questionnaire 
does attempt to collect some non-operational safety data.   
The decision to focus on the operational environment was intent onal due to 
several factors.  First, the researcher was restricted by Navy authority to limit the 
survey instrument to a specific time limit (20 minutes) for a respondent to complete 
the questionnaire.  This limitation was imposed to minimize the impact on unit 
routine since the data collection occurred during work hours.  The survey design 
would have exceeded this restriction if a thorough question bank was included that 
queried non-operational activities.  Second, there is a propensity for military 
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respondents to inaccurately report on leisure activities du  to a strong privacy bias, 
regardless of the most persuasive anonymity contract.  Controlling for this bias, given 
the limited size of the study group, would be problematic.  This non-operational 
drawback does not diminish the relevance of the study; rather it represents a research 
limitation and presents an acknowledged opportunity for future study.         
Listed below are six research questions evaluated in Phase 1 nd Phase 2 
analysis.  Each question is followed by a series of testable hypotheses developed 
based upon theory and a review of the applicable literature.  
Phase 1  
1) What demographics determine differences in how Navy and Marine Corps strike 
fighter squadron members assess the safety climate of th ir organization?   
a) Individual safety climate assessment for both officers and maintenance 
personnel varies with rank, authority, and experience. 
i) Senior officers, senior maintenance personnel, and persons in positions of 
authority have a higher assessment of organizational safety climate. This 
peer group is closely tied to formulating and implementing leadership 
practices evoking a positively skewed (elevated) safety climate assessment 
bias. 
ii)  Increased flight experience correlates directly with a higher assessment of 
command safety climate.  Aviators with more experience equate their 
longevity (e.g. safety record, flight qualifications, operational 
accomplishments) with confidence (trust) in organizational policies and 
procedures. 
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iii)  Mid-grade Petty officers (E-4 to E-5) will have a lower climate assessment 
compared to junior and senior enlisted categories.  This peer group 
negatively judges differences (inconsistencies) between leadership 
intentions and work level policy outcomes.   
b) Individual safety climate assessment for maintenance personnel varies by 
organizational work center and workday shift. 
i) Maintenance personnel assigned to the Maintenance Control (MC) and 
Quality Assurance (QA) work centers have a higher climate assessment 
than the production work centers.  MC and QA are supervisory 
organizations and are more inclined to favor current policies and 
procedures compared to their production counterparts.   
ii)  Day check personnel will have a higher climate assessment than night 
check (and/or mid check) personnel.  Less monitoring and supervisory 
involvement occurs during these evening work shifts. 
c) Variation in respondent climate assessment will occur based upon 
command/unit location and command type. 
i) Training organizations like the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and 
organizations serving the Commander Naval Air Training Command 
(CNATRA) will have a lower assessment of squadron climate than their 
operational counterparts will.  Training squadrons have more oversight 
and tend to be less operationally focused.  
ii)  Squadrons assigned overseas will have a lower assessment of climate than 
their embarked or ashore based counterparts.  Units stationed overseas 
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tend to view their support structure as inferior to their CONUS based 
counterparts.  
2) Using CSA/MCAS survey data, are there organizational variables (leadership best 
practices) that correlate with an individual’s assessment of unit safety climate?   
a) Individuals who favorably view the efficacy of certain leadership best 
practices will also give a higher rating to their organization’s safety climate.  
i) Leadership practices that facilitate or encourage open communication 
regarding operational schedule, organizational mission, safety concerns, 
personnel management policies, and daily job performance will predict 
higher levels of individual safety climate assessment. 
ii)  Leadership practices that express concern for subordinate development 
and individual welfare (transformational) will predict hig er levels of 
individual safety climate assessment than those leadership practices based 
primarily on exchange relationships (transactional) or aissez faire 
(autonomy) relationships. 
iii)  This close interaction with supervisors (transformational arrangement) 
predicts a subordinate will tend not to abandon a commitmen  to safety 
even when the focus on safety yields to higher operation l priorities.  
3) What effect did the Secretary of the Navy’s leadership best practices initiative 
have on improving safety climate in high-risk naval aviation units? 
a) Best practices designed to emphasize goals and/or means, orie t effective 
rewards, support individuals in their tasks or provide socio-em tional support 
to unit’s members will elevate safety climate (motivation). 
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i) The following practices outlined in COMNAVAIRFOR’s Fleet Response 
Plan (FRP) will improve safety climate in affected units: 
(1) Emphasize big picture 
(2) Develop culture of mission first, safety always 
(3) Expand human factors councils 
(4) A clear and relevant vision 
(5) Life skills program 
(6) Mentor program 
(7) Leadership wake-up call.  Real intervention with real Sailors 
ii)  The following practices outlined in COMNAVAIRFOR’s Fleet Response 
Plan (FRP) will fail to improve safety climate in affected units (hygiene): 
(1) Purge culture of complacency, take ownership of issue 
(2) Institute program focused on basic flying skills 
(3) Emphasize mastering basics 
(4) Complacency war council 
(5) Intensity ashore equals intensity afloat 
(6) Avoid repeat performances 
(7) Safety and ORM messages constant, renewed visibility  
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Phase 2  
4) Are there certain leadership best practices commonly considered outside the scope 
of the organizational safety program that improve an indiv dual’s assessment of 
unit safety climate? 
a) Improved personal and professional development programs will predict higher 
levels of safety climate assessment to include: 
i) Appraisal programs  
ii)  Awards/incentive programs 
iii)  Mentoring/counseling programs 
iv) Family advocacy/individual advocacy programs 
5) Does a supervisor’s leadership style correlate with an individual’s or group’s 
assessment of organizational safety climate?  Does safty priority influence this 
assessment? 
a) Respondents who report their leader or supervisor as transfo mational will 
report a higher level of safety climate assessment tha those respondents who 
report their supervisor as transactional (all else being qual). 
b) Respondents who report their leader or supervisor as laissez-faire will report a 
lower level of safety climate assessment than those respondents who report 
their supervisor as either transformational or transactional (all else being 
equal). 
c) As safety priority increases (e.g. work-ups, certifications, combat operations), 
safety climate assessment will increase for transformational leaders and 
remain unchanged for transactional and laissez-faire lead rs. 
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6) Does an individual’s safety climate assessment mediate behavior-dependent 
injury and accidents? 
a) Higher levels of safety climate assessment will predict lower injury and 
accident rates. 
Question 1 is evaluated by conducting a secondary analysis of the CSA and 
MCAS data sets.  Using a variety of analytical techniques s ch as t-tests, f-tests, chi-
squared and analysis of variance (ANOVA), different demographic variables are 
evaluated for independence with safety climate.  Question 2 again uses the 
CSA/MCAS data.  Logistical regression is conducted on these s condary data sets to 
assess the correlation between the dependent variable, s fety climate, and a variety of 
predictor variables derived from survey responses.  These independent variables 
represent a variety of organizational policies, programs nd procedures determined to 
reasonably represent the policy interventions outlined i the Navy’s mishap reduction 
strategy.  Question 3 relies on logistic regression techniques conducted on a parsed 
data set representing the pre and post-policy cohorts.  Several regression methods are 
used to compare cohorts searching for indicators of policy influence (elevated safety 
climate) across the spectrum of organizational predictor variables such as leadership 
and communications.  
Phase 2 data provides a significant number of demographic variables that will 
be subject to the same analytical techniques described above.  Question 4 will be 
evaluated using means comparison and multi-variable regression techniques designed 
to model organizational predictors of elevated safety climate.  Question 5 will be 
evaluated using question 4 techniques however the predictor variables are 
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participant’s assessment of their supervisor’s leadership style, leadership behavior 
and safety priority.  Question 6 uses logistic regression techniques to model 
performance assessment responses as predictors of safety climate assessment.  
Throughout Phase 2 analysis, individual and group interviews will be used to validate 
empirical findings.     
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Chapter 5: Data, Methods and Procedures 
This research study investigates the relationship between leadership 
interventions and their influence on the safety climate in high-risk military 
organizations, specifically U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Strike Fighter squadrons 
(VFA/VMFA).  This research is framed around a specific 2003 DOD policy to reduce 
preventable mishaps and is conducted in two distinct data collecti n and analysis 
phases.  The first phase is a secondary analysis of squadron survey data collected by 
the Naval Post-Graduate School at Monterey California between 2001 and 2005.  The 
second phase involves the primary analysis of data obtained by the researcher through 
the use of a study specific survey instrument and through interv ews conducted with 
voluntary study participants in August 2006.  This research design is modeled after 
previous research on organizational climate-behavior relationships, leadership-based 
intervention models and safety climate perceptions (Zohar, 2000). 
Research Roadmap (Theory to Practice)  
 This research plan is designed to evaluate a practical policy roblem using the 
theoretical model of organizational climate outlined in Chapter 2.  Schneider’s (1990) 
model suggests a linear organizational system that predicts that certain human 
resource management practices will produce a specific organizational climate within 
which workers (followers) will develop predictable cognitive and affective states.  
These workers’ attitudes correlate directly with their b havior within the organization 
and can be measured individually or in aggregate as a function of a specific 
productivity metric (e.g. efficiency, output, safety, etc.).  Using the framework of 
Schneider’s model, the methodology described throughout the remainder of this 
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chapter is designed to empirically test and evaluate this study’s research question with 
a specific focus on the components of human attitudes and behavior that have safety 
implications. 
 Recognizing the complexity of analyzing human systems, Schneider’s model 
allows for a simplified application of quantitative techniques to analyze data obtained 
from research participants.  Data will be obtained in five parts of the framework 
including human resource management practices, organizational clim te, cognitive 
and affective states, salient organizational behaviors, and organizational productivity.  
Using a variety of analytical methods, the framework will serve as a guide for 
evaluating the relationships between these components.  In general, the methods are 
designed to evaluate the relationship between certain ledership best practices (human 
resource practices), organizational climate (individual perceptions) and safety 
attitudes and behavior.    
Data Analysis  
 The author has retained working files of all research data in order to replicate 
the results of quantitative methods.  Using descriptive and multivariate statistical 
analysis, the remainder of this dissertation will focus on answering the research 
question proposed in Chapter 1.  This chapter will outline the data used in each phase 
of the research and provide descriptive statistics for several independent and 
dependent factors.  These factors include not only demographic data on survey 
respondents but also a variety of organizational factors that describe command 
functionality (e.g. policies, programs and procedures) and lea er/follower 
relationships.  Since the data were collected and analyzed in two distinct phases, this 
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chapter will describe each phase separately including a descriptive introduction to the 
data.  A variety of quantitative methods will be used for empirical analysis in 
subsequent chapters including cross tabulations, means comparison, nalysis of 
variance (ANOVA), factor analysis and logistic regression.  Because the size of each 
data set varies and the number of variables included for evaluation is vast, the 
potential of committing a Type 1 error cannot be eliminated.  The chance of rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it is not false exists and must be managed throughout the 
analysis phase.  Because of this potential, this research r will not rely on the results of 
one particular method to develop conclusions but will rely on the broader 
interpretation of mixed methods to determine potential correlation and causality.   
 Chapter 6 will examine the relationship between traditional safety program 
interventions and safety climate in Navy and Marine Corps Strike Fighter squadrons 
evaluating the phase 1 research questions and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4.  This 
analysis phase will evaluate relationships between certain unit demographics and their 
correlation with an individual’s assessment of safety climate.  Specific safety program 
interventions like the ones outlined in the DON’s mishap reduction strategy will be 
modeled along with a pre versus post-policy implementation assessment.  While none 
of the data used in Phase 1 is longitudinal (repeated sampling of respondents over 
time), the surveys used were collected over a five-year p riod that brackets the date of 
SECDEF’s mishap reduction policy mandate.  This technique presumes consistent 
survey responses during the five-year sample period. 
 Utilizing Phase 2 data, Chapter 7 examines the efficacy of ertain leadership 
interventions to improve safety climate outside the tradi ional confines of a formal 
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unit safety program.  These interventions target organizational factors such as award, 
performance, appraisal, and individual development and mentoring programs.  Of 
additional research interest is the influence of certain leadership styles on command 
safety climate.  Finally, this chapter evaluates the influence of safety climate on an 
individual’s safety performance focusing specifically on whether on this factor causes 
a reduction in behavior dependent accidents and injuries.  Phase 2 is augmented with 
a sizable number of personal interviews which may substantia e or contradict some of 
the empirical findings. 
Data Analysis Software 
 Statistical analysis for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 was conducted using STATA 
8.2, a full-featured statistical program for Windows provided by the University of 
Maryland, School of Public Policy (MSPP).  This program was utilized on computers 
in the Ph.D. lab at MSPP, Nimitz library at the United States Naval Academy and my 
private residence. 
The Command Safety Climate Assessment Survey (CSCAS) process  
 The Command Safety Climate Assessment Survey (CSCAS) process used in 
Phase 1 analysis was designed to provide squadron-level Commanding Officers 
(COs) with a means by which to survey their aircrew and maintenance personnel with 
regard to safety issues, and receive real-time feedback on their attitudes and 
perceptions.  A key goal of this survey method is to identify and correct latent 
organizational conditions that may lead to increased mishap potential.  Following 
survey administration, COs receive statistical feedback concerning key issues 
regarding command climate, safety culture, resource availability, workload, estimated 
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success of certain safety intervention programs, and other factors relating to safely 
managing military aircraft operations.  The CSCAS process helps squadron COs 
identify safety concerns (hazards) and highlight areas where t y might best focus 
their efforts (hazard assessment).  COs, Aviation Safety Officers, and those 
selectively afforded access, are then in a position to use this information to develop 
strategies (risk decisions) and then implement those strategies (controls) to better 
their organization’s performance. 
CSA/MCAS Survey Background 
In 1996, a Human Factors Quality Management Board (HFQMB) was 
established by the Navy to analyze and recommend improvements to processes, 
programs, and systems that affect human performance with the purpose of reducing 
the naval aviation mishap rate.  One outgrowth of the HFQMB was the development 
of two organizational climate assessment surveys by the Scool of Aviation Safety, 
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA: the Command Safety Assessment (CSA) 
survey which assesses an organization's operational practices from a safety 
perspective, and the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) which 
assesses an organization's maintenance practices from asafety perspective.  The 
QMB was chartered to analyze and recommend improvements to anything involving 
high-risk flying with the purpose of reducing the aviation mishap rate.  The QMB's 
ultimate goal was to prevent mishaps and enhance readiness.  The QMB is composed 
of representatives from each Type Commander, the Naval Safety Center, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, operational commands, and aviation safety and human factors 
specialists.  Led by a Flag Officer, the QMB meets biweekly during scheduled video 
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teleconferences.  Initially, the QMB defined several potential intervention areas 
including leadership, policy, organizational effectiveness, training and qualifications, 
standard operating procedures, aircraft systems, safety information management, 
human factors evaluation, mishap investigation, and operational risk management.  
Later, as the focus expanded to include maintenance operations, an aviation 
maintenance working group was added. 
Following the formation of the HFQMB and under sponsorship of the 
Secretary of the Navy's Office of Safety and Survivability, a study of organizational 
factors in flight mishaps was undertaken.  The Command Sfety Assessment Study 
began by focusing on the chain of events leading to a mishap.  The study was 
particularly interested in assessing command influence throug out the reconstruction 
of the event.  Examining many cases, they concluded much was available and much 
could have been done to prevent the mishap from occurring.   
While cultural factors are difficult to define in terms amenable to observation 
and measurement, a Model of Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) was 
developed by Professors Ciavarelli and Figlock that incorporated some organizational 
climate and cultural aspects that may underlie Naval Aviation values and norms. 
Their model presumes that command leaders set the tone for a healthy (positive) 
command climate and reinforce their safety culture.  Differences in safety climate and 
culture among commands may be a root source of certain unsafe attitudes and 
behaviors (Naval Safety Center, 2006). 
The MOSE model identifies five major areas that impact the effectiveness of 
Naval Aviation activities: 
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• Process Auditing: A system of ongoing checks to identify hazards and 
correct safety problems 
• Reward System: The expected social rewards and disciplinary actions used to 
reinforce safe behavior, and correct unsafe behavior 
• Quality Control:  The policies and procedures for promoting high quality 
work performance 
• Risk Management: A systematic process used to identify hazards and control 
operational risk 
• Command and Control: The organization’s overall safety climate, 
leadership effectiveness, and the policies and procedures used in the 
management of flight operations and safety 
The MOSE served as the basis for the initial Command Safety Assessment 
Survey (CSA).  The 57-item survey was administered by mail to 69 naval squadrons 
and a total of 67 units (97%) participated and a total of 1254 surveys w re collected.  
This sample was randomly selected from a sample frame that represented a 
proportional cross-section of both Navy and Marine aviation units from different 
types of communities.  The sample of respondents included only designated Naval 
Aviators and Naval Flight Officers.  Data were analyzed for all categories of the 
MOSE model and all survey items.  Findings show that ratings for most items, 
particularly those items related to command climate, qualification standards, safety 
training, and leadership issues, were favorable.  Key findings show a general concern 
about operational tempo, workload, staffing, and resource availability (Naval Safety 
Center, 2006). 
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The initial survey served as a starting point for the development of an internet-
based application for Fleet-wide use. A revised survey based on statistical validation 
and ease of use was developed as well as guidelines for Navy-wide administration.  A 
web-based CSA survey is now available to all aviation squadrons and is a required 
resource for all unit commanders. 
Currently, the CSA data collected is being analyzed by Dr Figlock (under 
contract by the Naval Safety Center) using multivariate techniques and his analysis is 
being published as issue papers (www.safetyclimatesurveys.org).  These issue papers 
provide insights into the causal and associative relationsh ps that impinge on safety in 
aviation organizations and also enable taking the next step in survey development, 
namely calibrating the survey to produce more helpful data. 
The Command Safety Assessment Study initially focused on aircrew.  Using 
the CSA survey and theoretical MOSE framework, a prototype maintenance-oriented 
survey was developed comprised of 15 demographic items (e.g., community, 
experience, etc.) and 67 maintenance-related items (MRIs).  The MRIs were selected 
from a candidate battery of over 200 items by maintenance d safety subject matter 
experts.  Items not fitting the original MOSE categories were placed into a sixth one: 
Communication/ Functional Relationship.  This category cnsiders such items as 
organizational communications, the influence of quality control, and the pressure 
placed on workers to complete their assigned tasks. 
The maintenance prototype and a revised Maintenance Safety Assessment 
survey served to validate the stability of the questionnaire using cluster and factor 
analysis.   A subsequent study of demographic variable bias found they do not impact 
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responses, but showed they are useful in understanding sample composition and 
response patterns.  A final study conducted by NPS determined the MCAS survey 
adequately assesses a technician’s perception of safety climate and that there is a 
positive correlation between the human errors in squadron mishaps and their 
corresponding survey results. 
The initial MCAS served as a starting point for the development of an 
internet-based application for Navy-wide use.  A revised survey based on statistical 
validation and ease of use was developed as well as guidelines for administration.  
Like the CSA instrument, a web-based MCAS version is now available to all Navy 
and Marine Corps aviation units and the data is being evaluated by qualified analysts.   
Data and Phase 1 Sample 
Phase 1 conducts secondary data analysis of survey data collected from Navy 
and Marine Corps Strike Fighter squadrons between November, 2000 and August 
2005.  Research was done in compliance with the following Department of the Navy 
policies regarding the CSCAS system: 
• Individual Survey Respondent Anonymity: An individual must be free to 
respond without fear of reprisal, whether the fear is real or perceived.  
• Organizational Confidentiality:  The identity of the organization is kept 
confidential to avoid the perception that the results could be used as a unit safety 
report card.  
• Ability to Conduct Unfettered Research/Analysis of Data: Access to data on 
an "as needed" basis to safety researchers in the acad mic environment allows the 
 
  137 
 
Navy and Marine Corps the ability to address strategic issues regarding safety 
climate and culture.  
This researcher obtained permission from Professor Figlock (then the data 
base manager) at NPGS to use four CSCAS data sets in compliance with the policies 
outlined above.  These data sets were electronically trnsmitted as four separate Excel 
files.  Each file contains the cumulative responses to CSCAS samples taken over a 
five-year period from officers and enlisted maintenance personnel in U.S. Navy and 
U.S. Marine Corps Strike Fighter squadrons.  The CSA officer sample responded to a 
two-part 72-question survey instrument (Appendix A) and the MCAS officer/enlisted 
sample responded to a similar 54-question survey (Appendix B).  While data linking 
the survey respondent to a particular unit were not available, the date the survey was 
completed was determinable.  Table 5.1 summarizes the data obt ined in the four 
spreadsheets received from NPGS. 
Table 5.1 Phase 1 Data Sets 
Data Set Service Officer/Enlisted # of respondents 
1 (CSA) U.S. Navy Officer 1,783 
2 (MCAS) U.S. Navy Officer/Enlisted 14,242 
3 (CSA) U.S. Marine Corps Officer 1,160 
4 (MCAS) U.S. Marine Corps Officer/Enlisted 7,134 
Survey data collected between November 2000 and August 2005. 
  
Part 1 of the CSA survey asked respondents to answer 10 demographic 
information questions with survey options (data choices) outlined in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Demographic Data Choices for CSA Respondents 
Demographic variables USN USMC 
Rank Junior Officer (O-1 to O-3) 
Senior Officer (O-4 to O-6) 
Junior Officer (O-1 to O-3) 
















Total flight hours Numerical response Numerical response 
 
Total hours in model Numerical response Numerical response 
 







































 Survey data collected between November 2000 and August 2005. 
  
Similarly, Part 1 of the MCAS survey asked respondents to answer 10 
demographic information questions with choices outlined in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Demographic Data Choices for MCAS Respondents 
Demographic variables USN USMC 
Rank E-1 to E-3 
E-4 to E-5 
E-6 to E-7 
E-8 to E-9 
O-1 to O-3 
O-4 to O-6 
WO-1 to CWO-5 
 
E-1 to E-3 
E-4 to E-5 
E-6 to E-7 
E-8 to E-9 
O-1 to O-3 
O-4 to O-6 
WO-1 to CWO-5 
Total Years Aviation 
Maintenance Experience 
 
Numerical response Numerical response 























































































Survey data collected between November 2000 and August 2005. 
 
Part II of the CSA and MCAS surveys asked participants to respond to 
statements regarding their organizations by selecting an appropriate agreement 
statement gradated on a seven-factor Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, 
agree, strongly agree, not applicable, or don’t know).  The CSA survey had 61 such 
questions with two final free response questions.  The MCAS survey had 43 survey 
statements with two final free response questions. 
Part II of both the CSA and MCAS surveys present statements about a variety 
of organizational features associated with safety programs, processes and procedures.  
The survey statements are aligned with the categories f the MOSE model discussed 
in the previous section.  Survey participants completed th questionnaire on-line 
(within unit spaces) and were given adequate privacy and time to complete the 
instrument.  Due to the anonymity policy, associating respondents with particular 
units is indeterminable therefore cumulative assessments of individual squadrons is 
beyond the scope of Phase 1 analysis.  Demographic informati n collected in Part I is 
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very limited.  The survey instrument focuses specifically on the major elements of 
each command’s aviation safety and maintenance program.  
Variables 
 Principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA) provides a 
sophisticated method for simplifying large survey instruments into a manageable 
number of underlying elements by combining many correlated variables.  The 
challenge for the researcher is to accurately ascertain these dimensions and model 
them in a fashion such that different options produce similar or convergent results.  
Maximum-likelihood factoring (MLF), a technique that provides formal hypothesis 
tests to help determine the appropriate number of factors was also employed.  There 
is always the possibility that arbitrary or inaccurate ssumptions might lead to 
analytical flaws in data analysis when using PCA or FA techniques.  To protect 
against this danger, this researcher chose to: a) verify the principal components in the 
CSCAS surveys using PCA and MLF techniques, and b) conduct multivariate 
analysis using both principal components and selected dummy variables created from 
specific survey statements. 
Independent Variables (Phase 1) 
 The MOSE model organizes the CSA and MCAS surveys into five principal 
components or factors (Naval Safety Center, 2006).  Table 5.4 displays the principal 
factors and shows which survey questions (identified by question number) contribute 
to each principal component in the respective questionnaire. 
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PA 1-9 1-6 Process Auditing 
RA 10-18 7-14 Reward System 
QC 19-22 15-20 Quality Control 
RM 23-35 21-29 Risk Management 
CC 36-61 30-43 Command & Control 
Table derived from Naval Safety Center data obtained at: 
http://www.safetyclimatesurveys.org/mainpage.aspx  
 
As an example, CSA survey questions 1-9 and MCAS survey questions 1-6 correlate 
(associated with the same principal factor) because the surv y statements ask 
respondents to consider organizational processes that identify safety hazards and to 
evaluate procedures designed to correct the organizational practices that allow such 
hazards to manifest in the organization.  An example is CSA2 (Command Safety 
Assessment Question 2), “My command uses an internal audit and hazard reporting 
system to catch any problems that may lead to a mishap”.   PCA with promax 
rotation was conducted on the PA (Process Auditing) elements of all four data sets 
and the results are summarized in Table 5.5.  
 
  143 
 









2 no factors/ 
χ








2 / 58% 
2 / 57% 
1 / 58% 
1 / 55% 
sig/not sig 
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1 / 49% 
2 / 58% 
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1 / 67% 
1 / 64% 
1 / 58% 
















3 / 63% 
3 / 59% 
1 / 48% 





RM1, RM2 RM3 











4 / 62% 
3 / 54% 
1 / 48% 





CC1, CC2, CC3, CC4 
CC1, CC2, CC3 
CC1 
CC1 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with promax rotation 
Maximum-Likelihood Factoring (MLF) 
“sig”: significant, “not sig”: not significant  
 
To help understand Table 5.5, consider the Process Auditing (PA) factor of 
the CSA(USN) dataset.  PCA generates two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 
(the standard threshold for determining factor significance) that explains 58% of the 
nine variables combined variance (CSA1-CSA9).  Factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1.0 and subject to MLF can be used for statistical modeling instead of the full 
variable set.  Again referring to the PA factor of the CSA(USN) data, MLF reveals 
that while the 2-factor model significantly improves upon a o-factor model (sig), the 
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2-factor model is not significantly worse than a perfect- it model (not sig).  It took a 
4-factor MLF test to reject the hypothesis of equal variance among factors (not shown 
in Table 5.5).  Because the MLF test yields multiple insta ces of negative variance 
among factors and one factor with zero uniqueness, the results might lack formal 
justification and will be viewed cautiously (improper solution).  The same procedure 
was conducted on the remaining three datasets for each principal component in the 
MOSE model.  
 The variables shown in Table 5.5 will be used in the empirical modeling 
efforts during the data analysis phase and the results will be compared with a 
complete variable model.  Factor scores are linear composites, formed by 
standardizing each variable to zero mean and unit variance, d then weighing with 
factor score coefficients and summing for each factor (Hamilton, 2004).  Being 
standardized, these new factor variables have means close to zero and standard 
deviations equal to one and are measured in units of standard deviation from their 
means.  One standard deviation away from the mean in either direction accounts for 
somewhere around 68 percent of the data, two standard deviations accounts for 
roughly 95 percent of the data and three standard deviations accounts for about 99 
percent of the data.  Each factor score represents the standardized distance from the 
mean each data point is within that factor category.  Table 5.6 shows an example of 
the factor scores for the Navy CSA database.  The remaining 3 sets of factor scores 
are not shown but display a similar pattern.  
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Table 5.6 Principle Factor Scores, CSA/USN Data Set 
Factor 
Variables 
Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
PA1 1783 -3.12e-09 1 -8.080742 3.00098 
PA2 1783 1.22e-09 1 -5.035276 2.140173 
RA1 1783 -3.06e-09 1 -8.04078 2.651947 
QA1 1783 -1.52e-08 1 -7.502046 2.771927 
RM1 1783 3.84e-10 1 -8.153972 3.264045 
RM2 1783 1.83e-09 1 -3.676329 5.978342 
RM3 1783 1.66e-09 1 -3.738338 2.694448 
CC1 1783 -6.47e-11 1 -6.424253 2.446435 
CC2 1783 1.27e-09 1 -6.072398 3.269277 
CC3 1783 -5.37e-10 1 -3.82878 4.119328 
CC4 1783 2.32e-09 1 -3.173315 8.219871 
USN/CSA data set, STATA 8.2 
  
 Categorical variables such as those generated in response to survey questions 
in the CSA and MCAS instruments can become predictors in a regression when they 
are expressed as one or more dichotomies.  Dummy variables wer  created for many 
of the predictor questions in Part II of the surveys using the following example to 
illustrate the technique.  Question 18 of the MCAS instrument asked members to 
respond to the following statement, “Maintenance on detachments is of the same 
quality as that at home station.”  Members selected their response on a seven-factor 
Likert scale.  A dummy variable named quality_1 was generated with a value of 1 
assigned to those respondents who either “Agreed” or “Strongly Agreed” with the 
statement.  A value of 0 was assigned to all other respondent choices.  This technique 
was replicated for many of the survey statements of interes  with a 1 always being 
assigned to a respondent who either agreed or highly agreed.  Not all statements were 
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used to generate dummy variables from each questionnaire.  Qu stion selection will 
be explained in a subsequent section along with a more complete explanation of this 
statistical technique.  Each dummy variable was assigned a ame that closely relates 
the content of the survey statement participants wereask d to respond to.  Table 5.7 
displays the dummy variables generated for both surveys using this technique. 
Table 5.7 Dummy Variables, CSA/MCAS Survey Instruments 
Variable name* CSA Survey Question # MCAS Survey Question # 
reportviolations 11 - 
swiftcorrections 14 - 







humanfactorcouncil 7 - 
humanfactorboard 8 - 
tolerance - 14 






















riskmanagement - 3 









































consequence_1 17 - 
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consequence_2 18 - 

























peerinfluence - 9 

















* Variable names were chosen to reflect the main focus of the survey statement. 
  
Pre-policy and post-policy dummy variables were created to allow the data to 
be parsed into two sections based upon the date the survey was completed and 
relative to the May 2003 implementation date of SECDEF’s policy mandate. 
There exists some debate among social science researchers and behavioral 
scientists regarding the appropriate statistical techniques for analyzing survey data 
that represents individual attitudes and perceptions collected through Likert response 
scales.  While acknowledging many social science research rs apply interval 
techniques to ordinal data such as that generated using CSCAS survey instruments, 
this researcher concludes that this particular data lacks “intervalness” and is not 
normally distributed (two important criteria necessary for applying interval 
techniques to ordinal variables).  The aforementioned procedure takes a seven-
response Likert scale and collapses it into a dichotomous (dummy variable) 
represented as a 1 or 0 response (yes or no).  Some researchers consider this to be a 
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procedure that wastes valuable data (more variation is better) because much can be 
gained from a response scale that offers a significant gradation in choice options.  In 
addition, many researchers support using interval statistic l procedures for ordinal 
data.  In a recent review of the literature on this topic, Jaccard and Wan (1996) 
summarize, "for many statistical tests, rather severe d partures (from intervalness) do 
not seem to affect Type I and Type II errors dramatically."  Use of ordinal variables 
such as 5-point (or greater) Likert scales with interval techniques is the norm in 
contemporary social science.  Use of scales with fewer values not only violates 
normality assumptions but also runs a heightened risk of confounding difficulty 
factors (Garson, 2007).  
There is however an opposing viewpoint.  Thomas Wilson (1971) concludes, 
"The ordinal level of measurement prohibits all but the weakest inferences concerning 
the fit between data and a theoretical model formulated in terms of interval 
variables."  The researcher should attempt to discern if the values of the ordinal 
variable seem to display obvious marked departures from equal “intervalness” and 
qualify his or her inferences accordingly.  “The decomposition of survey data (Likert) 
having ordinal properties into dummy (dichotomous) variables in order to employ 
correlation and regression techniques has now become a widely accepted practice.  It 
should be noted, however, that this methodology uses only n minal information in the 
analysis.  Using the full range of the scale would likely r sult in higher coefficients 
because more of the information would be used” (Albrecht and Carpenter, 1976).   
  The decision to employ the dummy variable technique was based upon an 
evaluation of the “intervalness” of the data.  Analysis of both dependent and predictor 
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variables reveal data summaries that lack order and equal intervals.  The response 
scales have order, but the intervals between scale points seem uneven or skewed.  
Two factors influenced this conclusion.  First, the distribution of response data is 
highly slewed (non-normal distribution) implying that the more appropriate statistical 
test would be based upon binomial theory rather than normal theory.  For example, 
over 94% of the survey population (both Navy and Marine Corps officers) either 
“Agree” or ”Strongly Agree” with the safety climate assessment statement in the CSA 
survey (see Table 5.18).  The policy question under consideration, nd the relevant 
research, strives to illuminate organizational interventions and/or leadership best 
practices that might explain the distinction between these two cohorts.  The remaining 
6% (those participants who responded with anything other than “Agree” or “Strongly 
Agree”) are of less relevance in answering the policy question.  The research focus is 
on the highest categorical affirmation amongst survey participants.   
Second, random interviews with survey participants suggest that respondents 
seem to approach climate assessment statements with a binary choice attitude; 
meaning, participants choose a standard agreement (Agree) with most survey 
statements and only deviate from this pattern if they find a survey statement 
appreciably influential or persuasive in their assessment.  Thus, the questionnaire can 
be reduced to a binary choice between “Agree” and/or “Strongly Agree” and 
everything else.  For the purposes of this research, the dummy variable analytical 
method (collapsing ordinal Likert responses into a dichotom us variable) does not 
significantly reduce the analytical potential of the datab se.  To the contrary, STATA 
8.2 offers a full range of techniques for modeling categorical (ordinal) variables, 
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many of which will be described in greater detail later.  Perhaps most significant, is 
the value of logistical regression (dprobit), a technique that provides for meaningful 
interpretation of modeling results (i.e. gives changes in probabilities (marginal 
effects), rather than coefficients).  In addition, several statistical techniques such as 
ANOVA and t-tests which can be used to evaluate continuous variables were used to 
offer analytical balance.  These techniques will also be described in much greater 
detail later.    
Dependent Variables (Phase 1) 
 Survey questions were evaluated for their relevance in d termining an 
individual’s assessment or perception of the operational safety environment within 
which they work (safety climate).  While not directly assessing the safety climate of 
their organization, the following questions were determined to be reasonable 
predictors and were selected to serve as dependent proxies in emp rical models and 
statistical analysis.  Table 5.8 outlines the dependent variables created to represent 
safety climate. 
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Table 5.8 Dependent Variables in CSA Survey Instrument 










“My command provides a positive 















“In my command, we believe safety is 






















In the above table, two dependent dummy variables were created from each 
survey statement based upon the response strength of the individual completing the 
questionnaire.  This researcher acknowledges that response bias is d fficult to assess 
regardless of how much anonymity is promised from survey administrators and 
command authority.  It is common in military surveys to have inflated responses 
meaning many respondents will agree in general with positive at ments and 
disagree with negative statements particularly when the stat ments deal with the 
command in general rather than the individual completing the survey in specific.  
This would suggest that a dummy variable that assigned a value of 1 to all positive 
respondents, “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” would be skewed (or inflated) with many 
respondents who felt neutral about the statement but were bias d to over assess their 
feelings about the statement.  Some researchers suggest that a dummy variable 
created from just those respondents who “Strongly Agree” with a survey statement 
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gives a more accurate indication of the questionnaire population that really has a 
positive emotion or opinion about the statement in question.  Following this logic, 
two dummy variables were created for each survey statement chosen to serve as a 
proxy for safety climate.  The strength of validity was as essed by the researcher and 
the variable numbering reflects the order of analytical relevance assigned.  Table 5.9 
shows the dependent variables generated from the MCAS survey instrument. 
  Table 5.9 Dependent Variables in MCAS Survey Instrument 
Variable name MCAS 
# 

























“The command has a reputation for 
quality maintenance and sets 















“In my command safety is a key part 
of all maintenance operations and all 







 In both survey instruments, safetyclimate_1 provides the best assessment of 
safety climate in the organization because the statement specifically requires the 
respondent to specifically consider climate as opposed to more specific command 
policies and procedures.  Safetyclimate_2 and safetyclimate_3 were created to provide 
increased confidence in the interpretation of safetyclimate_1 results although neither 
statement specifically deals with the organizational dimension of climate.  This 
 
  153 
 
researcher predicts there will be some consistency between the analyses of all three 
dependent variables. 
The maximum likelihood estimation model dprobit will be used to apply the 
interpretive benefits of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis to dichotomous 
variables.  The model dprobit was chosen because the data tends to be “skewed” and 
since dprobit evaluates averages (means), this model is much tighter at the tails.   
H0= There is no correlation between leadership intervention (best practices) and 
safety climate. 
The basic model can be expressed:  
 Yi= β0 + βpi(PA)pi + βri (RS)ri + βqi(QC)qi+ βmi(RM) mi + βci(CC)ci  + ЄI  
   Where: 
Y i = safety climate (CSA #42 or 13; MCAS #7 or 34) 
p = number of Process Auditing (PA) dummy variables (CSA #1-9; MCAS #1-6) 
r = number of Reward System (RS) dummy variables (CSA #10-18; MCAS #7-14)  
q = number of Quality Control (QC) dummy variables (CSA #19-22; MCAS #15-
20) 
m = number of Risk Management (RM) dummy variables (CSA #23-35; MCAS 
#21-29) 
c = number of Command and Control (CC) dummy variables (CSA #36-61; MCAS 
#30-37) 
I = number of observations 
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Policy Correlation 
 In order to accomplish relevant policy analysis, the leadership intervention 
best practices outlined in the DON policy memorandum had to be matched with 
survey statements in the CSA and MCAS surveys for quantitative analysis.  In 
general, there was ample similarity between guidance in the FRP memo and the 
organizational practices surveyed in the CSCAS instruments to find reasonable policy 
proxies from the two questionnaires.  It must be emphasized that the CSA and MCAS 
surveys were not designed to evaluate policy performance rath r they were designed 
to provide unit commanders with a snapshot of organizationl climate.  This 
researcher has selected specific CSA and MCAS survey statements to model the 
policy recommendations outlined in the guidance messages to unit commanders 
outlined in Chapter 1.   
Phase 1 is designed to investigate if certain leadership interventions, like the 
ones outlined in COMNAVAIRFOR’s Fleet Response Plan (FRP) message (272254Z 
APR 04), correlate with enhanced or elevated safety climate.   Certain questions in 
the CSA and MCAS survey will be used as proxies for several of the leadership 
interventions recommended by naval authorities outlined i Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 Leadership Best Practices Policy Recommendations 
FRP Category/Theme Best Practices outlined in FRP 
Complacency  
1. Air Combat Training Continuum 
(ACTC) like fundamentals program 
- Institute program focused on basic 
flying skills 
 
2. Empower people to eradicate this 
attitude 
 
- Purge culture of complacency 
- Take ownership of issue 
 
3. Complacency War Council 
 
- Use safety councils to identify 
immediate threats 
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- All hands tasked with responsibility and 
given authority to correct unsafe 
situations 
 
4. Intensity ashore equals intensity afloat 
 
- Emphasize mastering basics 
 
5. NATOPS Scenario Training 
 
- Use mishap trends for training 
- Avoid repeat performances 
 
6. Communication tools 
 
- Clever construct, constant 
reinforcement 
- Face-to-face and/or other media 
- Safety and ORM messages constant, 
renewed visibility. Top down from C.O. 
 
7. Develop a culture of mission first, 
safety always 
 
- Start with check-in 
- All circumstances, all evolutions 
 
8. Expanding Human Factors Council 
 
- Use ORM risk assessment matrix to 
assign people to job/mission 
- Assess individual strengths/weaknesses 
Change and Uncertainty  
1. Crawl, walk, run philosophy - Provide facts early and often 
- Emphasize big picture 
 
2. A clear and relevant vision 
 
- COs must articulate command 
expectations and mission 
Personal Behavior and Taking Care of 
Sailors 
 
1. Life Skills Program - Team effort to promote healthy ifestyle 
- Alcohol/drug education, stress and 
anger management, suicide awareness 
and prevention, sexual harassment, 
hazing, nutrition and fitness awareness 
and financial management 
 




3. Personnel Human Factors Meetings 
 
- Identify Sailors at risk 
 
4. Division Quarters - None 
 
5. Leadership wake-up call 
 
- Real intervention requires face-to-face 
interaction with Sailors 
1 COMNAVAIRFOR’s Fleet Response Plan (FRP) message (272254Z APR 04) 
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Table 5.11 presents an outline of the survey questions that will be used as 
leadership intervention proxies.  As will be discussed later in the data analysis 
section, many of the proxies have strong similarities with the leadership best practices 
outlined in the DON’s policy message.  Other proxies ar less strongly related while 
certain best practices have no correlative counterparts in the CSA or MCAS survey. 
Table 5.11 Leadership Best Practices, Proxies in CSA/MCAS urvey 
FRP Best practices CSA or MCAS survey statement proxy1 
Complacency  
- Institute program focused on 
basic flying skills 
None 
 
- Purge culture of complacency 








- Individuals in my command are willing to report 
safety violations, unsafe behaviors or hazardous 
conditions. CSA #11 (reportviolations) 
- In my command, anyone who intentionally 
violates standard procedures or safety rules is 
swiftly corrected. CSA #14 (swiftcorrection) 
- Supervisors are more concerned with safe 
maintenance than the flight schedule, and do not 
permit cutting corners. MCAS #26 
(cuttingcorners) 
 
- Take ownership of issue 
 
- My command restricts maintainers who are 
having problems. MCAS #30 (supervision_1) 
- Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in this 
command. MCAS #14 (tolerance) 
 
- Use safety councils to identify 
immediate threats 
      
 
- Human Factors Councils have been successful in 
identifying aircrew members who pose a risk to 
safety. CSA #7 (humanfactorcouncil) 
- Human Factors Boards have been successful 
reducing chances of an aircraft mishap due to 
high-risk aviator. CSA #8 (humanfactorboard) 
- Command uses safety and medical staff to 
identify/manage personnel at risk. MCAS #3 
(riskmanagement) 
 
- All tasked with responsibility 
and given authority to correct 
unsafe situations. 
- Command leadership encourages reporting 
safety discrepancies without the fear of negative 
repercussions. CSA #10 (leadership_7) 
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- I am not comfortable reporting a safety violation, 
because people in my command would react 
negatively towards me. CSA #18 (negreaction) 
- Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP1 or 
other violations and encourages reporting safety 
concerns. MCAS #9 (peerinfluence) 
 
- Emphasize mastering basics 
 
- Maintenance on detachment is of the same 
quality at home station. MCAS #18 (quality_1) 
 





- Avoid repeat performances 
 
- Safety education and training are adequate in my 
command. CSA #57 (safetyedu) 
- Safety education and training are comprehensive 
and effective. MCAS #35 (training) 
 
- In this command, an aviator who persistently 
violates flight standards and rules will seriously 
jeopardize his/her career. CSA #17 
(consequences) 
- Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards 
associated with maintenance activities.  
MCAS #43 (supervision_4) 
 
- Communication tools, clever 
construct, constant 
reinforcement 
- Face-to-face and/or other 
media 
- Safety and ORM messages 
constant, renewed visibility. 
- Top down from C.O. 
 
- Command leadership is successful in 
communicating its safety goals to unit personnel. 
CSA #41 (communication_1) 
- My command’s safety department keeps me well 
informed regarding important safety information. 
CSA #60 (communication_2) 
- The command adequately reviews and updates 
safety procedures. MCAS #1 (planning_1) 
- Supervisors communicate command safety goals 
and are actively engaged in the safety program. 
MCAS #32 (communication_1) 
- I get all the information I need to do my job 
safely. MCAS #39 (communication_2) 
 
- Develop a culture of mission 
first, safety always: 
- Start with check-in 
- All circumstances, all 
evolutions 
 
- In my command, safety is an integral part of all 
flight operations. CSA #13 (safetyclimate_2) 
- Leaders in my command encourage everyone to 
be safety conscious and to follow the rules. CSA 
#16 (safetyculture_1) 
- In my command, safety is a key part of all 
maintenance operations and all are 
responsible/accountable for safety. MCAS #34 
(safetyclimate_3) 
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- Use ORM risk assessment 
matrix to assign people to 
job/mission 
- Assess individual 
strengths/weaknesses 
 
- My command takes the time to identify and assess 
risks associated with its flight operations. CSA 
#28 (riskassess_1) 
- The command monitors maintainer qualifications 
and has a program that targets training 
deficiencies. MCAS #2 (quality_2) 
Change and Uncertainty  
- Crawl, walk, run philosophy 
- Provide facts early and often 
- Emphasize big picture 
- Command leadership reacts well to unexpected 
changes to its plans. CSA #47 (leadership_1) 
- Within my command, good communications flow 
exists up and down the chain of command. CSA 
#55 (communication_3) 
- Effective communication exists up/down the 
chain of command. MCAS #38 
(communication_4) 
- I get all the information I need to do my job 
safely. MCAS #39 (communication_2) 
 
- COs must articulate command 
expectations and mission. 
 
None 
Personal Behavior and Taking 
Care of Sailors 
 
- Team effort to promote 
healthy lifestyle 
- Alcohol/drug education, stress 
and anger management, suicide 
awareness and prevention, 
sexual harassment, hazing, 
nutrition and fitness awareness 
and financial management 
- Command leadership is actively involved in the 
safety program and management of safety matters. 
CSA #5 (leadership_6) 
- Personnel are comfortable approaching 
supervisors about personal problems/illness. 
MCAS #12 (gethelp) 
 
 




- Identify Sailors at risk 
 
- The command uses safety and medical staff to 
identify/manage personnel at risk. MCAS #3 
(highrisk) 
 




- Real intervention requires 




1 Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) 
Associated dummy variable names are in parentheses 
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Phase 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Four separate sets of data were used for Phase 1 analysis and Tables 5.12 
through 5.15 shows a demographic summary of each survey cohort.  The parent 
command for Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL) and Commander Naval 
Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) are organized geographically with a notional distribution 
of military forces on the east and west coast respectively while Commander Naval 
Air Rework Facilities (CNARF) and Commander Naval Air Training Activities 
(CNATRA) have operating locations throughout the United States.  CNAL and 
CNAP are operational frontline combat aviation units while CNARF is a shore-based 
support command responsible for the depot-level repair and refurbishment of aviation 
equipment including aircraft and support equipment.  CNATRA is a shore-based 
education and training component for both officer and enlisted aviation replacements 
(meaning they are trained to fill rotational assignments in operational units).  Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) includes those operational units responsible for 
the test and evaluation of new or enhanced aircraft systems.   
It should be noted that neither survey instrument queries traditional 
demographic information such as gender, race, age, education or marital status.  
Survey sponsors felt there existed a sizable risk that these questions might 
compromise the condition of anonymity upon which the value nd power of this 
survey instrument is based.  If respondents felt their id nt ty might be traceable, they 
might be less inclined to complete the survey accurately nd honestly.  This is an 
obvious tradeoff that has significant implications for scial science researchers.  
Table 5.12 represents the Navy officer/aviator (CSA) survey cohort.   
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Table 5.12 Demographic Summary of CSA survey (USN/VFA) 
Demographic variables n (number of 
respondents) 
% (survey  population) 
Rank   
Junior Officer (O-1 to O-3) 












Total flight hours   
Flight Hours < 500 
Flight Hours ≥500 ; <1000 
Flight Hours ≥1000; <2000 


























































n=1783.  Survey data collected between November 2000 and June 2005. 
 
Table 5.13 displays a demographic summary of the Marine Corps 
officer/aviator (CSA) cohort.  The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1MAW) is located in 
Okinawa, Japan, the 2MAW at Cherry Point, NC, the 3MAW at Miramar, CA and the 
4MAW is the reserve component headquartered in New Orleans, LA.  
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Table 5.13 Demographic Summary CSA survey (USMC/VMFA) 
Demographic variables n (number of 
respondents) 
% (survey  population) 
Rank   
Junior Officer (O-1 to O-3) 












Total flight hours   
Flight Hours < 500 
Flight Hours ≥500 ; <1000 
Flight Hours ≥1000; <2000 




















































n=1160.  Survey data collected between November 2000 and June 2005. 
 
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show the data for the Navy and Marine Corps
maintenance (MCAS) cohorts respectively.  These survey respondents were 
comprised primarily of enlisted personnel although each data set includes some 
officer personnel specializing in maintenance.   
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Table 5.14 Demographic Summary MCAS survey (USN/VFA) 
Demographic variables n (number of respondents) % (survey  population) 
Rank   
E-1 to E-3 4,420 31.0 
E-4 to E-5 6,407 45.0 
E-6 to E-7 2,667 18.7 
E-8 to E-9 292 2.1 
WO-1 to CWO-5 64 0.5 
O-1 to O-3 231 1.6 
O-4 to O-6 36 0.3 
Work center   
Airframes 1,504 10.6 
Avionics 2,313 16.2 
Flight line 2,848 20.0 
Ordnance 1,805 12.7 
Power plants  1,135 8.0 
Quality assurance 728 5.1 
Survival 1,032 7.3 
Maintenance Control 1,113 7.8 
Other 1,639 11.5 
Primary Shift   
Day check 8,481 59.5 
Night check 5,761 40.5 
Status   
Regular 13,250 93.0 
Active reserve 750 5.3 
Drilling reserve 117 0.8 
Parent Command   
CNAL 3,445 24.2 
CNAP 4,985 35.0 
CNARF 353 2.5 
CNATRA 59 0.4 
NAVAIR 3,257 22.9 
Other 2,059 14.5 
Unit’s location   
Ashore 10,331 72.5 
Afloat 2,079 14.6 
FRS 434 3.1 
Overseas 1,314 9.2 
n=14,242.  Survey data collected between November 2000 and June 2005. 
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Table 5.15 Demographic Summary MCAS survey (USMC/VMFA) 
 
Demographic variables n (number of respondents) % (survey  population) 
Rank   
E-1 to E-3 2,299 32.2 
E-4 to E-5 3,223 45.2 
E-6 to E-7 1,134 15.9 
E-8 to E-9 133 1.9 
WO-1 to CWO-5 96 1.4 
O-1 to O-3 60 0.8 
O-4 to O-6 17 0.2 
Work center   
Airframes 914 12.8 
Avionics 1,445 20.3 
Flight line 430 6.0 
Ordnance 1,212 17.0 
Power plants  759 10.6 
Quality assurance 346 4.9 
Survival 481 6.7 
Maintenance Control 442 6.2 
Other 933 13.1 
Primary Shift   
Day check 4,425 62.0 
Night check 2,537 35.6 
Status   
Regular 6,081 85.2 
Active reserve 529 7.4 
Drilling reserve 352 4.9 
















Unit’s location   
Ashore 5,429 76.1 
Afloat 45 0.5 
FRS 253 3.6 
Overseas 1,290 18.1 
n=7,134.  Survey data collected between November 2000 and June 2005. 
 
Table 5.16 shows a summary of response means for the indepe nt variables 
categorized by the principal components in the MOSE model.   
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  USN USMC  USN USMC 
PA (Process 
Auditing) 
1-9 4.34 4.34 1-6 3.97 3.98 
RA (Reward 
System) 
10-18 4.10 4.06 7-14 3.75 3.69 
QC (Quality 
Control) 
19-22 4.38 4.28 15-20 3.91 3.84 
RM (Risk 
Management) 
23-35 3.53 3.53 21-29 3.58 3.49 
CC (Command 
& Control) 
36-61 4.25 4.22 30-43 3.75 3.72 
* Means calculated from Likert response scale 
0=N/A, 1=Strongly Disagree, 2 Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree, 6=Don’t know 
 
Table 5.17 shows response means for the independent variables used to model 
the FRP mishap reduction policy plan.  Each question repres nts a specific policy 
predictor modeled after the leadership best practices outlined by Navy leadership.  
The policy proxies are summarized for both the CSA and MCAS cohorts. Appendix 
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Table 5.17 Mishap Reduction Policy Proxies, CSA/MCAS Response Means 
Response Means* CSA/MCAS Survey 
Question # USN USMC 
CSA5 4.43 4.45 
CSA7 4.41 4.52 
CSA8 4.24 4.34 
CSA10 4.44 4.35 
CSA11 4.30 4.23 
CSA13 4.56 4.49 
CSA14 4.31 4.30 
CSA16 4.51 4.49 
CSA17 4.47 4.44 
CSA18 4.26** 4.16** 
CSA28 4.36 4.35 
CSA41 4.32 4.26 
CSA47 4.22 4.15 
CSA55 4.10 4.08 
CSA57 4.24 4.21 
CSA60 4.30 4.26 
MCAS1 4.02 4.05 
MCAS2 3.96 3.95 
MCAS3 3.82 3.84 
MCAS9 3.69 3.67 
MCAS12 3.72 3.81 
MCAS14 3.79 3.77 
MCAS18 3.93 3.94 
MCAS26 3.64 3.54 
MCAS30 3.73 3.74 
MCAS32 3.83 3.83 
MCAS34 3.91 3.90 
MCAS35 3.79 3.76 
MCAS39 3.77 3.80 
MCAS43 3.84 3.84 
* Means calculated from Likert response scale 
0=N/A, 1=Strongly Disagree, 2 Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree, 6=Don’t know 
** CSA18 is a negative question.  USN mean = 1.76, USMC mean = 1.88. Mean recalculated for 
positive statement comparison 
 
Positive response rates to the dependent variable safety climate survey 
statements in the CSA and MCAS surveys are summarized in Table 5.18 and 5.19.   
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Table 5.18 Summary of Safety Climate Assessment, (USN/USMC CSA) 








“My command provides a 
positive command climate that 


















“In my command, we believe 



















“My command is genuinely 













 *n= 1783 for USN/CSA cohort 
**n=1160 for USMC/CSA cohort 
Survey data collected between November 2000 and June 2005. 
 
 
Table 5.19 Summary of Safety Climate Assessment, (USN/USMC MCAS) 








“Our command climate 


















“The command has a reputation 
for quality maintenance and sets 




















“In my command safety is a key 
part of all maintenance 


















*  n= 14,242 for USN/MCAS cohort 
**n= 7,134 for USMC/MCAS cohort 
Survey data collected between November 2000 and June 2005. 
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Data and Phase 2 Sample 
 This researcher designed a survey instrument that was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Maryland in January 2006 and 
meets all of the requirements for the protection of human subjects outlined in the 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Part 219, section 101, and the Secretary of the 
Navy Instruction 3900.39C, dated 25 February 2002.  The officer survey (Appendix 
C) and enlisted survey (Appendix D) are both 86 question surveys formatted in seven 
sections.  The surveys were very similar and varied only when investigating areas that 
were specific to the different cohorts.   
The survey instrument underwent Beta testing prior to the data collection 
phase.  The survey was originally reviewed by the research r’s dissertation committee 
in May 2005.  Comments and suggestions were incorporated into a second draft that 
was forwarded to two organizations for review.  The F-18 aircr ft analyst at the Naval 
Safety Center in Norfolk Virginia provided the draft survey to his staff for voluntary 
review.  The survey was completed anonymously and comments w re provided by 
each participant.  Comments were received from both officer and enlisted 
respondents.  A modified survey was then forwarded to the staff of Commander 
Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic at NAS Oceana Virginia.  The Aviation Safety staff 
completed a similar review and provided comments regarding the content, question 
format, language, design utility and their time completion estimate.  These comments 
were incorporated into a final product that included all IRB language requirements for 
voluntary participation and anonymity (consent statement).     
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The survey instrument was administered to four separate strik fighter 
squadrons at NAS Oceana Virginia from August 6-12, 2006.  The squadrons surveyed 
will remain anonymous for the purpose of this research and will be referred to 
throughout as Unit’s 1-4.  Table 5.20 outlines response rates of he survey sample. 
Table 5.20 Phase 2 Data Summary 






1  27/205 27/150 12(45%) / 68(33%) 
2  38/225 38/150 12(32%) / 122(54%) 
3  37/219 37/150 13(35%) / 70(32%) 
4  72/625 72/350 15(21%) / 284(45%) 
1Numbers based on permanent staff.  (excludes officer students, FRAMP and transition units) 
Total usable surveys collected, 51 (officer), 544 (enlisted) 
 
All officer surveys received from the 4 units were usable, m aning they met 
the researcher’s criteria for accuracy and completeness.  13 enlisted surveys were not 
used for the following reasons.  Six of the surveys indicated that the respondent did 
not want to participate.  Seven completed questionnaires had a “flat-line” response, 
meaning the same response option was selected for every cat gory.   
Variables 
Independent Variables (Phase 2) 
 The officer and enlisted survey instruments developed for Phase 2 are divided 
into four principal components and are organized in each survey as Part’s 2-5.  Table 
5.21 summarizes the research focus of each principal component in the questionnaire 
and is the same for both the officer and enlisted instrument. 
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Table 5.21 Principal Factors, Phase 2 Survey Instruments 
Principal Factor Research Focus 
SC “Safety Climate” 
Questions 33-43 
Respondent’s perception of the safety climate; how they 
interpret the safety condition of their work environment a d 
how it guides behavior. 
 
SP “Safety Programs” 
Questions 44-56 
 
Respondent’s assessment of the safety programs in the unit. 
UP “Unit Programs” 
Questions 57-66 
Respondent’s assessment of the management and leadership 
programs in the unit. 
 
LS “Leadership Style” 
Questions 67-84 
Respondent’s assessment of the leadership style and 
behavior of their most immediate supervisor. 
    
Similar to the Phase 1 survey, principal factors were created under the 
presumption that certain survey statements (variables) would elicit correlated 
responses and could be combined into a smaller number of underlyi g dimensions.  
As an example, survey questions 67-84 (Leadership Style) might potentially be 
simplified because the survey statements ask respondents to consider the leadership 
style of the supervisor that most closely influences their daily behavior.  An example 
is question 68, “My supervisor promotes a collective sense of mission”.   PCA with 
promax rotation was conducted on the LS (Leadership Style) elements of both the 
officer and enlisted data sets.  The officer dataset yielded five factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1.0 that explained 76% of the 18 variables combined 
variance (Questions 67-84).  Maximum-Likelihood Factoring reveals that while the 5-
factor model significantly improves upon a no-factor model, th  5-factor model is 
significantly worse than a perfect-fit model.  It took a 7-factor MLF test to derive a p-
value adequate to accept the hypothesis that the model fits as well as a more 
complicated, perfect-fit model.  The same procedure was conducted on both the 
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officer and enlisted datasets for each principal component and he results are 
summarized in Table 5.22. 















SC (Safety Climate) Officer 
Enlisted 
3 / 61% 
2 / 53% 
* / ** 
* / -- 
SC1 SC2 SC3 
SC1 SC2 
 
SP (Safety Programs) Officer 
Enlisted 
5 / 73% 
2 / 47% 
* / ** 
* / -- 
SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 
SP1 SP2 
 
UP (Unit Programs) Officer 
Enlisted 
3 / 67% 
2 / 52% 
* / ** 
* / -- 
UP1 UP2 UP3 
UP1 UP2 
 
LS (Leadership Style) Officer 
Enlisted 
5 / 76% 
3 / 58% 
* / -- 
* / -- 
LS1 LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 
LS1 LS2 LS3 
* Factor model significantly improves upon a no-factor model 
- Factor model fails to significantly improve upon a no-factor model. 
** Factor model is not significantly worse than a perfect fit model 
-- Factor model is significantly worse than a perfect fit model 
 
 The variables shown in Table 5.22 will be used in the empirical modeling 
efforts during the principal components data analysis phase and will compared with 
complete variable modeling results.   
 Categorical variables such as those generated in Phase 1 wer  created based 
upon responses to predictor questions in the Phase 2 survey.  Since the Phase 2 survey 
was created using response options graded on a seven-factor Likert scale like in the 
Phase 1 instrument, dummy variables were generated using a similar methodology.  A 
value of 1 was assigned to those respondents who either “Agreed” or “Strongly 
Agreed” with the survey statement while a value of 0 was assigned to all other 
respondent choices.  This technique was replicated for many of the survey statements 
 
  171 
 
of interest with a 1 always being assigned to a respondent who either agreed or highly 
agreed.  Not all statements were used to generate dummy variables from each 
questionnaire.  One significant distinction should be noted among the variable 
annotation in Phase 2.  Variables that end in the numeric “1”, were generated from 
the same survey question as their non-numeric counterpars, however, the categorical 
distinction was drawn between those respondents who “Str ngly Agreed” with the 
survey statement and all other choices.  This rationale is based upon a perceived 
inflation bias among survey participants and will be discus ed in further detail in the 
data analysis section.   Table 5.23 displays the dummy variables generated for both 
surveys using this technique. 
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Table 5.23 Dummy Variables, Oceana Survey Instrument 
Variable name*  Officer Survey  
Question # 
Enlisted Survey  
Question # 
safetypriority 36 36 
recommendtofriend 38 38 
morale 39 39 
myopinion 40 40 
expectedaccidents 41 41 
standdowns 43 43 
humanfactorbds 45 -- 
orm 46 45 
handleschange -- 48 
safetystats -- 49 
safetydata 51 50 
fairassessment -- 51 
safetyawards 53 52 
empowered -- 53 
sufficienttime -- 54 
bestpeoplesafety 56 55 
injuriesreported -- 56 
counselingguidlines 57 57 
counselinghelpful 58 58 
evaluation -- 59 
mentoring 60 60 
meaningfulreward 61 61 
familyimpact 62 62 
prodevplan 63 63 
perfjobassignment 64 64 
leaderdevelopment -- 66 
leaderpride 67 67 
leaderinspiration 69 69 
leadersacrifice 70 70 
leadermoralstand 73 73 
goalsknown 74 74 
leaderawardrec 75 75 
leaderperfawareness 77 77 
leaderdecide 79 79 
leadermicro 82 82 
leadergetsit 84 84 
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Dependent Variables (Phase 2) 
Survey question number 33 of both the officer and enlisted survey was 
designed to measure a respondent’s assessment of the safety climate in their particular 
unit.  The statement read, “I consider the safety climate in this command to be very 
high.”    A dummy variable safetyclimate was generated for those respondents who 
either “Agreed” or “Strongly Agree” with the survey statement and a variable 
safetyclimate1 for those who “Strongly Agreed”.  Unlike the CSA or MCAS survey 
instrument, the Oceana survey only had one question to assess afety climate.  Table 
5.24 summarizes officer and enlisted responses to the safety climate assessment 
question. 
Table 5.24 Officer and Enlisted Response Summary (safetyclimate, Q33) 









Officer 0 0 0 28 (54%) 24 (46%) 0 0 
Enlisted 6 (1%) 23 (4%) 149 (27%) 264 (49%) 93 (17%) 8 (2%) 1 (.2%) 
n=52 (officers), 544(enlisted) 
 
 As can be seen from the above table, 100 percent of officer respondents either 
“Agreed” or “Strongly Agreed” with the safety climate assessment statement while 
93 percent of the enlisted cohort either “Agreed”, “Strongly Agreed” or were 
“Neutral” about the statement. 
Phase 2 Descriptive Statistics 
The Phase 2 survey instrument was organized into seven diff rent sections.  
Part 1, the demographic data section presented both cohorts with thirty two questions 
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asking respondents to circle an appropriate option.  Demographic data for the officer 
respondents are summarized in Table 5.25.   
Table 5.25 Demographic Data Summary, NAS Oceana Survey (Officers) 
 Demographic variables n (number of 
respondents) 
% (survey  population) 













Rank   
Junior Officer (CWO to O-3) 






































Total flight hours   
Flight Hours: < 500 
Flight Hours: 500-1000 
Flight Hours: 1001-1500 
Flight Hours: 1501-2000 
Flight Hours: 2001-2500 




































Spouse’s living arrangements 
  
Spouse lives with member 








Spouse’s work   
Works full time 











Spouse’s occupation   
Serves in military  





















Education   
2 year degree 











Commissioning Source   
U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) 


























































































Promotion recommendation   
Promotable (P) 
Must Promote (MP) 
Early promote (EP) 
Don’t Know 


















n=52.  Survey data collected August 2006. 
   
  Demographic data for the enlisted respondents are summarized in Table 5.26.   
Table 5.26 Demographic Data Summary, NAS Oceana Survey (Enlisted) 
 
Demographic variables n (number of 
respondents) 
% (survey  population) 













































Citizenship   
U.S. born 
U.S. naturalized 
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Divorced 23 4.2 
Spouse’s living arrangements   
Spouse lives with member 








Spouse’s work   
Works full time 











Spouse’s occupation   
Serves in military  





















Education   
Some High School 




















Authority   
Worker 
Leading Petty Officer 
Shift supervisor 
Work center supervisor 
Branch Chief Petty Officer 














































  179 
 
Other 13 2.4 













































Promotion recommendation   
Promotable (P) 
Must Promote (MP) 

















n=544.  Survey data collected August 2006. 
 
 Section 1 asks several questions designed to assess each unit’s accident and 
injury statistics.  Questions 22 and 23 ask for personal injury data (both at work and 
during leisure time), while questions 24 and 25 question mishap involvement.  
Question 27 asks respondents to assess the number of unit members they have seen 
injured at work over the past year.  The variable names, survey statement and 
selection choices are summarized in Table 5.27.  
Table 5.28 summarizes survey responses to these five variables for both the 
officer and enlisted cohorts.  A more detailed set of figures displaying specific injury 
and mishap variable distributions by unit is included in Appendix E. 
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Table 5.27 Injury and Mishap Variables 
Variable 
name 
Survey statement Selection choices 
injury1 “Over the past year, I have been injured on the 
job (mild to serious)” (Q22) 
 
none, 1, 2, 3, >3 
injury2 “Over the past year, I have been injured during 
leisure time (mild to serious)” (Q23) 
 
none, 1, 2, 3, >3 
injury3 “Number of people I have seen injured at work 
over the past year(mild to serious)” (Q27) 
 
0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, >6 
mishap1 “Over the past year, I have been involved in a 
workplace mishap.” (Q24) 
 
none, 1, 2, 3, >3 
mishap2 “Over the past year, this command has had a 
Class A, B, or C aircraft mishap” (Q25) 
none, 1, 2, 3, >3 
  
Table 5.28 Summary of Injury and Mishap Variable Responses 
Survey response options (n per cohort) Variable Cohort 

















































Survey response options Variable Cohort 













n=52 (Officers); n=544 (Enlisted).  Survey data collected August 2006 
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 Finally, section 1 asks three questions regarding a partici nt’s assessment of 
organization performance (both operational and safety), and their current level of job 
satisfaction.  The variable names, survey statement and selection choices are 
summarized in Table 5.29. 
Table 5.29 Performance Appraisal and Job Satisfaction 
Variable 
name 
Survey statement Selection 
choices 
opperf “My assessment of this command’s operational 
performance” Scale: 1=poor, 6=exceptional (Q28) 
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
saperf “My assessment of this command’s safety 
performance” Scale: 1=poor, 6=exceptional (Q29) 
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
jobsat “My job satisfaction is” Scale: 1=low, 6=high (Q30) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
  
Table 5.30 summarizes survey responses to these three variables for the 
officer and enlisted cohorts.  A more detailed set of figures displaying specific injury 
and mishap variable distributions are included in Appendix F. 
Table 5.30 Summary of Injury and Mishap Variable Responses 











































n=52 (Officers); n=544 (Enlisted).  Survey data collected August 2006 
 
Parts 2-5 of both the officer and enlisted survey instrument presented survey 
statements that asked participants to respond to organizatioal statements graded on a 
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Likert scale similar to the one used in the CSA/MCAS instruments.  Several reverse 
statements were included as a precaution against respondents who might be flat-lining 
their responses (Questions 41, 78, 79 and 82).  Table 5.31 outlines the categorization 
and distribution of survey questions. 
Table 5.31 Oceana Survey Instrument, Statement Categories 
 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4 Part 5 










33-43 44-56 57-66 67-84 
Enlisted Survey 
Question # 
33-43 44-56 57-66 67-84 
 
 Part 6 of the survey asked participants to assess potential ways to improve the 
safety climate within their respective units.  Respondents were asked to rank their top 
three choices from a pre-determined set of 23 options with the opportunity to write-in 
a non-listed preference as option 24.  Table 5.32 outlines the pre-determined choices 
available to respondents in question 85.  
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Table 5.32 Safety Climate Improvement Options (Question 85, Oceana Survey) 
Option # Choice Description 
1 Establish a functional mentor program 
2 Publish safety statistics 
3 Improve squadron resources 
4 Reduce operational tempo 
5 Give out more awards 
6 Take better care of my family 
7 More objective and concrete feedback 
8 Better hardware(aircraft, tools, parts) 
9 Improve base housing 
10 Increase unit diversity (e.g. race, gender) 
11 More medical personnel (e.g. flight surgeon) 
12 Better professional growth programs 
13 Institute a merit-based ranking system 
14 Improve squadron communications 
15 Increase my pay and benefits 
16 Increase tour length/reduce turnover 
17 Improve technical training 
18 Make decision-making more participatory 
19 More individual autonomy, less micro-management 
20 Improve workspaces (equipment, habitability) 
21 Improved medical care for my family 
22 Improve family advocacy programs 
23 Get rid of poor performers 
24 (fill-in) 
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the distribution of first choice ptions selected 
when completing question 85 of the Program Assessment section for officers and 
enlisted personnel respectively.  A more comprehensive set of figures showing the 
first choice distribution by unit and second and third choie distribution by both total 
and unit is included in Appendix F.  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Question 85 (first choice)
 









































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Question 85 (first choice)
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Positive response rates to the dependent variable safety climate survey 
statement (question # 33) in the officer and enlisted surveys are summarized in Table 
5.33 and 5.34.  Tables which summarize safety climate assessment by demographic 
category are included in Appendix H. 
Table 5.33 Summary of Safety Climate Assessment Oceana (Officer)  
Survey Question Response Option n/pop% 
Strongly Agree 24 / 46.2 
Agree 28 / 53.8 
Neutral - 
Disagree - 
Strongly Disagree - 
#33 
“I consider the safety 
climate in this command to 
be very high” 
Don’t know / N/A - 
n=52, survey data collected August 2006 
 
Table 5.34 Summary of Safety Climate Assessment Oceana (Enlisted) 
Survey Question Response Option n/pop% 
Strongly Agree 93 / 17.1 
Agree 264 / 48.5 
Neutral 149 / 27.4 
Disagree 23 / 4.2 
Strongly Disagree 6 / 1.1 
#33 
“I consider the safety 
climate in this command to 
be very high” 
Don’t know / N/A 9 / 1.6 
n=544, survey data collected August 2006 
 
 Table 5.35 displays the mean scores categorized by principal factor for both 
the officer and enlisted cohort.   





  Officer Enlisted 
SC (Safety Climate) 33-43 3.78 3.37 
SP (Safety Programs) 44-56 4.13 3.70 
UP (Unit Programs) 57-66 3.77 3.30 
LS (Leadership Style) 67-84 3.47 3.36 
n=51 (officers), 544 (enlisted), survey data collected August 2006 
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Table 5.36 summarizes response means for the independent variables.  
Table 5.36 Independent Variable Response Means, Oceana Survey 












safetypriority 36 4.54/.67 36 3.67/1.15 
recommendtofriend 38 4.44/.75 38 2.99/1.31 
morale 39 4.13/.93 39 2.89/1.15 
myopinion 40 4.01/.90 40 2.97/1.30 
expectedaccidents 41* 1.71/.82 41* 2.96/1.28 
standdowns 43 3.65/.90 43 3.51/1.12 
humanfactorbds 45 4.38/1.32 -- -- 
orm 46 4.33/.71 45 3.85/.90 
handleschange -- -- 48 3.57/1.11 
safetystats -- -- 49 4.01/2.45 
safetydata 51 4.35/1.04 50 3.94/1.16 
fairassessment -- -- 51 3.61/1.12 
safetyawards 53 3.69/.98 52 3.41/1.33 
empowered -- -- 53 3.61/1.13 
sufficienttime -- -- 54 3.71/1.55 
bestpeoplesafety 56 3.50/1.21 55 3.52/1.43 
injuriesreported -- -- 56 3.78/1.23 
counselingguidlines 57 3.85/1.11 57 3.58/1.13 
counselinghelpful 58 3.67/1.21 58 3.39/1.23 
evaluation -- -- 59 3.48/1.22 
mentoring 60 3.35/1.23 60 3.23/1.25 
meaningfulreward 61 3.75/.88 61 3.19/1.29 
familyimpact 62 3.65/1.44 62 2.88/1.42 
prodevplan 63 3.02/1.46 63 3.06/1.20 
perfjobassignment 64 3.90/1.05 64 3.18/1.27 
leaderdevelopment -- -- 66 3.68/3.08 
leaderpride 67 3.98/.85 67 3.42/1.08 
leaderinspiration 69 3.94/.92 69 3.35/1.11 
leadersacrifice 70 4.15/.92 70 3.61/1.21 
leadermoralstand 73 3.88/.96 73 3.49/1.18 
goalsknown 74 4.21/.87 74 3.80/2.42 
leaderawardrec 75 3.96/.88 75 3.39/1.18 
leaderperfawareness 77 3.75/1.05 77 3.58/1.10 
leaderdecide 79* 1.82/.90 79* 2.84/1.24 
leadermicro 82* 1.94/.89 82* 2.80/1.22 
leadergetsit 84 4.12/.88 84 3.63/1.10 
* negative question 
n=51 (officers), 544 (enlisted) 
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Modeling Leadership Style 
An important part of this research plan is to identify relationships between 
leadership style and a respondent’s assessment of their organization’s safety climate.  
While the survey instruments are different in Phase 1 and Phase 2, the methodology is 
similar.  In both research phases, several survey statements were determined to be 
suitable proxies for leadership style assessment purposes.  Th e survey statements 
are based upon the Full Range Leadership Model developed by Bernard Bass and 
Bruce Avolio (1989).  Using these survey results, particular leadership styles (types) 
will be subject to quantitative modeling in order to evaluate any empirical correlation 
between style factors and an individual’s safety climate assessment.  As depicted 
earlier in Figure 3.2, the transformational leader elevates followers’ efforts by raising 
their confidence and by increasing the value of the possible outcomes by:  
• Expanding the follower’s needs 
• Transcending the follower’s self interests (placing the group above the 
individual) 
• Elevating/altering or widening the follower’s level of needs on Maslow’s 
scale  
The principal behavior of the transactional leader is to motivate follower 
behavior through a series of exchange relationships facilitated by trading awards and 
incentives for services rendered.  A broader concern for the individual actualization 
of subordinates is overshadowed by an immediate interest in unit objectives and short 
term goals. 
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In the Phase 1 survey instrument, participants were not asked specifically to 
comment on the leadership style of their direct supervisor, rather the survey 
statements referred broadly to command level practices and command level 
observations from which a supervisor’s style propensity might be deduced.  
Therefore, survey statements used to model leadership style were evaluated based 
upon how well they conformed to the following criteria for determining a certain 
leadership environment within the respondent’s organization. 
A leadership environment was considered transformational if respondents 
reported leadership practices within their organization that facilitated open 
communications (regarding mission, safety, schedule, personnel management, and job 
performance) and/or expressed concern for subordinate development and individual 
welfare.  The leadership environment was considered transaction l if a respondent 
determined the dominant supervisory practices in place were based upon exchange 
relationships and considered laissez-faire if their leader was autonomous.   
The Phase 2 survey instrument presents 18 survey statements (Questions 67-
84) designed to place a respondent’s leader in one of three broad leadership style 
categories, i.e. transformational, transactional or laissez-faire.  Questions 67-73 and 
84 are designed to identify those respondents who work for transformational leaders 
if they respond in the affirmative.  Questions 74-78, 80 and 82 are designed to assess 
the transactional supervisor.   
Question 79 assesses if a supervisor or leader is actually engaged in any 
aspect of leadership as assessed by the respondent.  Agreement with this survey 
statement implies the respondent judges their leader as one who avoids responsibility 
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(is uninvolved in the decision-making process) and is essentially an autonomous 
entity in the chain of command (i.e. a laissez-faire leader).  Questions 81 and 83 
assess changes in leadership style due to increases in operational demand or tempo.  
It is important to note that while individuals often exhibit a specific leadership 
style in their leadership behavior, it is not uncommon for followers to be subject to a 
variety of leadership interventions simultaneously, many that may represent different 
leadership styles or types.  It is also not uncommon for a particular leadership practice 
to have both transformational and transactional components.  The important research 
challenge is to identify a certain leadership style, manifested in a distinct (and 
observable) intervention practice that correlates with a follower’s assessment of their 
organizational safety climate.      
Phase 2 Personnel Interviews 
 During the Phase 2 data collection phase, this researcher was authorized to 
conduct interviews with unit personnel.  These interviews were voluntary and every 
effort was made to make the interview cohort a random sa ple from each of the 4 
units participating in the survey.  Because these are operational military units, 
interview participants were chosen at the discretion of the participating unit, relying 
in large measure on the operational necessity of the partici nts during the interview 
windows.  This researcher acknowledges a certain selection bias might exist 
(interview participants may have been the least engaged or imp tant workers) 
however, every effort was made to include participants who represented all ranks, 
ratings, specializations, gender and work shift.  The interviews were conducted both 
individually and in groups; held in private spaces with only the researcher and 
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interviewees present.  Interviews were not recorded however the researcher had 
permission to take hand-written notes.  No other supervisory personnel were in 
attendance nor were parent unit supervisors allowed to see the interview notes.  
Interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes and participants were allowed complete 
control over their level of participation.  The researcher’s military rank was not 
disclosed and he wore civilian clothes.  Interviews were started using a bank of 
question prompts included in Appendix I.  Table 5.37 provides a general overview of 
the interviews conducted during Phase 2.  Additional interviews were conducted with 
CSFWL staff personnel including the Commodore, chief of staf , maintenance 
officer, safety officer, staff Corpsman, and maintenance Master Chief. 
Table 5.37 Phase 2 Interview Participants (Oceana Survey) 




1 1 1 Officer O-4 
2 1 1 Enlisted E-9 
3 1 1 Officer O-4 
4 1 15 Enlisted E-1 to E-3 
5 1 13 Enlisted E-6 
6 2 6 Officer O-1/2 
7 2 1 Officer O-5 
8 2 4 Enlisted E-4 
9 2 1 Enlisted E-6 
10 2 1 Officer O-3 
11 3 1 Officer O-4 
12 3 1 Officer O-3 
13 3 1 Officer O-2 
14 3 1 Officer O-5 
15 3 3 Enlisted E-7 
16 4 5 Enlisted E-1 to E-3 
17 4 1 Enlisted E-6 
18 4 1 Officer O-4 
19 4 6 Officer O-2/O-3 
20 4 15 Enlisted E-4 to E-5 
Interviews were conducted, August 2006. 
Participation was voluntary.  Sessions occurred during all three work shifts and endeavored to attain 
fair rank, gender, and race representation. 
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 In general, interviews were very informal and quite informative (revealing).  
Sessions occurred during all three work shifts and endeavord t  attain fair equitable 
gender, and race representation.   It took very little promting to get people to 
participate in the large focus group settings while the individual interviews took 
longer to gain some interactive tempo.  Some people were reluctant to participate and 
some were curious about the chance of attribution.  All participants signed consent 
forms and were briefed on the conditions of volunteerism, non-disclosure and 
anonymity.  The researcher intentionally prompted quiet participants to encourage 
participation but did not coerce individuals in single interviews or invite peer pressure 
to coax personnel in group interviews.  No one refused to par ici te and no one 
objected to the researcher taking notes.  The researcher was primarily interested in a 
few topics and drove the interviews in a specific directon using the following 
prompts:   
1. Describe the safety environment/climate.  Does this climate influence how you 
perform?  On the job?  During off-duty hours? 
2. What are the things your supervisor does that improves this climate?  Degrades 
the climate? 
3. Explain why certain leader actions have either a positive or negative effect on 
your perception of safety climate. 
There was considerable consistency in the discussions and the information 
gathered during these interview sessions will be introduced in Chapter 7 as applicable 
to illuminate the empirical findings. 
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Chapter 6: Phase 1 Analysis: Assessing the Navy’s Mishap 
Reduction Policy 
 
 Phase 1 of this research investigates the relationships between certain 
organizational variables (demographics, safety policies and programs) and safety 
climate in high-risk organizations such as naval aviation strike fighter squadrons 
(specifically F/A-18 aviation squadrons).  Of specific interest is the 2003 DOD policy 
aimed at reducing preventable accidents and mishaps.  The focus of the Navy’s 
intervention strategy (policy) was to elevate safety climate in these organizations 
presuming this change would improve individual behavior and decision-making as it 
relates to safety performance.  Three specific questions were proposed in Chapter 4 
for Phase 1 research that will be investigated using a secondary data set designed to 
collect safety climate data within these high-risk units of interest. These questions 
will facilitate a broader understanding of: the efficacy of the Navy’s mishap reduction 
strategy; how safety program intervention policies might nfluence such 
organizational factors as climate; and offer insight on ways to improve future policies 
designed to ultimately reduce preventable mishaps.  
   The Phase 1 data  focuses specifically on traditional policies, programs and 
procedures within the formal construct of the Naval Aviation Safety Program 
(OPNAVINST 3750.6R, 2001).  This program is based upon the principle of 
“necessitarianism” which means every event (mishap) is a re ult of organizational 
antecedents that had some influence on the event’s occurren e (things just don’t 
happen).  Identifying, and then eliminating these causes is at the core of the Naval 
Aviation Safety Program.  Phase 1 takes the first step in trying to identify some of 
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these organizational antecedents to mishaps looking for ass ciations between unit 
demographics and safety climate.  Second, this phase analyzes the relationship 
between certain safety program interventions (best-practices) and their influence on 
safety climate.  Finally, Phase 1 evaluates how effective the Navy’s mishap reduction 
strategy was in meeting the 50% reduction goal imposed by the Secretary of Defense 
in 2003. 
Squadron Demographics and Safety Climate 
 The Navy’s mishap reduction strategy outlined in Chapter 1 is focused at the 
unit-level, broadly considering each organization (strike-fighter squadron) to be 
relatively homogeneous in terms of personnel composition.  The FRP policy does not 
reflect the demographic differences of unit members, choosing to ignore the 
potentially distinct correlation a specific demographic might have with an 
individual’s assessment of safety climate.  Upon closer consideration, this knowledge 
of demographic distinctions seems potentially relevant to crafting a policy designed 
to elevate a member’s perception of the safety climate in their unit.  An important 
first step would be to baseline the relationship between demographics and 
organizational perceptions regarding safety climate before crafting an intervention 
strategy that applies comprehensively to an entire unit.   
Several consequences seem possible without this analysis.  First, precious 
resources, particularly time and manpower might be wasted on cohorts not 
necessarily in need of a specific policy treatment.  Why waste the time and effort on a 
group of unit members who require little if any of the policy ever?  Second, applying 
policy to a cohort not in need of the intervention could invite a negative reaction from 
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a demographically definable group of constituents.  An example ight be offering 
private education vouchers in a public school district that has a few schools exceeding 
established standards for teacher and student performance.  The treatment might be 
universally applied to a geographic region or certain school b ard district with 
pockets of underperforming schools while the reaction from parents in the high 
performance areas could potentially manifest in student tra sfers, increased home 
sales and parental unrest.  What may be good for some may not necessarily be good 
for others.  Finally, failure to baseline unit demographics makes policy analysis 
difficult if not impossible.  Evaluating the influence of a policy treatment can only be 
measured with confidence if the pre-policy perceptions of the s udy group are well 
known and documented (controlled for).  Measuring policy success or failure requires 
a credible evaluation of interventions and outcomes, the validity of which cannot be 
determined without a baseline measure of the policy cohort. 
 The first step in demographic analysis is to compare the means of variable y 
across categories of variables x investigating the null hypothesis that there is no 
statistical difference between means.  In this case, y r presents the unit’s safety 
climate assessment as measured by question #42 in the CSA (Table 5.7) and question 
#7 in the MCAS (Table 5.8) survey and x represents the ten demographic questions 
asked of each survey respondent as outlined in Table 5.2.  Tables 6.1 through 6.4 
summarize the statistically significant means differences for both the Navy and 
Marine Corps CSA and MCAS cohorts.  These differences will be evaluated in the 
subsequent paragraphs.   
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Table 6.1 Safety Climate, ANOVA Means Comparison (USN/VFA, CSA) 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (CSA42) (0-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic Variables n mean SD means comparison/statistic l 
significance1 
Rank    a b c d 
a. Junior Off (O-1 to O-3) 









   
Total flight hours        
a. Flight Hours < 500 
b. Flight Hours ≥500 ; <1000 
c. Flight Hours ≥1000; <2000 





























Authority        
a. Non-Department Head 









   
1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
 
Table 6.2 Safety Climate, ANOVA Means Comparison (USMC/VMFA, CSA) 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (CSA42) (0-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic Variables n mean SD means comparison/statistic l 
significance1 
Rank    a b c d 
a. Junior Off (O-1 to O-3) 









   
Total flight hours        
a. Flight Hours < 500 
b. Flight Hours ≥500 ; <1000 
c. Flight Hours ≥1000; <2000 





























Authority        
a. Non-Department Head 












Status        
a. Regular 
b. Active Reserve 




















Parent Command        
a. 1 MAW 
b. 2 MAW 
c. 3 MAW 





























1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
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Table 6.3 Safety Climate, ANOVA Means Comparison (USN/VFA, MCAS) 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (MCAS7) (0-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic 
Variables 
n mean SD means comparison/statistical significance1 
Rank    a b c d e f g h i 
a. E-1 to E-3 
b. E-4 to E-5 
c. E-6 to E-7 
d. E-7 to E-8 
e. E-8 to E-9 
f. O-1 to O-3 
g. O-4 to O-6 


























































































Work center             
a. Airframes 
b. Avionics 
c. Flight line 
d. Ordnance 
e. Power Plants 
f. QA 
g. Survival 
h. Maint Control 
i. Other 












































































































Primary Shift             
a. Day check 











       
1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
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Table 6.4 Safety Climate, ANOVA Means Comparison (USMC/VMFA, MCAS) 
 Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (MCAS7) (0-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic 
Variables 
n mean SD means comparison/statistical significance1 
Rank    a b c d e f g h i 
a. E-1 to E-3 
b. E-4 to E-5 
c. E-6 to E-7 
d. E-8 to E-9 
e. O-1 to O-3 
f. O-4 to O-6 








































































Work center             
a. Airframes 
b. Avionics 
c. Flight line 
d. Ordnance 
e. Power plants 
f. QA 
g. Survival 
h. Maint Control 
i. Other 












































































































Primary Shift             
a. Day check 











       
Status             
a. Regular 
b. Active Reserve 



















      
1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
 
In general, there are statistically significant means differences regarding safety 
climate assessment amongst different rank, experience and authority cohorts.  Safety 
climate assessment tends to positively correlate with an increase in rank, experience 
and authority. 
Military Rank and Authority 
Junior officers have lower safety climate assessment tha  their senior officer 
counterparts in both Navy and Marine Corps aviation units (Tables 6.1 and 6.2).  
Both cohorts have similar means and the differences between rank categories (junior 
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vs. senior officers) are similar in both size and direction.  Senior officers in these 
aviation units tend to be leaders (policy makers) and managers while junior officers 
are the followers when it comes to unit policies and programs.  Senior officers tend to 
be strong advocates for unit policies on two levels.  First, they have been members of 
the formal organization (Navy or Marine Corps) longer than their junior officer 
counterparts.  In an all volunteer force, this means they have chosen to remain within 
the organization.  This implies a certain organizational self-selection, meaning those 
individuals who oppose organizational policies that have an adverse effect on safety 
might leave the organization over time while those who feel the organization fulfills 
their needs or promotes their priority for safety might naturally decide to stay.  These 
are broad generalizations and not all officers, either junior or senior, have a priority 
for safety.  This correlation between rank and safety climate assessment is consistent 
with researchers who suggest a correlation between climate and certain satisfactions 
that can be derived from the influence of organizational climate including 
achievement, affiliation, power and job satisfaction (Litwin and Stringer, 1968). 
A second explanation might be that senior officers are empowered to 
influence, shape or change local safety policies and procedures to fit their 
management and leadership priorities.  Policy makers struggle with objectivity when 
asked to evaluate the programs they are responsible for implementing.  With an 
almost prophetic bias, senior officers believe their policies are working while junior 
officers are more inclined to be critical of those things they have had little 
responsibility in creating.  This intuitive and yet criti al finding has significant 
implications for crafting a mishap reduction policy that might actually work, i.e. 
 
  199 
 
elevate safety climate.  First, the mishap reduction policy must be based upon 
empirical evidence and data that cannot be influenced by the subj ctive bias of senior 
policy makers motivated to be their very own policy advocates.  Second, senior 
officers must acknowledge the safety climate assessment difference between them 
and their junior officer squadron mates acknowledging the critical importance of 
trying to ascertain why the shared perceptions among a sizable and influential 
component of the overall unit is lower than their own.  
The same rationale applies to the authority demographic which highlights the 
distinction between officers serving as Department Heads (DH) and those not in a 
department head billet.  The department head mean for safety climate assessment is 
statistically higher than the non-department head mean in Navy units.  This is not the 
case with Marine Corps units.  Among the Navy cohort, this finding is consistent with 
the rank demographic because department heads are traditionally senior officers, 
typically holding the rank of Lieutenant Commander (O-4).  There are exceptions to 
this rule in the Navy which requires a brief explanation.  In some operational F-18 
squadrons, senior Lieutenants (O-3) can serve as a DH.  This occurs when manpower 
shortages have a unit manned below their O-4 multiple or when a Lieutenant 
demonstrates exceptional leadership acumen and the Commanding Officer is 
accelerating the individual’s professional development and career timeline.  These 
exceptions are rare and would not exist in large enough numbers to influence the 
assessment gap noted between demographic groups.   
The Marine Corps data is quite interesting.  While a statistically significant 
safety climate assessment means difference exists between junior and senior officers, 
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safety climate assessment between DHs and their non-DH counterparts are almost 
identical (4.32 vs. 4.35).  Two explanations seem plausible.  First, junior officers 
serve as DHs more frequently in Marine Corps squadrons than their Navy 
counterparts.  Marine Corps promotion to Major (O-4) is traditionally 12-18 months 
behind a Navy counterpart who was commissioned on a similar date.  Because tour 
lengths and professional assignment timelines are similar within the two sea services, 
aviators are serving in their DH tours during the 10 to 12.5 year point from service 
commissioning date (Navy Personnel Command, 2005).  Fiscal year 2007 promotion 
zone predictions to Lieutenant Commander is 9 years and 10 months (Navy Personnel 
Command, 2006) while Marine Corps promotion plans to the rank of Major are a full 
one-year later (Marine Personnel Plan, 2006). 
Second, command relationships between COs/XOs and DHs are considerably 
more formal in USMC units than they are in their USN counterparts.  While difficult 
to assess empirically, USMC units are a bit more regimnted and particular about 
rank structure and this is reflected in the professional rel tionships between these two 
management groups.  This suggests perhaps that DHs in USMC units enjoy less 
familiarity with their senior’s motivations and intentions when formulating policies 
that might influence a unit’s climate.  With less professional intimacy on planning 
and leading matters, USMC DHs might be more aligned perce tually with their JO 
counterparts explaining the near identical climate assessm nt.   
Both USN and USMC enlisted survey groups show a unique safety climate 
assessment trend in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.  There exists a staistically significant 
difference in safety climate assessment means between th  most junior cohort (E-1 to 
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E-3) and the mid-grade enlisted survey group (E-4 to E-5) that in all likelihood can be 
attributed to several organizational factors including work hours, stress and time on 
the job (Pflantz, 2006).  Most E-4s and E-5s are still on their first enlistment and are 
serving in their first operational unit assignment.  As their rank increases, so does 
their job responsibility which also correlates directly with longer work hours (by 
practice, not policy).  Also, these mid-grade enlisted technicians are striving to flex 
their management and decision-making muscle while still fee ing the restriction of 
being junior personnel.  Very few members in this E-4 to E-5 peer group are serving 
as anything higher than a maintenance team leader or shift supervisor.  This burden to 
perform more complex tasks without a commensurate rise in authority can cause 
frustration, potentially leading to a more critical assessment of senior management 
and supervisors (the “only if I could do it my way” syndrome).  Second and third tour 
technicians in the E-6 to E-7 rank category have a much higher safety climate 
assessment due to an amelioration of all the supervisory and management challenges 
facing the E-4 to E-5 cohort.  They have enjoyed both a formal and informal rise in 
decision making authority and their elevated safety climate assessment seems to be 
more in line with the explanation offered for the elevat d assessment in the DH 
cohort. 
Because the enlisted participants in the MCAS survey responded to a different 
question regarding safety climate assessment, care is taken when comparing the 
officer and enlisted cohort.  Overall, the enlisted safety climate assessment means are 
lower than the officer cohort while there is a close similarity between aviation 
officers and their maintenance officer counterparts.  It certainly appears that where 
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one exists in the military (organizational hierarchy) seems to influence directly one’s 
perception of the safety climate in their particular unit.  While certain units might 
have a particularly positive emphasis or focus on improving safety policies and 
procedures, it seems as if there exists some organizational influences on climate that 
are unique to these particular types of units.  What seems consequential is the fact that 
safety climate assessment has high predictability when it comes to the demographic 
constructs of military rank and organizational authority and that most leaders have a 
significantly higher perception of safety climate than their followers. 
Flight Experience 
 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reveal a safety climate assessment non-linearity for 
aviators’ experience level similar to the rank inconsistency among maintenance 
technicians.  Young aviators, those with less than 500 hours of flight experience 
baseline safety climate assessment means at 4.35 and 4.32 respectively for USN and 
USMC members.  There exists a subsequent reduction in meas for the next 
experience category (≥500 and <1000 hours) followed by a linear increase among the 
remaining experience categories.  This safety climate ass ssment drop is likely 
attributable to the tenure explanation offered in the previous section with potentially 
some additional explanations.  The first two flight exp rience categories are 
transitioned by first tour aviators, with the 500 hour barrier broken sometime around 
the mid-point of a member’s first tour.  It is around thistime that a young aviator 
starts to question the rationale and justification for certain policies and procedures.  
Prior to that, they were typically consumed with thec allenge of operational flying, 
particularly on and off an aircraft carrier.  Once thir comfort level increases and they 
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start getting more flight authority (like being designated a formation leader or a 
section leader), young aviators start to analyze unit policies that might influence their 
perception of the safety climate (i.e. crew selections, mi sion assignments, currency 
requirements, advancement and promotion policies, etc.).  These generalizations are 
broadly defined and certainly vary based upon a variety of factors.  Anecdotally, 
some might suggest that novice aviators do not know any better during the initial 
phase of their first tour and it is not until some of the initial challenge wears off that 
young pilots and NFOs begin a more critical assessment of unit operations including 
safety relevant leadership decisions. 
 Many aviators, particularly those flying military high performance aircraft 
have a great mortality revelation sometime during their first tour (the powerful 
recognition that flying can kill you).  This revelation entails a vivid realization of the 
dangers of their chosen occupation and a reaction that invites the close discrimination 
of the policies and procedures that directly influence theirassessment of their 
personal survival and safety.  This typically happens midway during the first tour and 
aligns nicely with the means perturbation displayed in the tables above.  When one 
questions their basic needs such as safety and survival, the environment within which 
they are asked to function is often called into close discriminating question. 
 The more experienced flight categories show a nice linear tr nd with the most 
experienced aviators demonstrating the highest safety climate assessment.  More 
flight experience correlates directly with higher rank nd authority which therefore 
shares the previously explained justifications for such an association.  The self 
selection phenomenon is also potentially applicable.  The all volunteer force culls out 
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many disenfranchised aviators and attrites marginal performers through performance 
appraisals, voluntary resignations and Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Boards 
(FNAEB).  Therefore, the preponderance of highly experienced aviators have 
performed at an exceptional level, have embraced the organizational programs that 
govern flight operations and safety, and are now serving in positions of responsibility 
and authority; all attributes that correlate directly with higher rates of safety climate 
assessment. 
Reserve Personnel 
 Marine Corps reserve aviators, both drilling officers and those recalled to 
active duty, have a higher safety climate assessment tha  their active duty 
counterparts.  This finding is consistent with the parent command data which reveals 
a safety climate assessment mean in the reserve wing (MAW4) significantly higher 
than the remaining three active duty wings.  Navy reserve officers do not show a 
similar trend and there is not a reserve component repres nt d among the Navy’s 
parent commands.  Explaining this finding is difficult because comparing reserve and 
active duty units is subject to many distinct variations.  Drilling members serve one 
weekend a month and two weeks a year on active duty while their active duty 
counterparts are full-time unit members.  Drill officers have civilian full-time jobs 
with a sizable component serving as civilian commercial airline pilots.  Comparing 
these cohorts lacks measurable control although it is not u reasonable to conclude 
that job satisfaction might be a valid predictor of higher safety climate assessment.  
Drill officers serve voluntarily and get enormous pleasure from flying military 
aircraft on a part-time, almost hobby-like basis while th ir active duty counterparts 
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endure the challenge of cyclical deployments, family separation and high work 
tempo.  This factor has significantly changed in recent yars with a high level of 
active duty force activation for reserve members due to the war on terror (particularly 
Afghanistan and Iraq). 
 This explanation fails to explain why recalled to active duty aviators have a 
higher safety climate assessment than their active duty counterparts.  Two reasons 
seem plausible.  One, the majority of recalled officers are junior officers who may be 
either in civilian job transition (waiting to be hired or just recently furloughed from a 
commercial airline), volunteers of reserve duty or volunteers of activation, and/or 
members who regret their active duty separation decision (miss flying jet aircraft).  
Activation is perceived by some as a desirable hiring, a paycheck which equates to 
higher morale and job satisfaction.  Second, the reserv  components tend to self-
select those who were not completely disdainful of active service but had a mitigating 
reason to leave active service.  For many it was family separation which can be 
softened by an agreement to be activated for a predictable and finite period of time.  
This recalled cohort is comprised traditionally of those aviators who love tactical 
flying but decided to leave active service due to personal, not professional reasons.  
While these generalizations might not align completely with intuition, there is ample 
statistical evidence to support acknowledging a means differenc  between active duty 
and reserve USMC aviators.  It is interesting to point out that this difference also 
exists among USMC enlisted personnel but not among USN personn l.  It might 
stand to reason that activation as a tactical pilot plausibly provides similar job 
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satisfaction (both professional and financial) compared to ac ivation as an USMC 
enlisted maintenance expert.   
Work center 
 The final demographic that yields significant safety climate assessment means 
differences is work center for the MCAS cohort as shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.  The 
work center demographic is not applicable to the officer group.  Maintenance Control 
has the highest means for both enlisted groups.  Not surprisingly, this work center is 
the management and oversight center for all squadron mainten nce operations and is 
consequently manned by the most senior enlisted maintainers in the squadron and run 
by the most senior enlisted personnel.  These two factors explain the high level of 
safety climate perception since it is this organization that is evaluating its very own 
policies, programs and procedures.   
The ordinance work center, responsible for the preparation, loading, arming 
and de-arming of all ordinance and ordinance related equipment has the next highest 
perception of the organizational safety climate.  Besides being somewhat reassuring, 
this work center must have some organizational qualities that distinguish it from the 
other work centers.  Perhaps it can be attributed to the nature of their job 
specialization.  Working with ordinance requires safe guards, team confidence, 
technical competency and trust besides all the other qualities necessary to operate 
effectively in a high risk military organization.  None of the previous demographic 
explanations apply such as rank, tenure, experience or authority.  The fleet ordinance 
work center is manned with the same distribution of enlisted manning as any other 
maintenance work center (i.e. rank, authority, etc.).  Potential explanations will be 
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explored in Phase 2 but suffice it for now to acknowledge that there exists a 
quantifiable elevated safety climate in both USN and USMC ordinance work centers. 
 Finally, the Quality Assurance (QA) work center in USN units has an elevated 
safety climate while it does not in the USMC units.  Formally, the QA work center 
works directly for the Maintenance DH and not the Maintenance Control supervisor 
or the Maintenance/Material Control Officer (MMCO) (OPNAVINST 4790.2J, 
2005).  Informally, the QA work center often answers directly to MC, mirroring the 
attitudes and perceptions of that work center (essentially becoming safety program 
advocates).  This explains the distinction between USN and USMC units.  In the 
Navy, the QA work center is typically manned by senior enlisted personnel who 
become the agents of the Maintenance/Material Control Chief (MMCPO).  They look 
to the MMCPO for both operational guidance and professional advocacy and venerate 
his/her position because of organizational nepotism.  This explains the similarity 
between MC and QA perceptions of safety climate. 
 In the Marine Corps, QA operates in a more traditional role embracing the 
value of impartial and unfettered monitoring of squadron maintenance and operations 
remaining uninfluenced by or protected from, senior maintenance department leaders.  
Therefore, USMC QA work centers have a lower safety climate assessment than their 
MC counterparts and their safety climate assessment mean is in line with the other 
departmental work centers. 
Safety Program Best Practices and Safety Climate 
Logistic regression analysis was performed on the four Phase 1 data sets using 
the variables described in Chapter 5.  Logistic regression all ws for regression 
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modeling of the categorical (dummy) dependent and predictor variables described in 
Chapter 5.  Statistical analysis was conducted to reveal significant predictors 
(independent variables) of safety climate (dependent variable) from the CSA and 
MCAS secondary data sources.  The data tables in this chapter show abridged results 
presenting only those predictor variables with statistically significant marginal effects 
greater than 5%.  The modeling technique was exploratory and methodical in nature 
meaning additional independent variables were added after subsequent iterations in an 
effort to improve the model’s predictive power.  With such a variable rich data set, 
the researcher endeavored to build a parsimonious model excluding variables that did 
not have policy relevance or did not add to the model’s coefficient of determination, 
R2.    
Analyzing the Officer (Aviator) Cohort 
 Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the regression results of the CSA data analysis using 
safetyclimate_1 and safetyclimate_11 as the dependent variable.  Similar modeling 
was done for the safetyclimate_2 and safetyclimate_3 variable sets.  
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Table 6.5 Regression Results CSA Survey (USN/VFA) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  
safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_11 safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_11 
Independent Demographic variables 
FRS 0.003 -0.103 0.001 -0.091 
 (0.394) (0.033)* (0.867) (0.056) 
Independent Organizational Variables  
reportviolations 0.003 0.241 -0.000 0.212 
 (0.457) (0.000)** (0.915) (0.001)** 
humanfactorboard 0.003 0.218 0.002 0.216 
 (0.371) (0.000)** (0.305) (0.000)** 
planning 0.008 0.537 0.002 0.536 
 (0.036)* (0.000)** (0.424) (0.000)** 
communication_1 0.048 0.242 0.006 0.155 
 (0.000)** (0.015)* (0.130) (0.166) 
leadership_1 0.013 0.146 0.003 0.099 
 (0.004)** (0.009)** (0.250) (0.082) 
motivation_1 0.042 0.158 0.026 0.136 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.003)** 
# of variables 29 29 41 41 
Respondents 1783 1783 1783 1783 
Pseudo R2 .60 .37 .68 .38 
n=1783.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
safetyclimate_11: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
Robust p-values, * significant at 5%; **  1%. dprobit result .  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
Table 6.6 Regression Results CSA Survey (USMC/VMFA) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  
safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_11 safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_11 
Independent Organizational Variables  
reportviolations 0.011 0.160 0.000 0.113 
 (0.159) (0.013)* (0.891) (0.083) 
motivation_1 0.031 0.250 0.003 0.220 
 (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.269) (0.000)** 
consequence_1 -0.002 0.206 -0.001 0.205 
 (0.649) (0.000)** (0.604) (0.000)** 
# of variables 29 29 41 41 
Respondents 1160 1160 1160 1160 
Pseudo R2 .60 .37 .68 .38 
n=1783.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
safetyclimate_11: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
Robust p-values , * significant at 5%; **  1%. dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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 Tables 6.5 and 6.6 reveal those statistically significant predictor variables that 
were verified by the regression results of either safetyclimate_2 or safetyclimate_3.  
Only those variables that had a similar modeling result using either the secondary or 
tertiary dependent variable are included in the tables above.  This was done to give 
the researcher additional confidence in the results of he primary model.  As can be 
seen from the data, only one demographic variable, Fleet Replacement Squadron 
(FRS) is a statistically significant predictor of safety climate assessment and that is 
only among the USN cohort (Table 6.5, Model 2).  While the ps udo R2 equals .37 in 
model (2) of each data set, care should be taken when interpreting this result.  
Contrary to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, which provides an R2 value 
than can be interpreted as an estimate of explained variation, the same cannot be said 
in a maximum likelihood regression.  STATA documentation warns against using 
pseudo R2 in formal write-ups of results.  The idea of a pseudo R2 came from 
economists who wanted some rough measure of explanatory power of the model.  
Therefore, it is really just a guide for fitting models. A small pseudo R2 should make 
a researcher question the model's explanatory ability, u  a big pseudo R2 should not 
be considered a research panacea.  This is particularly true when using continuous y 
(dependent) variables although this is not the case with this data set (Hamilton, 2004). 
Since the dprobit logistic regression routine yields margin l effects, this 
variable’s coefficient (-0.103) can be interpreted as follows.  Officers in the FRS are 
10.3 percent less likely to strongly agree with the safety climate assessment statement 
(CSA42) in the CSA survey than officers in other types of units (all else being equal).  
The remaining organizational variables can be interpreted the same way but rely on a 
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review of the survey statement that generated them for clarity.  For example, the 
dummy variable reportviolations was generated from CSA11, “Individuals in my 
command are willing to report safety violations, unsafe behaviors or hazardous 
conditions.”   From model (2) in Table 6.5, one could interpret the coeffi ient (.241) 
as, officers who agree or strongly agree with CSA11, are 24.1% more likely to 
strongly agree with the safety climate assessment statement (CSA42) than those 
officers who neither agree or strongly agree with CSA11.  This suggests that if one 
believes their organizational cohorts are willing to report safety violations, they 
perceive their safety climate as higher (i.e. 25 percent more likely to either agree or 
strongly agree with CSA42) than those who think their organizational cohorts are not 
as willing to report this type of unsafe behavior. 
 The remaining variables can be interpreted in the same manner.  It is 
interesting to note that the high percentage correlations occur among the “strongly 
agree” safety climate assessment variables (safetyclimate_11).  One way to interpret 
this is that officers who have an extreme opinion about the independent variable 
(those who either strongly agree or strongly disagree as opposed to those who have 
either a moderate opinion about the statement or don’t know), tend to have a similarly 
aligned opinion about the safety climate in their unit.  However, safety climate seems 
to be one of those organizational dimensions that tends to get a mainstream (positive) 
assessment from the population majority and requires a careful examination of 
extremes (strongly agree or disagree) to analyze organizatio al predictors that might 
correlate with an atypical assessment. 
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 For the Navy and Marine Corps officer/aviator cohort, 30 dummy variables 
were created as independent predictors of safety climate assessment while 16 of those 
dummies were used to model the specific policy interventions outlined in the Navy’s 
mishap reduction strategy (FRP).  Excluding the demographic predictors, only 6 
organizational variables correlate with elevated safety climate assessment for the 
Navy data set and only 3 variables correlate for Marine Corps aviators.  One of these 
variables, CSA8 is in the PA (Process Auditing) factor set; 2 variables, CSA11 and 
CSA17 are in the RA (Rewards System) factor set; one variable, CSA26 is in the RM 
(Risk Management) factor set; and 3 variables, CSA41, CSA47 and CSA50 are in the 
CC (Command and Control) factor set.  Of the 16 prescribed “leadership best 
practices” outlined in the FRP, only 4 organizational variables positively correlate 
with elevated safety climate assessment in the Navy and only 2 correlate in the 
Marine Corps.  Based upon a five-year sample of secondary data, it appears that only 
25 percent of the prescribed mishap reduction interventions seem to have the desired 
policy outcome for the Navy and only 12.5 percent for the Marine Corps.  Table 6.7 
summarizes these results. 
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Table 6.7 Interventions Associated with Elevated Safety Climate (CSA)  
Organizational 
Variable 
CSA # Service Factor  Survey Statement 
humanfactorboard CSA8 USN PA Human Factors Boards have 
been successful reducing chances 
of an aircraft mishap due to high-
risk aviator. 
 
reportviolations CSA11 USN 
USMC 
RA Individuals in my command are 
willing to report safety violations, 
unsafe behaviors or hazardous 
conditions. 
 
consequences CSA17 USMC RA In this command, an aviator who 
persistently violates flight 
standards and rules will seriously 
jeopardize his/her career.  
 
communication_1 CSA41 USN CC Command leadership is 
successful in communicating its 
safety goals to unit personnel.  
 
leadership_1 CSA47 USN CC Command leadership reacts well 
to unexpected changes to its 
plans.  
CSA survey data 
Factors: PA (Process Auditing), RA (Rewards System), RM ( isk Management), CC (Command & 
Control).  
 
 Using the leadership style assessment guidance outlined in Chapter 5, each 
organizational variable in Table 6.7 reveals a principal leadership style component.  
The variable humanfactorboard has a distinctly transformational component because 
this particular leadership intervention shows concern for an individual’s welfare and 
professional development.  While historically considered a primary attrition method, 
human factor boards are far from that today.  These boards provide exceptional 
support to individuals in need of performance remediation, professional development 
advice, and personal advocacy.  Reportviolations, albeit a factor grounded in concern 
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for safety and individual welfare, also reflects a transactional arrangement between 
those who observe unsafe behavior and the reciprocity f r reporting such an 
observance.  Followers are generally rewarded for this type of individual effort and 
the focus of this intervention is the accomplishment of the immediate job at hand.  
Consequences follows a similar transactional arrangement between th  follower who 
violates a known organizational procedure and the predictability (or certainty) of a 
substantial consequence.  While follower concern is a factor, the leadership 
intervention that imposes consequences for violating flight standards is concerned 
primarily in unit objectives and short term goals.  Communication_1 and 
leadership_1 are primarily transformational factors.  Each focuses on individual 
consideration and attempts to expand the follower’s needs by facilitating open 
communications and managing job and schedule uncertainties.  
In an effort to validate these findings, logistic regression was conducted on the 
11 factor variables derived for each CSA survey cohort described in Chapter 5 as 
predictors of safteyclimate_1.  Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the statistically significant 
results of this analysis for both the Navy and Marine Corps cohort.   
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Table 6.8 Regression Results, CSA Factor Analysis (USN) 
Factor Analysis Variables 
Model 1 
safetyclimate_1 
RM1 (Risk Management 1) 0.004 
 (0.020)* 
RM2 (Risk Management 2) -0.009 
 (0.000)** 
CC1 (Command & Control 1) 0.009 
 (0.000)** 
# of Factors 11 
Respondents 1783 
Pseudo R2 .53 
Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
Robust p values in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
Table 6.9 Regression Results, CSA Factor Analysis (USMC) 
Factor Analysis Variables 
Model 1 
safetyclimate_1 
PA1 (Process Auditing 1) 0.009 
 (0.025)* 
RM3 (Risk Management 3) -0.020 
 (0.000)** 
CC1 (Command & Control 1) 0.016 
 (0.000)** 
# of Factors 11 
Respondents 1160 
Pseudo R2 .39 
Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
Robust p values in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
 As described in Chapter 5, caution should be exercised whn correlating 
certain factors to specific policies variables when using factor analysis in social 
science research.  Attributing factor analysis results to organizational policies can be 
misleading and can present a slippery “analytical” slope.  Value is gained by 
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comparing factor analysis with the empirical results of regression techniques using 
policy specific variables and evaluating generalizations that either verify or contradict 
those results.  Interpreting the results of logistic regression, when using factor 
variables, is equally difficult.   Table 6 .8 shows, for example, that a 1 unit increase in 
the RM1 factor score will increase the likelihood of a respondent either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing to the safety climate assessment survey statement by .4 percent (a 1 
vice a 0 dummy score).  While the influence of this factor may not seem large, it was 
derived by creating a principle component that considers risk management across a 
broad spectrum of organizational actions.  Additionally, this factor considers the 
interaction effect amongst a variety of variables, many which either enhance or 
diminish the combined influence of certain organizational actions that have a risk 
management component along with a multitude of other functional components.  
There is evidence that suggests the principle components RM1, PA1 and CC1 
correlate positively with safety climate assessment among the CSA cohort.  This is 
consistent with the “best practices” analysis that reveals 2 of the Navy’s 5 highly 
correlative policy interventions came from the CC factor and that all three of the 
Marine Corps’ came from the RM category. 
The RM correlation for both the Navy and Marine Corps is negative however.  
This should not be interpreted directly, postulating thatrisk management causes a 
reduction in safety climate assessment.  RM has several principal components and it 
is the second and third components that correlate negatively with safety climate 
assessment.  In the CSA instrument, 4 of the 13 questions are negatively phrased, 
meaning a higher opinion choice correlates with a lower assessment of the 
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organizational function or policy in question.  For example, CSA23 states, 
“Command leaders permit cutting corners to get a job done.”  To agree or strongly 
agree with this survey statement would intuitively imply a lower safety climate 
assessment.  The correlation in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 seem to reflect at least a portion of 
this negative relationship with the risk management principle component.   
A second explanation will be further investigated in Phase 2.  This 
explanation involves an investigation of the potentially negative influence that certain 
risk management policies may have on a unit member’s assessment of the safety 
climate in his or her squadron.  The risk management funcions surveyed in the CSA 
instrument deal with broad matters of manning, budgeting, training, and equipping 
and the management challenge of risk identification and assessment.  It is 
hypothesized that there are certain aspects of the latter component, risk identification 
and assessment that might retain a negatively correlative component when related to 
safety climate assessment.  Certain risk management techniques have become highly 
intrusive and may potentially have a transition point where they become counter-
productive and damaging to individual self-esteem and job satisfaction; two 
components that are presumed to be highly predictive of safety climate assessment.  
Analyzing the Maintenance Cohort 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the regression results for the MCAS data sets using 
safetyclimate_1 as the dependent variable.  Similar modeling was done for the 
safetyclimate_2 and safetyclimate_3 variables.  
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Table 6.10 Regression Results MCAS Survey (USN/VFA) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  
safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_1 
Independent Demographic Variables 
E4_to_E5 -0.024 -0.024 -0.028 -0.022 
 (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.012)* 
nightcheck -0.021 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.004)** (0.007)** (0.013)* (0.013)* 
ashore 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.024 
 (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.016)* 
avionics -0.049 -0.055 -0.063 -0.057 
 (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.001)** 
Independent Organizational Variables  
tolerance 0.095 0.082 0.075 0.070 
(MCAS14) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
training 0.071 0.047 0.047 0.038 
(MCAS35) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
planning_1 0.139 0.101 0.098 0.096 
(MCAS1) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
respect_1 0.071 0.051 0.048 0.041 
(MCAS16) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
leadership_1 0.076 0.043 0.033 0.033 
(MCAS23) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
# of variables 38 45 49 52 
Respondents 14242 14242 14242 14242 
Pseudo R2 .42 .44 .45 .45 
 Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (MCAS7) 
Robust p-values in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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Table 6.11 Regression Results MCAS Survey (USMC/VMFA) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  
safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_1 safetyclimate_1 
Independent Demographic Variables 
E4_to_E5 -0.040 -0.038 -0.038 -0.035 
 (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.005)** 
E6_to_E7 -0.069 -0.062 -0.064 -0.057 
 (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.003)** 
daycheck 0.022 0.028 0.027 0.026 
 (0.057) (0.015)* (0.020)* (0.026)* 
MAW_4 0.052 0.040 0.040 0.042 
 (0.026)* (0.098) (0.101) (0.084) 
ashore 0.113 0.067 0.067 0.067 
 (0.004)** (0.086) (0.079) (0.078) 
overseas 0.078 0.043 0.042 0.041 
 (0.014)* (0.206) (0.206) (0.210) 
Independent Organizational Variables 
tolerance 0.105 0.090 0.085 0.083 
(MCAS14) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
planning_1 0.150 0.108 0.102 0.103 
(MCAS1) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
respect_1 0.089 0.062 0.057 0.056 
(MCAS16) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
leadership_1 0.094 0.057 0.043 0.045 
(MCAS23) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.005)** (0.004)** 
# of variables 36 43 47 50 
Respondents 7117 7117 7117 7117 
Pseudo R2 .40 .42 .43 .43 
Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (MCAS7) 
Robust p-values in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
 
 Tables 6.10 and 6.11 reveal those statistically significant predictor variables 
that were verified by the regression results of either safetyclimate_2 or 
safetyclimate_3.  Only those variables that had a similar modeling result using either 
the secondary or tertiary dependent variable are included in the tables above.  Similar 
to the CSA cohort, this was done to give the researcher additional confidence in the 
results of the primary model.  As can be seen from the data, there are several 
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demographic variables that are statistically significant predictors of safety climate 
assessment among both the Navy and Marine Corps maintennc  cohort.  
Demographic coefficients are interpreted relative to the cat gorical variable that was 
omitted from the model.  Referencing the USN/MCAS model 1, the E-4 to E-5 
enlisted cohort is 2.4 percent less likely than the E-1 to E-3 cohort (the rank dummy 
variable omitted from the model) to agree or strongly agree with the safety climate 
assessment survey statement (MCAS7).  This is consistet with the Marine Corps 
model and in addition, the E-6 to E-7 cohort shows a similar trend and is consistent 
with the means analysis shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
 Navy night check maintenance technicians are almost 2 percent less likely to 
have a positive safety climate assessment compared to their day check counterparts 
while the Marine Corps disparity is almost 3 percent.  This finding is also consistent 
with previous means analysis.  Sailors serving in shore-bas d units are 3 percent more 
likely to have a positive safety climate assessment than eir sea-based (afloat) 
counterparts while the Marine Corps difference between th se two groups is over 11 
percent.  The difference between Marines serving overseas and those serving afloat is 
almost 8 percent.   
 Work center assignment is highly correlative with safety climate assessment 
among the Navy cohort while this is not necessarily the case among Marines.  For 
Navy maintenance experts, assignment to a technical (producti n) work center 
predicts a lower assessment than those maintainers assigned to Maintenance Control.  
Table 6.10 shows that members of the avionics work center are about 5 percent less 
likely to have a positive safety climate assessment than eir maintenance control 
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counterparts.  Although not included in Table 6.10, this correlation is similar for 
every production work center.  The Quality Assurance branch does not correlate. 
Marines assigned to the reserve air wing, MAW4, are over5 percent more likely to 
have a favorable safety climate assessment than their fellow Marines serving in 
MAW1.      
The modeling results (coefficients) for the organizational variables can be 
interpreted like those in the CSA cohort.  For example, Navy MCAS respondents who 
deem unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in their command (agree or strongly 
agree with MCAS14, the tolerance dummy) are almost 10 percent more likely to have 
a positive safety climate assessment than those respondents who have a neutral, 
negative or inconclusive response (all else being equal).  This correlation might 
equate to organizational programs, policies or procedures that monitor and mitigate 
behavior at all levels that does not conform to some institutional standard.  Bear in 
mind, the question refers to behavior in general, and is not pecifically tied to 
behavior that has some safety related component.  A survey participant may respond 
to this statement considering social, professional, ethical or financial behavior rather 
than behavior that might jeopardize the safety of a particular unit member.   
 The remaining variables can be interpreted in the same manner.  It is 
interesting to note that contrary to the CSA cohort, high percentage correlations for 
the MCAS cohort occur with the “agree” or “strongly agree” safety climate 
assessment dependent variables (safetyclimate_1) as opposed to the “strongly agree” 
dependent variable, (safetyclimate_11).  One explanation may be that the MCAS 
cohort, comprised primarily of enlisted respondents, is more h nest (or objective) in 
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reporting their opinions on organizational attributes meaning the mainstream 
tendency is not to naturally align with an elevated (agree) climate assessment as is the 
baseline with the officer cohort.   Perhaps officers f el obligated to report more 
positive unit evaluations than their maintenance counterparts because by 
organizational structure alone, they retain certain codified responsibilities for shaping 
the very attributes they are being asked to evaluate.  It is clear from means analysis, 
that the MCAS cohort has significantly lower safety climate assessment means than 
the CSA cohort.  Finally, it should be emphasized that both cohorts responded to 
different survey statements that were used to generate the safety climate variable.  
This discrepancy was resolved in the Phase 2 instrument and both cohorts responded 
to an identical safety climate assessment statement. 
 For the Navy and Marine Corps maintenance cohort, 29 dummy variables 
were created as independent predictors of safety climate assessment while 14 of those 
dummies were used to model the specific policy interventions outlined in the Navy’s 
mishap reduction strategy (FRP).  Excluding the demographic predictors, only 5 
organizational variables correlate with elevated safety climate assessment for the 
Navy data set and 4 variables correlate for Marine Corps maintainers.  One of these 
variables, MCAS1 is in the PA (Process Auditing) factor set; 1 variable, MCAS14 is 
in the RA (Rewards System) factor set: MCAS16 is in the QC (Quality Control) 
factor set; MCAS23 is in the RM (Risk Management) factor set and the fifth variable, 
MCAS35, is in the CC (Command and Control) factor set.  Of the 14 prescribed 
“leadership best practices” outlined in the FRP, only 3 organizational variables 
positively correlate with elevated safety climate asses ment in the Navy and only 2 
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correlate in the Marine Corps.  Based upon this five-year sample of secondary climate 
data, it appears only 21 percent of the prescribed policy intervention measures are 
positively correlated with the policy objective (elevated safety climate) for the Navy 
and only 14 percent for the Marine Corps.  Table 6.12 summarizes these results. 
Table 6.12 Interventions Associated with Elevated Safety Climate (MCAS) 
Organizational 
Variable 
MCAS # Service Factor  Survey Statement 
planning_1 MCAS1 USN 
USMC 
PA The command adequately 
reviews and updates safety 
procedures. 
 
tolerance MCAS14 USN 
USMC 
RA Individuals in my command are 
willing to report safety 
violations, unsafe behaviors or 
hazardous conditions. 
 
training MCAS35 USN CC Safety education and training 
are comprehensive and 
effective. 
MCAS survey data 
Factors: PA (Process Auditing), RA (Rewards System), CC ( ommand & Control).  
 
 Similar to the CSA cohort, the organizational factors in Table 6.12 have a 
specific leadership style focus.  Tolerance (similar to reportviolations in the CSA 
cohort) reflects primarily a transactional arrangement b tween those who observe 
unsafe behavior and the reciprocity for reporting such an observance although 
follower well being is an important element.  Followers a e generally rewarded for 
this type of individual effort and the focus of this intervention is the accomplishment 
of the immediate job at hand.  Planning_1 and training are primarily transformational 
factors.  Each focuses on individual consideration and worker well being.  Each 
 
  224 
 
intervention attempts to expand the follower’s needs by facilitating open 
communications and managing job and schedule uncertainties.   
  In an effort to validate these findings, logistic regression was conducted on the 
6 factor variables derived for the Navy MCAS survey cohort and the 7 factor 
variables for the Marines as described in Chapter 5.  Tables 6.13 and 6.14 show the 
statistically significant results of this analysis for both the Navy and Marine Corps 
cohort.   
Table 6.13 Regression Results, MCAS Factor Analysis (USN) 
Factor Analysis Variables 
Model 1 
safetyclimate_1 
PA1 (Process Auditing 1) 0.081 
 (0.000)** 
RA1 (Rewards System 1) -0.015 
 (0.002)** 
RA2 (Rewards System 2) 0.047 
 (0.000)** 
QC1 (Quality Control 1) 0.054 
 (0.000)** 
CC1 (Command & Control 1) 0.056 
 (0.000)** 




Pseudo R2 .23 
Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (MCAS7)) 
Robust p values in parentheses;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
Table 6.13, the Navy MCAS cohort, shows that a 1 unit increase in the 
Process Auditing factor (PA1) score will increase the lik lihood of a respondent 
either agreeing or strongly agreeing to the safety climate assessment survey statement 
by over 8 percent (a 1 vice a 0 dummy score).  The only princial omponent that 
does not correlate with elevated safety climate is Risk Management (RM).  The 
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Rewards System (RA1) has a slightly negative correlation although it is close enough 
to zero to be considered neutral.  Deferring further investigation until Phase 2, there is 
evidence to suggest that some award programs may have perceptible policy inequities 
and process flaws; possibly explaining the negative correlation for the RA1 factor.   
Table 6.14 Regression Results, MCAS Factor Analysis (USMC) 
Factor Analysis Variables 
Model 1 
safetyclimate_1 
PA1 (Process Auditing 1) 0.076 
 (0.000)** 
RA1 (Rewards System 1) 0.016 
 (0.020)* 
RA2 (Rewards System 2) 0.044 
 (0.000)** 
QC1 (Quality Control 1) 0.034 
 (0.000)** 
RM1 (Risk Management 1) 0.025 
 (0.019)* 
RM2 (Risk Management 2) -0.049 
 (0.000)** 
CC1 (Command & Control 1) 0.051 
 (0.000)** 
# of Factors 7 
Respondents 7017 
Pseudo R2 .21 
Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (MCAS7) 
Robust p values in parentheses;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
For the Marines (Table 6.14), all components positively correlate with the 
exception of Risk Management 2 (RM2).  Similar to the explanation for the CSA 
cohort, risk management programs can interact with other command functions in 
ways that might actually reduce the perceived safety climate due to mismanagement, 
over supervision, and/or privacy intrusion.  This will be further examined in Phase 2.  
Factor analysis is a powerful analysis tool, capable of pr viding utility in exploratory 
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research.  It is reemphasized here however, that factor nalysis is not empirical proof 
of cause and effect relationships.        
Pre versus post-Policy Analysis 
 This section analyzes survey data before and after the policy implementation 
date to evaluate the performance of the Navy’s intervention strategy.  If safety climate 
assessment increased after the implementation date, ther  would be substantial reason 
to believe the policy caused the desired outcome (controlli g for other significant 
organizational influences).  Pre and post-policy means comparison of the safety 
climate assessment variable was conducted for both cohorts.  May 2003 was the date 
used for DOD policy implementation and April 2004 was when the FRP policy 
message was released. 
Table 6.15 Safety Climate Assessment Means, Pre and Post Policy Comparison 








CSA/USN 4.35 (566) 4.38 (1,217) 4.38 (1,023) 4.36 (760) 
CSA/USMC 4.26 (741) 4.46 (412) 4.30 (941) 4.48 (212) 
MCAS/USN 3.92 (4,002) 3.94 (10,156) 3.94 (7,221) 3.94 (6,937) 
MCAS/USMC 3.89 (2,977) 3.99 (4,040) 3.94 (3,987) 3.95 (3,030) 
Means calculated using response to  CSA42 or  MCAS7 
Total respondents in parentheses (n) 
May 2003:DOD mandate; April 2004: FRP message release 
   
  Table 6.15 shows there was no discernable elevation in safety climate 
assessment after either the DOD mandate or the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan (FRP) 
and the results are unremarkable for both the aviator and m intenance Navy cohort.  
The Marine Corps aviator cohort experienced a 0.2 rise in the safety climate 
assessment means following the DOD policy mandate in 2003 and an almost identical 
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rise following the FRP implementation plan.  While both services were subject to 
DOD’s policy mandate, only the Navy cohort was subject to the FRP implementation 
plan.  The maintenance cohort in the Marine Corps exerienced a slight means 
increase following May 2003 but the rise topped out for the remainder of the study. 
In addition to means comparison, this researcher conducted logistic regression 
analysis on the Navy survey data comparing the correlation of predictor variables 
before and after the DOD policy implementation date.  Tables 6.16 and 6.17 compare 
those significant predictor variables before and after th FRP implementation date for 
the Navy CSA and MCAS cohort.  









Independent Organizational Variables  
reportviolations 0.000 0.004 0.302 0.218 
(CSA11) (0.981) (0.185) (0.005)** (0.004)** 
humanfactorboard 0.003 -0.001 0.231 0.215 
(CSA8) (0.022)* (0.505) (0.000)** (0.000)** 
planning 0.001 0.006 0.517 0.553 
(CSA26) (0.618) (0.013)* (0.000)** (0.000)** 
communication_1 0.006 0.054 0.323 0.203 
(CSA41) (0.034)* (0.000)** (0.034)* (0.104) 
leadership_1 0.008 0.006 0.257 0.090 
(CSA47) (0.028)* (0.025)* (0.012)* (0.159) 
motivation_1 0.007 0.045 0.158 0.175 
(CSA50) (0.011)* (0.000)** (0.029)* (0.002)** 
# of variables 29 29 29 29 
Respondents 566 1217 566 1217 
Pseudo R2 .65 .65 .37 .39 
n=1783.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
safetyclimate_11: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
Robust p-values in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects 
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Independent Organizational Variables  
planning_1 0.075 0.104 0.025 0.038 
(MCAS1) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.231) (0.006)** 
tolerance 0.063 0.075 0.041 0.067 
(MCAS14) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.019)* (0.000)** 
respect_1 0.056 0.037 0.034 0.055 
(MCAS16) (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.087) (0.000)** 
leadership_1 0.061 0.022 0.025 0.001 
(MCAS23) (0.001)** (0.070) (0.289) (0.939) 
training 0.038 0.037 0.062 0.037 
(MCAS35) (0.021)* (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.003)** 
# of variables 51 51 51 51 
Respondents 4007 10212 4007 10235 
Pseudo R2 .4057 .4753 .1658 .1645 
n=14,242.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
safetyclimate_1: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
safetyclimate_11: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (CSA42) 
Robust p-values in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects 
 
None of the predictor organizational variables emerged as stati tically 
significant among the post-policy cohort that was not significant in the pre-policy 
cohort.  This means that those leadership interventions hat elevated safety climate 
prior to the policy implementation date remained essentially unchanged following 
FRP implementation.   
For the officer cohort, none of the organizational variable coefficients 
increased (in fact, some decreased) among the post-policy group with the exception 
of communication_1 which increased its influence on the survey respondent group by 
5%.  This means that officers who agree or strongly agree that command leadership is 
successful in communicating its safety goals to unit personnel are 5% more likely to 
agree their unit’s safety climate is high compared to officers who have a lesser 
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assessment of safety communications.  This factor was insignificant among the pre-
policy cohort.  Although a relatively small increase, this could be interpreted as 
improvement in safety communications, a leadership best practice outlined in the 
FRP.   
Post-policy analysis for the Navy enlisted cohort remains equally 
unimpressive.  None of the organizational factors outlined in the FRP significantly 
increased their correlative relationship with safety climate assessment while several 
coefficients (marginal effects) actually decreased.  The only organizational variable 
that showed significant increase among the post-policy cohort is respect_1.  Enlisted 
personnel in this group, who agree quality assurance and safetypersonnel are well 
respected and are seen as essential to mission accomplish ent, are almost 6 percent 
more likely to strongly agree that their safety climate is very high compared to those 
members who have a lower assessment of the respect shown for these Sailors.  This 
could be attributed to an increased focus on empowering quality assurance and safety 
personnel in the post-policy group.  Unfortunately, this organizational factor was not 
included as a best practice in the Navy’s FRP. 
In general, the leadership best practices outlined in the Navy’s FRP plan to 
reduce preventable accidents and mishaps had minimal statistical influence on 
elevating safety climate among the officers and Sailors studied using Phase 1 safety 
climate data.  Of the organizational factors that did show p sitive correlation, few 
seemed to increase their marginal effect on safety climate assessment when 
comparing the pre and post-policy cohorts. 
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Chapter 7: Phase 2 Analysis: Safety Climate and Leaership 
 Interventions 
 
Three specific questions were proposed in Chapter 4 for Phase 2 research that 
will be investigated using a primary data set designed to collect safety climate data 
within several high-risk units of interest.  Phase 2 of this research plan investigates 
the relationship between certain organizational variables ( oth within and outside the 
scope of an institutionalized safety program) and safety climate.  Specifically, do 
these variables influence members’ assessment of safety climate?  Second, does 
leadership style influence a worker’s safety climate assessm nt and finally, is there a 
measurable relationship between safety climate assessment and organizational 
performance?    
   While Phase 1 data analysis focused specifically on traditional policies, 
programs, and procedures within the formal construct of the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program, Phase 2 reaches beyond these traditional programs and searches for 
organizational level influences that might positively influence the safety climate 
assessment of unit workers.  Equally important is assessing the relationship between 
safety climate perceptions and individual behavior. This phase also focuses on 
evaluating supervisory practices commonly associated with a specific leadership style 
and searches for empirical proof of a causal link between safety climate and worker 
performance.    
Squadron Demographics and Safety Climate 
 The Phase 2 instrument was designed to collect broad demographic 
information in comparison to the Phase 1 instrument.  Therefore, Phase 2 analysis 
will start with an assessment of both the officer and enlisted cohort evaluating 
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correlations between demographic categories and a respondent’s perception of safety 
climate.  As was done in Phase 1, the first step in demographic analysis is to compare 
the means of variable y across categories of variables x investigating the null 
hypothesis that there is no statistical difference betwe n means.  In this case, y 
represents the unit’s safety climate assessment mean as measured by question #33 in 
both the officer and enlisted survey and x represents the demographic questions asked 
of each survey respondent in section 1.  Because the Phas  2 data set is much smaller 
than Phase 1, many of the analytical routines (ANOVA) employed to compare means 
failed Bartlett’s test for equal variance.  A low Bartlett’s χ2 probability implies that 
ANOVA’s equal-variance assumption is implausible, in which case, ANOVA’s F test 
results should not be trusted (Hamilton, 2004).   
Means comparison gives a researcher clues about potential correlations and 
possible cause and effect relationships.  This researcher exercises extreme caution 
when analyzing these associations because of the extrmely complicated and 
interconnected nature of organizations.  Tables 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the statistically 
significant means differences for both cohorts.  Complete tables are included in 
Appendix J.  In Table 7.1, the dummy variable name was included in the variable 
column to help explain the focus of the survey question subjected to means 
comparison.  The numeric correlates with the Likert grading scale (1 equals a 
respondent who “strongly disagrees” with the survey statement, 2 “disagrees”, 3 
“neutral”, 4 “agrees”, and 5 “strongly agrees”.  Table 7.2 shows there were four 
demographic, but no organizational variables that had statistic lly significant means 
differences because all ANOVA tests failed Bartlett’s est for equal variance. 
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Table 7.1 Safety Climate, ANOVA means comparison (NAS Oceana Officers) 
 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (Q33) (1-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic 
Variables 
n Mean  SD means comparison/statistical 
significance1 
Unit    a b c  
a. Squadron 1 
b. Squadron 2 
c. Squadron 3 








































   
Organizational Variables 




























































































































































































































































1 absolute value of means difference 
2 negative question, *= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 (ANOVA), Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
 
Table 7.2 Safety Climate, ANOVA means comparison (NAS Oceana Enlisted) 
 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (Q33) (1-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic 
Variables 
n Mean  SD means comparison/statistical significance1 
Unit    a b c   
a. Squadron 1 
b. Squadron 2 
c. Squadron 3 


























Work Shift    a b    
a. Day check 
b. Night check 
















   
Sleep (Avg. hrs per 
night) 














































































































1 absolute value of means difference, *= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 (ANOVA), Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
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 An alternative way to compare means is to abandon the equal vari nces 
assumption and conduct a one-way ANOVA with a dichotomous x variable (dummy 
variable) which is equivalent to a two-sample t t st.  Dummy variables were created 
for all demographic and organizational predictor variables for both the officer and 
enlisted cohort.  One-way ANOVA testing was completed on each data set to test for 
differences among safety climate assessment (q33) means and each dichotomous 
variable.  The statistically significant results are p sented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
Table 7.3 One-way Analysis of Variance (Officer Cohort) 

































































































n=52, data collected August 2006 
* negative question, Analysis of variance (ANOVA); p≤ 0.05 
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Table 7.4 One-way Analysis of Variance (Enlisted Cohort) 














































































































































n=544, data collected August 2006 
* negative question, Analysis of variance (ANOVA); p≤ 0.05 
 
 In general, very few of the 32 demographic questions that comprise section 1 
of the Oceana survey generate means of y that vary significantly across categories of 
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x where y is the safety climate assessment value (q33) and x is a specific demographic 
category.  This is true for both the officer and enlisted cohort.   
The first analytical step will be to compare the safety climate assessment 
means results of Phase 2 with Phase 1.  The rank distinction (i.e. senior officers have 
a higher safety climate assessment than junior officers) among the Phase 1 officer 
cohort does not bear out in the Phase 2 data although this can probably be explained 
by the small data set.  However, the rank distinction is verified in the Phase 2 data 
among the enlisted cohort.  E-3 personnel have a higher saf ty climate assessment 
means when compared to all other enlisted categories whilethe E-4 cohort is 
significantly lower than all other ranks.  Because Phase 2 data was parsed by each 
pay-grade as opposed to Phase 1 which combined pay-grades (e.g. E-1 to E-3 or E-4 
to E-5), a more specific pay-grade comparison could be conducted.  There appears to 
be much lower perception of the unit’s safety climate by Junior Petty Officers (E-4) 
compared to the other rank cohorts (all else being equal).   
 For the officer respondents, safety climate assessment in Unit 3 was higher 
than the other three units and statistically higher thanUnit 2.  The enlisted data shows 
Unit 1 with a statistically higher safety climate mean than the other units while Unit 4 
has a statistically lower climate means.  In compliance with the researcher’s 
agreement to keep any unit identifiable data out of this report, these unit findings are 
consistent with the data analyzed in Phase1 when referencing unit type (i.e. training 
unit vs. operational unit).  It appears members of training units have a lower 
(statistically significant) safety climate assessment means than their operational 
counterparts.   
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These statistical findings were in fact corroborated during the personnel 
interviews.  Based upon a subjective evaluation of all interview sessions, interviewees 
in Unit 4 (training unit) had a lower perception of their unit’s safety climate compared 
to Units 2, 3 and 4 (operational units).   Referencing the data g thered during the 
Phase 2 interview process (see Table 5.37), session #4 and #16 were with groups of 
E-1 to E-3 Sailors from two different units (Units 1 and 4) and interviews #8 and #20 
were with E-4 and E-5 personnel also from two different units (Units 2 and 4).  
Groups #16 and #20 were both from Unit 4.  The junior Sailors, E-1 to E-3 were 
discernibly more upbeat and positive about the safety climate in their units describing 
the atmosphere as “helpful”, “focused”, “professional”, “tough, but fair”, and “much 
better than the training unit I was previously in”.  The intrviewees were mostly 
excited about being a part of a real combat unit and were eag r to learn more about 
their technical ratings; in essence, contribute more t the overall productivity of the 
unit.  It was clear from the interviews, that the junior enlisted cohort was all eyes and 
ears and did not seem to resent the fact that the majority of their work effort was 
closely monitored and highly supervised.  This close supervision was not only 
expected, but actually appreciated by the new technicians.  They seemed to be a very 
close group, laughing and kidding and referring to each other by their first names 
during the discussion.  There was no tendency for participants to get off topic during 
the interviews or steer the conversation towards discussing alternative topics (there 
seems to be a tendency for disgruntled employees to vent to a yone who is willing to 
listen).  In general, this junior cohort (E-1 to E-3) was po itive about their current 
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situation and optimistic about their potential (growth, performance, and opportunity) 
within the organization.   
 This description above can be starkly contrasted with the 2 interviews 
conducted with the Third and Second Class Petty Officers (E-4 and E-5) in Unit’s 2 
and 4.  This cohort seemed perceptibly down about their station within the 
organization responding much more negatively about their assessment of the 
organization’s safety climate.  15 of the 19 Sailors in th s cohort were on their second 
enlistment and 12 of the 19 were in their second duty assignment.  This possibly 
explains why the tenure1to2 cohort (respondents who have been in the unit, 1 to 2 
years) has an assessment mean lower than respondents with higher or lower unit 
tenure (3.71 vs. 3.85).   
When the E-4’s and E-5’s were asked about their organization’s safety 
climate, some of the responses included “challenging’, dangerous”, “they care more 
about airplanes than people”, “we’re not people, we’re machines”, “I know more than 
my supervisor”, and “I’m surprised we don’t have more accidents”.  Many seemed 
frustrated with a perceived inconsistency between theirhigh technical knowledge 
(proficiency) and their lack of decision-making authority.  Many commented they felt 
as if their supervisor was more interested in his/her own career than the careers’ of 
their workers.  This researcher sensed a general lack of camaraderie and company 
during the group sessions.  The interview participants were not very friendly with 
each other nor did any of them refer to each other by their first names.  The 
discussion about safety climate focused squarely on supervisory priorities.  Many 
considered their supervisor’s priorities to be incorrectly aligned with operational 
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performance, productivity and supervisory aggrandizement rather than worker safety 
and a follower’s professional development.  The optimism and excitement exuded by 
the junior Sailors (E-1 to E-3) was replaced among the junior Petty Officers (E-4 to 
E-5) with a palpable bitterness and indolence.  This reseach r sensed a general 
apathy among the interviewees towards their supervisors; a bitterness that seemed to 
stem from a perceived lack of advocacy and individual sponsorship.  Personnel in this 
pay grade seemed to lack an acceptable level of individual choice or self-
determination (agency), with many expressing an inability to capitalize on their 
individual talents or capabilities (Sen, 2000). 
 Officers who hail from the northeast (U.S.) have a statistically higher 
assessment of safety climate (4.73 vs. 4.35) than thoseoffic rs from other parts of the 
U.S.  In addition, officers who have served in the safty department have a higher 
mean (4.69 vs. 4.38).  The safety department finding is consiste t with Phase 1 
results.  Further research is required to adequately explain the geographic correlation.  
One possible explanation might be the location of the survey site (east coast, mid-
Atlantic), meaning there might be a correlation between unit location and overall job 
satisfaction.  The job satisfaction and safety climate assessment correlation will be 
further investigated later in this Chapter. 
 Mid-check enlisted workers have a lower safety climate assessment than their 
day check and night check counterparts (3.48 vs. 3.86) which is consistent with Phase 
1 findings.  Night check and day check workers have a similar ean which is counter 
to Phase 1 findings.  This may be attributed to sample size.  Mid-check is a transition 
work shift that starts earlier than night check and ends arlier than night check (every 
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unit has slightly different work shift times).  Based upon unit interviews, respondents’ 
generally agreed there was a much lower perception of safety climate during the 
evening shifts as opposed to the day shifts.  In summary, this can be attributed to: 
a. Less manning/supervision at night (both external and internal to a work center) 
b. The general perception that “less favored” technicians/managers get relegated to 
night work. 
c. Less senior leadership/officer involvement at night 
d. Less senior leadership observation opportunity for a night shift worker 
e. Less administrative/support services at night 
f. Increased environmental hazards (temperature, lighting, fati ue, etc.) 
g. The general perception that “no matter what we do, day check will consider it 
inadequate.” 
 Safety climate assessment means comparison yields several other interesting 
results regarding the enlisted cohort.  Married Sailors have a statistically higher safety 
climate assessment than their non-married (single, separated, divorced) counterparts 
(3.88 vs. 3.74).  Perhaps the external socio-emotional support married personnel 
receive from their spouses has a positive influence on organizational perceptions.  
Also, there is a defined correlation between age and the ecision to marry and have 
children and this family satisfaction is a determinant for retention (Segal & Segal, 
2004).  Marriage therefore serves as a predictor of positive retention choice, 
correlating positively with increased age and higher enlist d pay grade.  Despite the 
same work associations and professional relationships as their married colleagues, 
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data suggests a spouse offers a statistically significant (positive) influence on an 
individual’s safety climate assessment.   
 Sleep rate correlates positively with safety climate assessment for the enlisted 
work force with a fairly linear increase in assessment as cumulative sleep averages 
increase per night.  There is a significant means difference between workers getting 
less than 5 hours per night compared to the 6-7 and 7-8 hours per night cohorts (3.42 
vs. 3.85/4.09).  Sleep values have been studied as a predictor of w rk attitude, with 
drowsiness correlating positively with lower attitude assessments towards shift-work 
(Isra-Golec, 1993).  By a relatively non-scientific show f hands, 11 of the 13 First 
Class Petty Officers, (E-6’s) in interview group # 5, and ll five Airman (E-1 thru E-
3’s) in interview group #16 responded in the affirmative when asked if they did not 
get enough sleep at night to accomplish their job safely.  Several interview 
participants commented they were often conflicted having to prioritize sleep ahead of 
personal commitments because they were cognizant of the dangers of their work 
environment.  Many mid-grade Petty Officers, (E-4 to E-5) held their supervisors 
accountable for their lack of sleep arguing long shift work and unplanned weekend 
work forced them to place their personal safety ahead of their personal life (i.e. 
choosing sleep over recreation, relationships, etc.). 
 Consistent with Phase 1 findings, Leading Petty Officers (LPOs) have a 
significantly higher safety climate assessment means than non-LPOs (4.06 vs. 3.79).  
“Worker”, the lowest category on the demographic authority scale, has the lowest 
means while safety climate assessment increases as authority increases (see Appendix 
J, Table J.2).  This is an extremely significant finding for policy formulation because 
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it reveals that climate perceptions are correlated with individual authority.  Therefore, 
organizational interventions designed to elevate climate ust consider the differential 
nature of baseline climate perceptions and carefully evaluate how leader choice will 
influence the attitudes and behavior of respective authority groups.  Many interviews 
with junior enlisted seemed to verify this condition.  One junior E-3 commented her 
“supervisor was out of touch and had no clue what her needs w re.”  Another more 
senior Petty Officer (E-6) said, “…pilots think everything is fine while we’re down 
here barely holding things together.”   
 Enlisted respondents from suburban settings had a significantly higher safety 
climate assessment than those Sailors from other settings (3.95 vs. 3.76) while Sailors 
from rural settings had a lower assessment than respondents from other settings (3.70 
vs. 3.85).  While this correlation requires further research to explain, this researcher 
suspects there may be a potential association between a r spondent’s domestic setting 
and their socio-economic status, a variable that was not ampled in the Phase 2 survey 
design.  Several other demographic variables such as flight experience for officers 
and work center for maintenance personnel showed comparable trends with Phase 1 
findings however the test results were not statistically significant (see Appendix J).  
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 display the logistic regression modeling coducted using 
the demographic predictor variables of section 1 of the Phase 2 instrument and safety 
climate assessment.  Both safetyclimate and safetyclimate1 were used as dependent 
dummy variables.  Only the statistically significant coefficients are displayed.  A 
complete set of regression tables for Phase 2 are included in Appendix K.    
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Table 7.5 Demographic Regression Results, Oceana Officer (USN/VFA)  
 Model (1) 
 safetyclimate1 
Independent Demographic Variables* 
unit3 (unit 4) 0.795 
 (0.000)** 
brancho (co/xo) -0.585 
 (0.003)** 
departhd (co/xo) -0.529 
 (0.013)* 
single (married) 0.553 
 (0.027)* 
se (ne) -0.691 
 (0.006)** 
midwest (ne) -0.647 
 (0.001)** 
urban (rural) -0.599 
 (0.000)** 
suburban (rural) -0.555 
 (0.004)** 
# of variables 20 
Respondents 52 
Pseudo R2 .47 
 Survey conducted August 2006. 
* the variable in parentheses is the comparison dummy variable (i.e., the variable left out of the model) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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Table 7.6 Demographic Regression Results, Enlisted (USN/VFA) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
Independent Demographic Variables* 
noncitizen (citizen) 0.216 0.444 
 (0.215) (0.014)* 
africanamerican (cauc) 0.014 0.102 
 (0.833) (0.035)* 
corrosion (mc) -0.391 0.039 
 (0.009)** (0.715) 
daycheck (mid) 0.198 0.185 
 (0.002)** (0.003)** 
nightcheck (mid) 0.212 0.254 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** 
worker (lpo) -0.280 -0.050 
 (0.009)** (0.518) 
rural (sub) -0.121 -0.077 
 (0.049)* (0.042)* 
urban (sub) -0.150 -0.039 
 (0.011)* (0.300) 
# of variables 54 54 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .11 .11 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
* the variable in parentheses is the comparison dummy variable (i.e., the variable left out of the model)  
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
 Officers in Unit 3 are almost 80 percent more likely to str ngly agree with the 
safety climate assessment statement (Q33) than their Unit 4 counterparts (all else 
being equal).  Branch Officers and Department Heads are less lik ly (over 50 percent) 
to strongly agree with Q33 than their CO/XO’s while single officers are over 50 
percent more likely to have the highest safety climate assessment when compared 
with their married colleagues.  Officers from the southeast and midwest have lower 
safety climate assessment when compared with officers from the northeast while 
officers raised in urban or suburban environments have a lower safety climate 
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assessment than officers raised in a rural setting (60 percent and 56 percent 
respectively).  All of these regression results are consistent with the means results 
presented in Appendix J for the Oceana officer cohort.  Caution should be placed on 
the conclusiveness of these results given the small size of the officer cohort.  In 
addition, these correlations were not investigated during officer interview sessions.  
 The single versus married distinction is an interesting finding.  Since married 
officers tend to be more senior (both in rank and time in service), the marital status 
finding seems counter-intuitive to Phase 1 results.  Upon cl ser inspection of the 
Phase 2 data, significant climate influences such as rank, flight experience and 
authority can be ruled out as potential biases.  This finding is consistent however, 
with the results of some of the officer interviews.  As will be investigated in the next 
section, it was primarily the married officers who had strong opinions about 
organizational processes and policies that influence their safety climate assessment.  
Perhaps the social arrangement of marriage introduces an organizational variable that 
correlates with an individual’s safety climate assessment.   
 Non-citizen enlisted members are more than 44 percent more likely to 
strongly agree with the safety climate assessment survey statement (Q33) than their 
citizen counterparts (all else being equal) while African American Sailors are 10 
percent more likely than their Caucasian counterparts to a sign the highest assessment 
grade.  Sailors who work in corrosion control have a lower climate opinion than 
members working in maintenance control while mid-check workers have the lowest 
opinion of their safety climate (compared to day and night check workers).  
Interestingly, urban and rural enlisted personnel have a lower safety climate 
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assessment than their suburban counterparts which is counter to the officer results.  
The enlisted results are consistent with the means comparison tables in Appendix J. 
 Race and safety climate assessment is an important aea of analysis when 
considering the depth, applicability and fairness of organization l processes and 
programs designed to influence employee behavior.  While the distinction between 
the safety climate assessment of African American and Caucasian sailors is a 
statistically significant finding, neither the survey nor the interviews provided 
adequate information to explain the difference.  What remains important at this point 
is the realization that race is a demographic variable that must be considered when 
designing policies intended to shape or improve an organization’s safety climate. 
Leadership Best Practices and Safety Climate 
 Sections 2 through 4 of the Phase 2 survey instrument assess a r spondent’s 
opinion of the safety, management and leadership programs within their respective 
commands.  Logistic regression analysis was conducted on the survey data base.  An 
explanatory model was built that attempts to determine significant predictor variables 
of safety climate assessment.  Since safety programs were queried in the Phase 1 
survey instrument, the Phase 2 model will be used to verify Phase 1 findings.  
Organizational management and leadership programs are surveyed for the first time 
in Phase 2.  Table 7.7 and 7.8 show the principal factors that statistically predict the 
dependent variable, safetyclimate or safetyclimate1.   
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Table 7.7 Principal Factor Regression Results, Oceana Officers (USN/VFA) 
 Model (1) 
Principal Factor Variables  safetyclimate1 
SC1 (Safety Climate1) 0.730 
 (0.005)** 
LS4 (Leadership Style4) 0.330 
 (0.020)* 
# of variables 16 
Respondents 52 
Pseudo R2 .51 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
Table 7.8 Principal Factor Regression Results, Oceana Enlisted (USN/VFA) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Principal Factor Var  safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
SC1 (Safety Climate1) 0.207 0.104 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** 
SC2 (Safety Climate2) -0.160 -0.044 
 (0.000)** (0.003)** 
SP1 (Safety Programs1) 0.104 0.068 
 (0.000)** (0.001)** 
UP1 (Unit Programs1) -0.052 -0.056 
 (0.100) (0.007)** 
UP2 (Unit Programs2)) 0.049 0.042 
 (0.066) (0.041)* 
# of variables 9 9 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .27 .23 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
  
 Two principal factors reveal statistically significant correlation among the 
officer cohort while five factors correlate among the enlisted cohort.  As was the case 
in Phase 1, caution is exercised when trying to quantitatively express or put into 
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operation these findings.  Care must be given when using factor nalysis as anything 
other than an exploratory tool.  Since the officer data yields very little safety climate 
assessment variation, it is not surprising that only two factors show significant 
correlation.  SC1 seems to be a predictable outcome due to th existence of a common 
climate thread that runs through questions 33-42 of the Oceana survey.  What is 
curious to this researcher is the lack of principal factor or elation among the other 
categories with the exception of LS4.  One explanatio may be the small data set and 
the lack of safety climate assessment variation among the survey group.  Perhaps 
however, there is a significant component of leadership style that can be identified 
through further research that contributes as a significat predictor of safety climate 
assessment. 
 For the enlisted cohort, the justification for SC1 remains the same as the 
officer group.  Of the remaining four factors, two correlate positively (SP1 and UP2) 
and two have a negative correlation with safety climate assessment (SC2 and UP1).  
This statistical result seems to verify a basic premis of this research, that is, certain 
organizational policies and programs (safety and non-safety) related, have 
implications for influencing climate perception.  Quantifying this influence is the 
focus of the multi-variable regression analysis conducted on both survey groups and 
substantiated through personnel interviews. 
 Tables 7.9 and 7.10 display the regression results for both safety and unit 
leadership and management programs as predictors of safety climate assessment.   
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Table 7.9 Unit Program Regression Results, Oceana Officer (USN/VFA) 
 Model (1) 
Safety and Unit Programs Variables safetyclimate1 
orm predicts failure perfectly 





# of variables 25 
Respondents 46 
Pseudo R2 .48 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
Safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
Table 7.10 Unit Program Regression Results, Oceana Enlisted (USN/VFA) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Safety and Unit Programs safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
standdowns 0.166 0.038 
(Q43) (0.001)** (0.119) 
handleschange 0.105 0.055 
(Q49) (0.062) (0.048)* 
counselingguidlines 0.035 -0.128 
(Q57) (0.577) (0.001)** 
counselinghelpful 0.103 0.182 
(Q58) (0.099) (0.000)** 
mentoring 0.079 0.084 
(Q60) (0.152) (0.001)** 
meaningfulreward 0.001 -0.058 
(Q61) (0.986) (0.018)* 
racebias 0.119 0.022 
(Q65) (0.029)* (0.364) 
# of variables 25 25 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .39 .33 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
Safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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Of the 25 variables used to build an explanatory model for the officer study 
group, one safety program variable (orm) predicted failure perfectly and those 
observations were dropped.  Two variables showed significant correlation with safety 
climate assessment; one is a safety program (s fetyawards) and the other is a unit 
program, (mentoring).   
 The dummy variable orm was dropped because of the four total observations 
coded as a 0 (neither agreed nor strongly agreed with Q45, “leadership considers 
safety issues during the formation of operational and training plans”).  None of the 
respondents strongly agreed with the safety climate assessment statement Q33.  The 
dummy variable orm predicts failure perfectly and is interpreted as being highly 
predictive of safety climate assessment.  Essentially, those officers who think 
leadership does not consider safety issues in planning, are highly likely to consider 
the safety climate in their organization to be unfavorable.  This finding is consistent 
with many of the opinions voiced during the officer interview sessions.  Particularly 
among the mid-grade junior officers, (O-3’s), interview participants lauded those 
planners who considered safety as an important component f operational planning as 
opposed to those who considered it an obstacle, nuisance or an item to just simply 
ignore.  One Lieutenant in Unit 4 said, “I feel much better about a training 
detachment when I know the folks who planned it gave due consideration to 
balancing risk versus reward, that is, they are not going t  let the training 
requirements dictate how much we fly!”  Another Lieutenant in Unit 4 said, 
“Sometimes we pretend bad weather doesn’t exist…we are going t  fly no matter 
what…it makes everyone very uncomfortable.”   
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 The second safety program, safetyawards, is positively correlated with safety 
climate assessment.  According to the Oceana data, those officers who agree or 
strongly agree that safety awards in their squadron are meaningful and highly coveted 
are 98 percent more likely to strongly agree with the safty climate assessment 
dummy (Q33) than those respondents who respond less favorably to their safety 
award program.  Based upon interviews, it seems the credibility of an awards 
program has a significant influence on command climate.  While a strong program 
that recognizes and rewards deserving individuals can maintain or elevate safety 
climate, it seems the opposite influence of a failing program can have a more 
dramatic effect on climate.  The majority of interviewees that voiced an opinion on 
the subject discussed how negatively they reacted when a less-than-deserving 
individual received an award for some safety related act.  Recognizing the difficulty 
in judging differences in perceptions regarding award choices, th re remains a 
substantiated problem with consistency in many safety award programs.  This 
inconsistency can be very problematic and presents a difficult challenge for managers 
and leaders trying to improve organizational climate.  This finding is consistent with 
Schneider’s model that depicts the human resource management practice of 
rewarding as being directly related to the climate dimension of reward orientation.  
While the prominence and emphasis of rewards may vary from unit to unit, the 
degree to which rewards are commensurate with merit and achievement is an 
important climate modifier.   
 The dummy variable mentoring is highly predictive of safety climate 
assessment.  This is the only squadron (non-safety) program that reveals statistical 
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significance.  Those respondents who either agreed or strongly agreed they had 
someone in their organization that took them under their wing and mentored them 
were 98 percent more likely to strongly agree with the saf ty climate assessment 
statement then those respondents who did not have a simil r mentoring association 
(all else being equal).  This finding was consistently corrobo ated during the 
interview sessions and applied equally to both the junior and se ior personnel.  The 
Commanding Officer of Unit 1 said, “… I am so fortunate to have an Airwing 
Commander (superior officer) that takes time to help me figure things out…”  This 
particular officer said it was this mentoring relationship that not only fostered his 
positive attitude, but also motivated him to establish similar arrangements with his 
Department Heads.  Those officers who did not have a positive mentor relationship 
expressed their envy of those colleagues who did, and also described how the lack of 
a mentor negatively influenced their perception about the organization’s climate.  
Again referring to Schneider’s model, the mentoring correlation is consistent with his 
notion that climate is modified to the extent to which a worker feels like their best 
interests and personal welfare is valued by management.      
 For the enlisted cohort, one of the two safety program predictor variables, 
standdowns, showed significant correlation with the dependent variable, safetyclimate 
or safetyclimate1.  While this may be an encouraging finding given the amount f 
time, effort and energy given to safety stand downs as an intervention method for all 
military services, the data is viewed with caution.  Interviewees were fairly split on 
the efficacy of safety stand downs based upon the quality of the event and the value 
of the training component.  While the data shows the positive correlation between 
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mandatory safety stand downs and safety climate, many interviewees said a poorly 
run stand down can have a negative influence on safety climate.  The survey 
statement asked respondents to express their opinion in reference to mandatory stand 
downs (irrespective of quality) relying upon the respondent’s stand down experience 
to determine their response.  This ambiguity introduces a vari tion that was 
highlighted during the interview sessions; reducing to a fairly polarized opinion on 
the subject of mandatory stand downs as a predictor of elevat d safety climate.  Good 
stand downs elevate safety climate and poor stand downs either seem to moderate or 
lower safety climate.  Schneider’s model considers the degree to which management 
places emphasis on the proper techniques, processes and proce ures needed for 
workers to get the job done.  This “means emphasis” is an mportant climate 
dimension and one that can be effectively (and positively) influenced through well 
planned and well executed human resource practices such as safety stand downs.  
 The second safety program variable, handleschange, showed that those 
respondents, who either agreed or strongly agreed that their squadron reacts well to 
planning changes, are 6 percent more likely to strongly agree with the safety climate 
assessment statement than their counterparts who think less favorably of change 
management (all else being equal).  It was clear in the group interviews that change is 
the “great equalizer” when it comes to organizational safety perceptions.  
Organizations that handle change calmly and professionally h ve higher safety 
climate assessment.  One particular Sailor in the group interview said, “…when my 
supervisor starts freaking out because the deployment date was moved up, we all start 
freaking out.”  Another more experienced Chief Petty Officer said, “How can we be 
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expected to get things done safely when everything keeps changing.  My guys run for 
fear every time I walk into their work center and tellhem the plan has changed!” 
 The counseling and mentoring coefficients in Table 7.10 are highly indicative 
of a common theme that emerged from the enlisted interv ew sessions.  Counseling 
and mentoring programs are both non-traditional safety program interventions that 
show statistical correlation with safety climate perceptions.  Sailors who are actively 
and professionally counseled and who are personally engaged through a viable and 
effective mentoring program are statistically more likely to have a more favorable 
safety climate perception than their unengaged counterparts.  The negative coefficient 
on the counselinguidlines variable is curious and may reflect a general apathy towards 
the current counseling system.  Interviewees reported a strong desire for effective 
counseling but expressed an equally strong dislike for the curr nt system which is 
calendar based, overly structured, highly supervised and lacks an effective training 
component for counseling administrators (NAVADMIN 146/95).  Mentoring is 
criticized by many of the same program indictments voiced by the officer cohort.  
Three common disparagements emerged from the interview sessions.   
1. A formal mentor program only exists because it is mandated by higher authority.  
“It exists in name only.”   
2. Mentors are assigned, not chosen, therefore the mentor/protégé relationship is 
flawed. “I should be allowed to choose my own mentor.” 
3. Good mentors are not recognized or rewarded in their performance appraisals.  “It 
seems the worst mentors always get promoted because they put production ahead 
of people.”   
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Consistent with the officer interviews, many enlisted participants lauded the value of 
being the protégé of an effective mentor and verified the correlation between a 
positive mentoring experience and elevated safety climate perceptions.  Again, this 
correlation is consistent with the Schneider model that places significant value on the 
socio-emotional support component of leader action and how t is dimension can 
positively influence the work environment.  
 Although not verified statistically, there was a strong emphasis placed on 
awards program inconsistencies during the enlisted interview sessions.  While the 
safetyaward variable was not statistically significant, the m aningfulaward variable 
showed a negative correlation (-6%).  This finding runs counter to interview opinions 
and may be attributed to several factors including statement wording and the small 
number of respondents who actually strongly agreed with this survey statement (less 
than 5 percent of the survey population).  In every group interview session, there was 
a discussion regarding award inconsistencies and how this organizational flaw 
degraded safety climate perceptions.  Not one interview cohort in any unit was able to 
unanimously agree the award program in that organization was well managed and 
equitably implemented.  It is not surprising to this researcher that awards (and 
associated award programs) were the source of much organizatio al discontent.  This 
stands to reason for in volunteer organizations like the ones under study in this 
research program, there are very few formal incentives a ailable to supervisors and 
leaders when compared to similar organizations across the public/private divide.  
Financial incentives, time-off and promotion, the grand rewards of private sector 
managers are virtually unavailable to military supervisors.  While time-off is still a 
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controllable incentive to the military leader, its cost/benefit structure is different than 
private sector managers and presents a significantly different “bottom-line” cost to 
the organization.  Therefore, awards present a potentially critical policy lever for 
organizational safety climate control.  While awards remain an important incentive 
device to military supervisors, they are subject to the following institutional ailments: 
1. Approval level continually creeps up the chain 
2. Approval process too long 
3. Awards become time/rank relevant (expectation of  receipt at specific times, only 
certain ranks can get certain awards) 
4. Submission process complicated, burdensome 
5. Approval process flawed (subject to favoritism) 
6. Awards become diluted  
Finally, the demographic characteristic of race that showed statistical 
significance in Table 7.6 (African Americans having a higher safety climate 
assessment than their Caucasian counterparts), emerges in this section as a significant 
predictor of safety climate assessment when considering the existence of racial bias.  
Unit members, who agree or strongly agree that there is no racial bias in their 
command, are 12 percent more likely to favorably assess th ir safety climate than 
their counterparts who have a less favorable opinion on the existence of racial bias.  
Considered long to be outside the realm of the formal organizational safety program, 
human relations and equal opportunity programs have a correlative influence on an 
individual’s perception of the safety climate within their organization.  
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  Section 6 of the Oceana survey asked both officer and enlisted participants to 
consider possible ways to improve their unit’s safety climate.  They were asked to 
rank their top three choices of a list of possible interventions considering how each 
option would improve how people perceive their work environment and/or improve 
safety performance.  Respondents were given the opportunity o add their own 
choice(s) if they were not satisfied with the preset li t.  Referencing Figure 5.2, 
almost 50 percent of the officer cohort selected three options as their first choice: 
establish a functional mentoring program (19 percent), get rid of poor performers (19 
percent), and improve squadron resources (17 percent).  While none of these are 
considered typical actions or responsibilities associated with managing the squadron’s 
safety program, they are in large measure embedded in programs under the control of 
unit leaders.  
 For the enlisted cohort, the top three interventions accounted for 44 percent of 
the first choice variation: increase my pay and benefits (17 percent), get rid of poor 
performers (16 percent), and establish a functional mentor program (11 percent).  
These findings were verified with both interview cohorts and both groups had two of 
the same top three choices. What made the top three choices is not as surprising to 
this researcher as is what did not spike as a top priority.  It was expected that choices 
like reducing operational tempo or better hardware (aircraft, tools parts) would 
emerge at the top of a safety climate improvement list however those choices 
received less than 2 percent and 8 percent respectively for the fficer group and less 
than 2 percent and 5 percent respectively for the enlisted survey group.      
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Leadership Style and Safety Climate 
 The Phase 2 survey instrument presented 18 supervisory assessment 
statements in section 5 designed to measure the leadership style of the respondent’s 
direct supervisor.  Each statement, if acknowledged in the affirmative, is designed to 
place the supervisor of the respondent in a general leadership style category as 
described in Chapter 5.  Section 5 responses were modeled as independent predictors 
of the dependent variable, safety climate assessment.  The results of this modeling 
effort are presented in Tables 7.11 and 7.12.  Only the statistic lly significant results 
are shown with the full model results included in Appendix K.   
Table 7.11 Leadership Style Regression Results, Oceana Officer (USN/VFA)  
 Model (1) 





# of variables 25 
Respondents 46 
Pseudo R2 .48 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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Table 7.12 Leadership Style Regression Results, Oceana Enlisted (USN/VFA) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Leadership Style Variables safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
leaderinspiration 0.065 0.097 
 (0.316) (0.002)** 
goalsknown 0.140 0.067 
 (0.008)** (0.012)* 
# of variables 36 36 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .39 .33 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
 
 Two leadership style survey statements show significant orrelation for each 
cohort.  For officer respondents, leadermoralstand and leadergetsit predict over 50 
percent and 60 percent respectively a “strongly agree” safty climate assessment 
response compared to respondents who have a less agreeable evaluation of their 
supervisor relative to these two categories.  The variable leadermoralstand is a 
dummy variable created from Q73, “my supervisor takes a stand on controversial 
issues, considering the moral consequences of decisions” while leadergetsit was 
created from Q84, “my supervisor really knows what is goin .”  The variable 
leadermoralstand is designed to categorize a transformational leader if answered in 
the affirmative.  Transformational leaders develop beyond the immediate concern for 
their own personal agenda to higher levels of values and obligations (Kuhnert & 
Lewis, 1987).  At their highest level, transformational le ders endorse universal 
ethical principles of justice, the equality of human rights, and the respect for human 
dignity.  According to Bass (1990), there is a belief in and  commitment to these 
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principles becoming almost unto themselves an objective for action.  It is this quality 
that differentiates transformational leaders from transactional leaders. 
 The variable leadergetsit is designed to assess the envisioning and intuitive 
qualities of a respondent’s supervisor with a notably affirmative evaluation 
categorizing a leader as transformational.  Tichy & Devanna (1986) describe 
envisioning as a charismatic’s leader’s ability to predict and show a follower how to 
achieve a future state.  Its success involves paying close attention to the 
organizational change agents, determining with great clarity the key issues, 
prioritizing strategies and decisions, and communicating the vision in a way that will 
move followers forward to the envisioned state (Bennis & Nanus, 1985).  Intuition 
augments interpretations of events and data that illuminate the image of the future 
state.  With their ability to provide images of the future state, inspiring leaders 
provide the path that must be taken that gives clear direction to the followers (Tucker, 
1981). 
 Referring back to the leadership style models presented in Chapter 3, these 
two style factors are consistent with the layer of individual consideration added to the 
transformational model as depicted in Figure 3.3.  Leadermoralstand and leadergetsit 
define a specific developmental orientation for a leader that manifests in the 
individualization of followers.  Regarding leadermoralstand, this individualization 
means a leader considers how his or her actions would impact follower differences 
resulting in the fulfillment of unique needs.  Similarly, leadergetsit fosters individual 
attention on the part of the leader which results in a follower’s fulfillment of personal 
desires for information and fate control.   
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Officer interviews verified the importance of serving for seniors who place 
priority on ethical decision making.  In general, officers placed the majority of their 
current supervisors in the transformational style category and emphasized the 
importance of serving for superiors who placed a high premium on conduct and 
decision-making grounded in high moral and ethical principles.  While none of the 
interviewees would acknowledge currently serving for a transactional leader, they did 
express a notable degradation in safety climate when serving for a supervisor that was 
focused primarily on exchange relationships and productivity.  The discussion 
regarding leaders who “really know what is going on” was les  about tacit knowledge 
and more about a leader’s ability to assess the organization’s “social architecture” and 
transform it into equitably beneficial action.  This, in its truest sense, is what is meant 
by a leader who really “gets it”.  Despite the participants ability to describe these 
qualities, most acknowledged these leaders were rare; many only having served for 
one or two during their careers. 
 For the enlisted cohort, two different but equally important leadership 
variables emerged as significant predictors of positive safty climate assessment.  The 
variable leaderinspiration is a classic transformational quality being derived from 
Q69, “my supervisor is inspirational”.  As was described in Chapter 3, inspirational 
leaders express goals that followers want to attain (McClelland, 1975).  Such leaders 
“conceive and articulate goals that lift people out of their petty preoccupations, carry 
them above the conflicts that tear a society apart, and unite them in the pursuit of 
objectives worthy of their best efforts” (Gardner, 1965).  Inspirational leaders 
stimulate enthusiasm among subordinates garnering individual support to accomplish 
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group objectives.  Enlisted interview participants expressed a strong desire for this 
quality in their leaders while noting a significant lack of this quality among 
contemporary supervisors.  Like the officer group, this quality was independent of 
rank, i.e. Chief Petty Officers were equally desirous of inspirational leadership in 
comparison with junior Sailors.  The enlisted group described an overall dearth of 
inspirational leaders within their units although the most junior group (E-1 to E-3’s) 
said they had some pretty inspirational junior Petty Officers supervising their training 
and job performance.  Mid-grade and senior Petty Officers revealed the most 
significant lack of inspirational leadership.  After a discu sion of leadership qualities 
among each enlisted interview group, participants were asked through a show of 
hands, how many of them were currently working for a supervisor they considered 
inspirational.  This was not done during the individual interviews or during the group 
officer interviews.  Table 7.13 shows the result of the survey. 
Table 7.13 Participants Who Work for Inspirational Leaders, by Unit 







1 15 Enlisted E-1 to E-3 13/15 (87%) 
1 13 Enlisted E-6 4/13 (31%) 
2 4 Enlisted E-4 1/4 (25%) 
3 3 Enlisted E-7 3/3 (100%) 
4 5 Enlisted E-1 to E-3 4/5 (80%) 
4 15 Enlisted E-4 to E-5 0/15 (0%) 
Numbers based upon interviews conducted August 2006.  Data generated by n affirmative show of 
hands to the question, “How many of you work for an inspirational leader?”  
 
 Recognizing the potential bias introduced during a public vote regarding an 
individual’s supervisor, the tallies very closely mirror the opinions derived during the 
group discussions.  In general, very junior and more senior listed have the highest 
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assessment of their current supervisor’s inspirational leadership attributes while mid-
grade enlisted have a very low assessment.  Clearly there ar  organizational 
influences causing this phenomenon.  Additionally, interviewees verified the positive 
correlation between inspirational leadership and safety climate assessment.  One 
Sailor raised a significant point in reference to the topic of inspirational leadership 
when she said, “I feel worse about my squadron when my supervisor gets replaced by 
someone who can’t lead themselves out of a paper bag.”  Her point was the absence 
of inspiration has a more damaging consequence on climate perhaps more than the 
positive influence of an actively inspirational leader.  When asked if participants were 
more likely to do their job safely and effectively when working for an inspirational 
leader, the result was overwhelmingly positive.  This finding has been verified 
statistically using a variety of methods and a variety of cohorts (Bass and Aviolo, 
1989; Colby and Zak, 1988; Waldman, Bass and Einstein, 1986).     
 The final variable correlating positively with safety climate assessment for the 
enlisted cohort is goalsknown, derived from Q74, “the goals of this command are 
known (updated, shared and published)”.  This element of leadership is critical to the 
transformational paradigm which relies on organizational awareness for followers to 
transcend their own self-interests for the good of the group.  “Ordinarily, open, easy, 
ready communications contribute not only to the extent to which the leader and the 
group can influence each other but to the extent to which t ey will be effective” 
(Bass, 1990, p. 674).  Leadership is directly responsible for the eas  and accuracy of 
communications within a group and the extent to which subordinates can use 
superiors as sources of information.  Several military studies have verified the 
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positive correlation between effective organizational communications and unit 
performance (Dyer and Lambert, 1953; O’Reilly, 1977; and Weschler and Shepard, 
1954).  Perhaps the number one complaint voiced during all the interview sessions 
was the follower’s lack of accurate and/or timely information regarding the unit’s 
schedule and goals.  This communication failure contributed to a significant 
degradation in morale, job satisfaction and overall climate.  Referring back to the 
transformational leadership style model (Individualized Consideration by Leader and 
Follower Effort) depicted in Figure 3.3, goalsknown fosters one-on-one contact and 
two-way communications resulting in the fulfillment of unique needs and the desire 
for information. 
Leadership Style Distinctions 
 Caution must be exercised when placing certain leadership best practices 
exclusively with the domain of one distinct leadership paradigm.  It is not uncommon 
for a leader’s actions to have a variety of components that might be perceived as both 
transformational and transactional.  The purpose of identifying a leader’s style is not 
to ideologically judge one leadership theory as superior to another, rather the purpose 
of this research is to understand why certain leadership actions produce the results 
they do (given a variety of followers within a variety of contexts).  For example, the 
intervention evaluated in section 6 of the Phase 2 survey instrument, “get rid of poor 
performers”, might (and probably would) require a predominantly transactional 
leadership approach for effective implementation.  Despit  its highly correlative 
relationship with safety climate assessment, any leader action designed to identify and 
attrite poor performers is a management function (see Table 3.2) and relies on the 
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transactional arrangement of a leader supporting a worker if it is merited by worker 
performance.  In the case of eliminating poor performers, worker support would not 
be warranted and managerial action should be taken to rem ve the employee.  If 
however the leader action is focused on behavior remediation or performance 
improvement, then the intervention takes on a distinctly transformational quality 
(helping workers achieve their full potential).  Regardless of the leadership alignment 
(transformational or transactional), any leader action to eliminate poor performers 
(attrite or remediate) would be viewed as a positive organizational intervention.   
 Bass (1985) recognized that leadership is not a neat and tidy concept.  Leaders 
often need to exercise organizational influence that varies dramatically across the 
leadership landscape.  Given organizational necessity and certain operational 
contexts, leader action is influenced by personality, interpretation and choice and can 
become a composite of many leadership theories.  An example ight be the 
“goalsknown” variable discussed in the previous section.  There is an nherently 
transactional dimension to a leader action that endeavors to make sure command 
goals are updated, shared, and published.  Referring to the transactional leadership 
model in Figure 3.1, this practice is based upon a leader recognizing what the 
follower needs (information on command goals) and clarifying how the worker’s 
needs will be fulfilled in facilitating this outcome.  Within this transactional 
arrangement, the follower has high confidence in achieving h s or her role 
requirements (because goals are known) and is motivated to attain the desired 
outcome.   
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 Leader action designed to ensure command goals are known, updated and 
shared also has a unique transformational dimension that focuses specifically on 
transcending the follower’s self interests as depicted in Figure 3.2.  A follower is 
transformed when they tend to place the interests of the group above their own.  
Sharing macro-level unit information regarding a command’s goals (e.g. schedule, 
production, personnel, advancement, transition, etc.), can serve to elevate the value of 
the unit outcome over the value of the individual outcome.  This is particularly true if 
the unit objectives are immediate and short term.  In summary, a leader’s actions may 
have disparate motivational components (i.e. aligned with a specific leadership 
theory), and yet these components can interact in seemingly complimentary ways to 
achieve a desirable worker behavior.             
Safety Climate and Performance  
Linking safety climate assessment to organizational performance is a critical 
second step in evaluating leadership interventions designed to elevate safety climate.  
Because Phase 1 data did not include performance data, this researcher designed a 
method to obtain this type of data in Phase 2 although it has some methodological 
weaknesses.  Unit safety data was not made directly available to this researcher. 
Specifically, unit identifiable data regarding mishap and injury statistics is considered 
by Navy instruction to be privileged safety data and is not releasable in unit 
identifiable form.  Permission was granted to this researcher to include performance 
related questions in the instrument survey which could not be attributed to individuals 
and only reflected the opinions of survey respondents, i.e. not a part of the official 
safety record.     
 
  267 
 
Section 1 of the Phase 2 survey included 5 questions regarding safety 
performance as outlined in Chapter 5.  Each respondent was asked to estimate their 
recollection of certain accident and mishap occurrences they have either been a part 
of or observed over the past year.  The researcher evaluated empirical correlations 
between the safety climate assessment variable and this self-reported performance 
data.  The first approach was to compare safety climate ass ssment means between 
performance categories.  There is an inherent weakness in analyzing climate and 
performance.  As discussed in Chapter 3, climate is a varying condition and it may be 
inaccurate to compare a very recent sample of safety climate assessment with 
historical performance data.  To adjust for this situation, two types of performance 
measurements were gathered.  Respondents were asked for their recollection of safety 
incidents which occurred over the past year, and to also offer their performance 
assessment of their particular organization today.  Theaccuracy of this data and the 
validity of means comparisons rely on a respondent’s fair and unbiased perception of 
their organization and the presumption that there is a positive correlation between a 
respondent’s assessment of their organization’s performance nd actual performance.        
Officer Safety Climate Assessment and Performance 
 ANOVA was conducted on the officer database testing whether the means of 
safety climate assessment (Q33) differ across different categories of performance.  
For each of the five injury and mishap variables (injury1, injury2, injury3, mishap1 
and mishap2), the null hypothesis of equal means fails to be rejectd.  While the null 
hypothesis of equal means cannot be rejected for the operati nal performance 
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variable (opperf), the safety performance variable (saperf) showed significant means 
differences.  Table 7.14 shows the ANOVA results. 
Table 7.14 Safety Climate, ANOVA means comparison (NAS Oceana Officers) 
 Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (Q33) (1-5 Likert scale) 
Performance 
Variables 














































1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 (ANOVA), Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
 
For the safety performance variable (Q29), we can reject th  hypothesis of 
equal means (P=.0022), but not the hypothesis of equal variance (P=.948) which 
indicates high confidence regarding ANOVA’s validity.  Two sample paired-
difference tests (t-tests) were conducted using the sameperformance variables and the 
categorical climate variable (safetyclimate1) to adjust for unequal variances.  
Following these tests, the basic conclusion remains that there does not appear to be 
significant means differences among historical performance measures and safety 
climate assessment among the officer cohort.  However, th e is a significant means 
difference among safety performance ratings across the afety climate assessment 
category.  Essentially, those officers who strongly agree the safety climate in their 
unit is very high also have a higher assessment of their unit’s safety performance.  
Since the majority of officers (88 percent) rate their unit’s safety performance as 
 
  269 
 
either a 5 or 6 on the performance scale, a rating of 5 might be interpreted as an 
indicator of some performance weaknesses while a 6 reflects optimum performance.  
It is not unusual for these performance marks to be skewed very high and to the right 
of the assessment scale.   
While this finding implies a correlation between climate nd safety 
performance, it does not imply causality, i.e. high climate assessment does not predict 
high safety performance.  To measure safety climate as a predictor of safety 
performance, regression analysis was conducted using performance measures as the 
dependent variable with a model comprised of organizational ndependent predictors 
including safety climate.   
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Table 7.15 Performance Regression Results (Oceana Officer) 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
Climate Variables safetyperf5 safetyperf6 
safetyclimate1 -0.369 0.414 
 (0.034)* (0.018)* 
safetypriority1 0.092 -0.081 
 (0.550) (0.577) 
recommendtofriend1 -0.101 0.312 
 (0.590) (0.078) 
morale1 -0.126 0.188 
 (0.511) (0.331) 
myopinion1 -0.176 -0.057 
 (0.449) (0.802) 
standdowns1 0.146 -0.165 
 (0.526) (0.431) 
expectedaccidents # 0.529 
 # (0.123) 
# of variables 6 7 
Respondents 50 52 
Pseudo R2 .21 .28 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyperf5: respondents assessed their unit’s safety performance as a 5 (Q29) 
safetyperf6: respondents assessed their unit’s safety performance as a 6 (Q29) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
# predicts failure perfectly, 2 obs. dropped. 
 
Table 7.15 shows a model comprised of all the independent saf ty climate 
predictors of performance from section 2 of the Phase 2 survey.  Officers who 
strongly agree their unit’s safety climate is very high are 37 percent less likely to rate 
their unit’s safety performance a 5 on the 1-6 scale.  Conversely, officers who 
strongly agree their unit’s safety climate is very high are 41 percent more likely to 
assign a safety performance rating of 6.  The regression results of all other modeling 
attempts using different dependent performance variables were inconclusive.  Given 
this limited sample size, there is evidence to suggest that here is a cause and effect 
relationship between safety climate assessment and safety performance assessment as 
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measured using self-reported perceptions of both variables.  However, there is no 
empirical safety data to substantiate this conclusion.  Additionally, safety 
performance is more closely linked with a respondent’s recent assessment of safety 
climate as opposed to the other performance measurement variables that assess safety 
performance over the last year.   
 Based upon officer interviews, this claim was substantiated.  Many officers 
commented their behavior (e.g. judgment and decision-making) is influenced by the 
safety climate within the organization.  Officers in Unit 4 had a much lower climate 
assessment as expressed during interviews and commented they were certain the 
unit’s safety performance, as measured by injuries and mishaps, w s much worse than 
other units they had been in.  Several stated that climate influenced an officer’s 
propensity to accept (tolerate) lower standards for maintenance quality and degraded 
aircraft material conditions.  One group of experienced aviators claimed that climate 
plays havoc on risk tolerance, often quietly reducing the overall standard of 
acceptable risk within an organization.  As safety climate diminishes, risk tolerance 
increases causing an ever increasing chance of an avoidable njury or mishap.             
Enlisted Safety Climate Assessment and Performance 
 Similar analysis was conducted on the enlisted cohort, searching for 
correlations between performance measures and safety climate assessment.  Table 
7.16 shows the statistically significant results of the ANOVA testing. 
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Table 7.16 Safety Climate, ANOVA means comparison (NAS Oceana Enlisted) 





SD means comparison / statistical 
significance1 
Command mishaps 
over the past year  
   a b c d  
a. None 
b. 1 time 
c. 2 times  
d. 3 times 


























































































































































1 absolute value of means difference,  *= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2  (ANOVA), Scheffe’s multiple comparison test, Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
 
The previous results show a positive correlation between a r spondent’s 
recollection of unit mishaps over the past year and safety climate assessment.  Those 
respondents with the highest safety climate assessment mean (3.88) recollect a 
mishap-free year while those respondents who report higher mishap rates, perceive a 
progressively lower safety climate assessment mean within their units.  Similar trends 
exist for both safety performance assessment and operational performance 
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assessment.  The lowest assessment rates for each category of performance attribute 
the lowest safety climate assessment means.  The safety climate assessment means 
get progressively higher as the performance assessment measures increase.    
Many of the performance variables not included in Table 7.16 failed Bartlett’s 
test for equal variance during ANOVA testing making means comparison relatively 
unreliable.  To remedy this, two sample t-tests were conducted using the categorical 
safety climate variable across performance measures adju te  for unequal variances.  
Conclusions were checked by conducting a nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test, also 
known as a Wilcoxon rank sum test.   
Table 7.17 Two Sample Performance t-Tests, (Oceana Enlisted) 














































STATA 8.2 t-test, Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 
The null hypothesis of equal population means can be rejected for mishap1, 
mishap2, injury3, opperf and saperf as depicted in Table 7.17.  Five performance 
variables have significant means differences when compared across the categorical 
variable, safetyclimate.  In each case, the performance measure (mean) is more 
favorable for higher categories of safety climate assessm nt supporting the conclusion 
that safety climate correlates positively with a variety of performance measures for 
the enlisted cohort. 
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Regression modeling was conducted to assess climate as a predictor of safety 
performance measures.  Table 7.18 summarizes the modeling results. 
Table 7.18 Performance Regression Results (Oceana Enlisted) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Climate Variables mishap0 opperf6 safetyperf6 
safetyclimate 0.052 0.064 0.131 
 (0.023)* (0.027)* (0.000)** 
safetypriority 0.016 0.020 0.040 
 (0.384) (0.464) (0.228) 
recommendtofriend 0.026 -0.118 -0.104 
 (0.229) (0.000)** (0.001)** 
morale 0.014 0.289 0.119 
 (0.569) (0.000)** (0.005)** 
myopinion -0.053 -0.014 0.021 
 (0.028)* (0.622) (0.561) 
expectedaccidents 0.020 -0.005 -0.048 
 (0.312) (0.873) (0.183) 
standdowns -0.025 0.024 0.061 
 (0.162) (0.365) (0.063) 
# of variables 7 7 7 
Respondents 544 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .02 .21 .12 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
mishap0: respondents assessed zero mishaps in their unit over the past year (Q25) 
opperf6: respondents assessed their unit’s operational performance as a 6 (Q28) 
safetyperf6: respondents assessed their unit’s safety performance as a 6 (Q29) 
Robust p values in parentheses, *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects.  
 
Similar to the officer cohort, high safety climate asse sment predicts the 
highest performance assessment mark from a respondent wh  compared to 
respondents who have a lower opinion of the unit’s safety climate (6 percent and 13 
percent respectively).  Respondents who have a high safety climate assessment are 5 
percent more likely to report zero mishaps over the past year when compared to their 
counterparts who have a lower safety climate assessment.  Again, while these factors 
are not based upon reported measures of empirical safety statistics, there is ample 
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evidence to conclude under these circumstances, elevated safety climate predicts 
higher levels of safety and operational performance. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
Summary of Results 
 The 2003 policy mandate of the Secretary of Defense to rduce preventable 
mishaps by 50 percent over a two-year period was not achieved by any of the military 
services directed to comply.  This research effort focused specifically on the 
Department of the Navy’s aviation component with the highest propensity for 
operational mishaps and highest mishap cost factor, the F/A-18 strike fighter 
community, and evaluated why the policy failed.  The Naval A iation strategy to 
reduce preventable accidents and mishaps was based upon the fudamental notion 
that improving organizational safety climate would influence personal decision-
making in a positive and generally prudent way.  At the heart of the Navy’s safety 
climate improvement initiative was a directive to implement specific leadership best-
practices that were designed to elevate safety climate by argeting three specific areas 
of concern: complacency, change and uncertainty, and taking care of Sailors.  The 
military commander in charge of all tactical aviation units formulated a policy 
designed to target these specific areas of weakness.  He directed all unit leaders to 
implement a series of best practices intended to improve safety climate by targeting 
these three areas (referred to operationally as the Fleet Response Plan).  This is the 
policy at the heart of this dissertation’s research fous.  
 In Phase 1 of the research, five years of safety climate data (over 20,000 
respondents) compiled by the Naval Post-Graduate School, was used to statistically 
evaluate the efficacy of the leadership best practices outlined in the Navy’s policy 
directive.  Although the Marine Corps was not targeted by the FRP, their data was 
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also evaluated for comparison.  Since the data collection survey was not designed 
specifically for this purpose (secondary analysis), proxy variables were designed to 
most closely model the leadership interventions under study. 
 The safety climate survey administered by the Naval Post-Graduate School 
did not query many demographic factors because the instrument was designed to 
ensure Sailors and Marines it was impossible for the data to be attributed to a specific 
member.  This compromise theoretically assured honest and accurate participation.  
Of the limited demographic data generated by the survey, several variables correlated 
both positively and negatively with safety climate asses ment.  For example, junior 
officers have a lower safety climate assessment than senior officers while mid-grade 
enlisted personnel have a lower assessment when compared with both their most 
junior colleagues and more senior Sailors.  This finding suggests that a fundamental 
requirement for an effective mishap reduction policy would be to customize the 
policy lever to a specific unit demographic or organizational peer group that shows 
statistical correlation with safety climate assessment.  A significant policy planning 
and execution flaw might occur if organizational interventions are unilaterally 
targeted at a unit, and not specific cohorts within the unit.     
For the officer cohort evaluated in both research phases (Navy and Marine 
Corps in Phase 1), a total of 16 FRP best practices were mod led using survey 
statements in the climate assessment questionnaire.  Additional leadership 
intervention proxies were modeled that fell outside the focus of the FRP.  A variety of 
statistical analysis techniques revealed a positive correlation between six Navy and 
three Marine Corps leadership best practices and safety climate.  Of those, only four 
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Navy and two Marine Corps factors that were included in the FRP directive, 
positively correlated with elevated safety climate.  For the Navy, these factors 
include: 
1) Using Human Factors Boards to effectively reducing chances of an aircraft 
mishap due to high-risk aviator. 
2) Leadership that encourages, facilitates, or enables individuals in a command to 
willingly report safety violations, unsafe behaviors or hazardous conditions. 
3) Command leadership that successfully communicates its safety goals to unit 
personnel.  
4) Command leadership that reacts well to unexpected changes to its plans. 
For the Marine Corps, these factors include: 
1) Leadership that encourages, facilitates, or enables individuals in a command to 
willingly report safety violations, unsafe behaviors or hazardous conditions. 
2) Command leadership that imposes sanctions/career consequencs on an aviator 
who persistently violates flight standards and rules.  
While these factors are important organizational leadership interventions in an 
active effort to improve safety climate, they comprised only 25 percent (4 of 16) of 
the prescribed mishap reduction policy methods in the FRP.  Phase 1 study analysis 
revealed two best practices that emerged as significant predictors of elevated safety 
climate that were not included in the FRP.  The first rega ds leaders who consider 
safety issues during the formation and execution of operational and training plans.  
This organizational practice correlates highly with elevat d safety climate assessment 
among the five-year officer cohort analyzed in Phase 1.  The second best practice that 
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emerged from the Phase 1 study that was not included in the FRP mishap reduction 
policy was leadership interventions designed to increase morale and motivation.  Of 
the almost 1800 officers among the Phase 1 Navy cohort, thse officers who assessed 
their command’s morale and motivation as high, also considered the safety climate 
very high.  This factor also correlated among the almost 1200 Marine Corps officers 
who completed the Phase 1 safety climate survey. 
For the enlisted cohort (both Navy and Marine Corps), a total of 14 FRP best 
practices were modeled using survey statements in the climate assessment 
questionnaire.  Like the officer study, additional leadership intervention proxies were 
modeled that fell outside the focus of the FRP.  This wa based in large measure on 
the types of survey statements that were included in the research questionnaire.  A 
positive correlation was found to exist between five Navy nd four Marine Corps 
leadership best practices and safety climate.  Of those, only three Navy and two 
Marine Corps factors included in the FRP directive, positively correlated with 
elevated safety climate.  For the Navy, these factors include: 
1) Leadership that adequately reviews and updates safety procedures. 
2) Organizational practices that demonstrate intolerance for unp ofessional behavior. 
3) Comprehensive and effective safety education and training programs. 
Like the officer study, a low percentage of leadership best practices outlined 
in the FRP actually show statistical correlation with elevated safety climate among a 
large data base of enlisted respondents in both the Navy and M rine Corps.  For the 
Navy, only 3 of 14 (21 percent) correlate and only 2 of 14 (14 percent) orrelate for 
the Marine Corps.  Two organizational variables, not included in the FRP, were found 
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to show significant correlation with elevated safety climate.  Sailors who agree 
quality assurance and safety members are well respected and are seen as essential to 
mission accomplishment within their organizations are much more likely to assess 
their unit’s safety climate as high compared to those Sailors who have a lower 
perception of the respect given these specific unit members.  Also, enlisted personnel 
who have supervisors who recognize unsafe conditions and maage hazards 
associated with maintenance and the flight-line are more likely to perceive their unit’s 
safety climate as very high compared to those Sailors who work for less diligent 
supervisors.  
Since the Phase 1 data included surveys completed between 2001 and 2005, 
the data actually bracketed the policy implementation period.  Statistical analysis was 
conducted comparing pre and post-policy implementation cohorts to assess the 
efficacy of the Navy’s plan to elevate command safety climate.  While the pre and 
post-policy cohorts were different survey respondents, it was presumed that the 
groups were similar enough in demographics to attribute any sig ificant change in 
safety climate attitudes to the policy treatment and not some socio-economic, cultural 
or political influence outside the control of the experiment.  Analysis of safety climate 
assessment means among enlisted personnel and officers in the pre and post-policy 
study groups reveals statistically insignificant differences.  Comparison dates 
included both pre and post-May 2003, the date of SECDEF’s mishap reduction policy 
mandate, and April 2004, the date of the FRP message release.  There was essentially 
no change in means among three of the four study groups with the exception of the 
Marine Corps officer cohort.  Their safety climate assessment mean rose from 4.26 to 
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4.46 following May 2003 and rose from 4.30 to 4.48 following April 2004.  For the 
Navy policy study group, the FRP policy had no measurable influe ce on elevating 
safety climate as measured by the by the Phase 1 survey instrument.           
Besides the fact that the preponderance of leadership best ractices outlined in 
the Navy’s mishap reduction policy show little correlation with elevated safety 
climate, additional scrutiny must be given to the policy implementation methodology.  
First, the FRP did not prioritize which best practices might be most effective for units 
given certain circumstances such as operational schedule, mishap history, status of 
equipment and infrastructure, manning level, etc.  Given this lack of priority, some 
unit commanders may have completely ignored some or allf the practices outlined 
in the FRP.  The implementation plan did not make the guidance actionable in either 
timeframe or comprehensiveness, i.e. there was no requirement to have any or all 
interventions in place by a specific deadline, nor was there a mechanism to measure 
policy effectiveness.  
Phase 2 surveyed 32 specific demographic factors along with a variety of unit 
performance factors, climate factors and leadership variables at four different F/A-18 
squadrons located at NAS Oceana in Virginia.  Surprisingly few demographic factors 
correlated positively with a respondent’s assessment of the safety climate within their 
organization although Phase 2 seemed to corroborate Phase 1 demographic results.  
For the officer cohort, authority, marital status and geographic region/setting 
correlated positively with elevated safety climate while for the enlisted group, 
citizenship, race, work center, work shift and geographic setting demonstrated 
positive correlation.   
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Of the 25 organizational variables, three displayed positive safety climate 
correlation for the officer cohort and 6 for the enlisted group.  Those variables for the 
officer group are: 
1) Leadership that considers safety issues during the formation of perational and 
training plans. 
2) Safety awards programs that are meaningful and produce highly coveted awards. 
3) Organizations that effectively mentor junior personnel. 
For the enlisted cohort: 
1) Units that conduct mandatory safety stand downs that are effective in improving 
safety climate. 
2) Commands that measure safety statistics and publish the results. 
3) Supervisors that conduct helpful counseling sessions. 
4) Organizations that effectively mentor junior personnel. 
5) Leadership that rewards people for meritorious work, not just for doing their job. 
6) Units that create an environment free of race/gender bias. 
Respondents to the Phase 2 survey were asked to answer statements designed 
to place the leadership style of their supervisors in either the transformational or 
transactional category.  Statistical analysis was conducte  to determine correlation 
between certain measures of leadership style and safety climate assessment.  Two 
leadership style survey statements show significant correlation for each cohort.  For 
officer respondents, two transformational qualities of their leaders emerge as positive 
predictors of safety climate assessment: 
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1. Leaders who take a stand on controversial issues, considering the moral 
consequences of their decisions. 
2. Leaders who seem to know what is “really going on”.   
For the enlisted group two different yet equally transformation l qualities emerge: 
1. Supervisors who are inspirational. 
2. Leaders who ensure command goals are known (i.e. updated, shared and 
published). 
Of the two factors identified as being significant for each cohort, only the 
command goals factor could potentially be considered a leadership best practice 
defined in the FRP policy message.  In the FRP, Commanding Officers were charged 
with articulating command expectations and mission although this FRP policy is 
different from the Phase 2 survey statement.  The survey statement specifically asks a 
respondent to evaluate whether his or her supervisor (not just his or her commanding 
officer) ensures command goals are known.  In either case, this specific leader 
behavior correlates highly with a follower’s safety climate assessment. 
 Phase 2 also endeavored to conduct an investigation into the causality link 
between safety climate and performance.  Performance in this regard refers 
specifically to individual safety behavior (i.e. mishap, accident and injury avoidance).  
Notwithstanding the limited empirical performance data generated by the survey, a 
preliminary causal relationship was identified between safety climate assessment and 
certain safety performance indicators such as a respondent’s assessment of 
organizational safety performance, operational performance d mishap frequency. 
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 The Phase 2 survey instrument provided the researcher with data on policy 
preferences for cohorts regarding elevated safety climate.  For both the officer and 
enlisted cohorts, policy measures designed to eliminate poor performers along with 
effective mentoring programs were identified as the top two measures that would 
potentially improve safety climate in a respondent’s unit.  These findings are 
important because they are intuitive, practical, and economical and can be easily 
operationalized and implemented at the unit level.  Many of the safest and most 
productive strike-fighter squadrons in the Navy today have imple ented these policy 
measures with significant results.    
Theoretical Analysis 
 Returning to the organizing framework detailed in Chapter 2, Schneider’s 
model (Figure 2.1) predicted a linear relationship between the five organizational 
components evaluated in this study (i.e. human resource management practices, 
organizational climate, cognitive and affective states, salient organizational 
behaviors, and organizational productivity).  Despite the simplicity of his framework, 
the results seem to be consistent with the theoretical design.  More specifically, Phase 
1 research revealed a highly correlative relationship between s veral leadership best 
practices and safety climate.  In general, the results reveal a positive relationship 
between rewarding, monitoring and developing practices and the resultant climate 
dimensions influenced by goals and means emphasis, reward orientations, and task 
support.  A Phase 1 example would be the finding that a comprehensive and effective 
safety education and training programs positively correlates with elevated safety 
climate assessment (Table 6.10).  This particular leadership best practice is a 
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“developing” practice given Schneider’s rubric and influences th  “means emphasis” 
and “task support” climate dimensions.     
Phase 2 results are similar however they predominantly include climate 
dimensions that emphasis socio-emotional support.  For example, a helpful 
counseling sessions was seen as a leadership practice that was highly predictive of 
elevated safety climate assessment for the Phase 2 enlisted cohort (see Table 7.10).  
Effective counseling can be seen as a “monitoring” and “developing” practice that 
influences “task support” but also provides a significant amount of influence on the 
socio-emotional dimension of a worker’s climate perceptions (i.e. the feeling that 
their best interests and personal welfare are valued).  Counseling sessions are 
typically one of the few leader-follower arrangements where personal matters can be 
openly and candidly discussed.  As might be predicted, th data confirms that it is 
these “effective” counseling sessions that predict higher climate perceptions.  
Schneider emphasized that his model was not all-inclusive and acknowledged that 
there are potentially many factors (leadership practices) out ide of his model that 
might influence an individual’s assessment of their workplace climate.  Though not 
comprehensive, the first two components of the climate explanatory model seem to be 
verified by the statistical analysis of Phase 1 and 2 data.
Schneider’s framework suggests that climate is the psychological process that 
mediates the relationship between what leaders do (best practices) and the resultant 
attitudes and behaviors of followers.  Based upon this theoretical concept, best 
practices that effectively elevate safety climate should predict higher levels of worker 
motivation and job satisfaction.  These elevated cognitive and affective states would 
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correlate with improved safety performance.  While these components were not 
assessed in the Phase 1 data, Phase 2 did survey respondents regarding their job 
satisfaction.  Although the officer cohort did not show any correlation (probably due 
to sample size), the enlisted cohort showed a statisticlly significant positive 
correlation between a respondent’s assessment of their saf ty climate and their job 
satisfaction (see Table 7.2).  As safety climate score increased, so too increased a 
worker’s evaluation of their job satisfaction.  Again cknowledging the limitations of 
this simple relationship, worker motivation is influenced by a variety of cognitive 
factors to include worker potential, self-efficacy, reward incentives, and how an 
individual generally feels about their work environment (affective state).   
The final theoretical arrangement evaluated in this research plan was the 
relationship between these two sources of follower influence (cognitive and affective 
state) and a worker’s behavior.  For example, does higher motivation (or any other of 
a variety of metrics used to measure an employee’s cognitive or affective state) 
predict distinctive behavior in three salient organizational contexts (attachment, 
performance, or citizenship)?  Regarding safety performance, quantitative analysis 
preliminarily reveals a positive correlation between elevat d safety climate and 
positive safety performance parameters.  Given the limitations of the safety 
performance data, Table 7.18 for example reveals that enlisted members who have a 
positive safety climate assessment are 13 percent more likely to assess their unit’s 
safety performance as a 6 (on a 1 to 6 scale), and 5 percent more likely to report zero 
mishaps in their unit over the past year, than their counterparts who have a lower 
safety climate assessment (all else being equal). 
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While focusing on just the safety element of leadership, climate and 
performance, it appears there is ample empirical evidence to demonstrate that 
Schneider’s climate and culture model provided an accurate and relevant theoretical 
framework upon which to design and conduct this policy evaluation research 
experiment. 
Evaluation of Hypotheses 
I.  For Phase 1, the first research question focuses on the demographics that 
determine differences in how Navy and Marine Corps strike fighter squadron 
members assess the safety climate of their organization.  Hypothesis One states that 
because of these differences, individual safety climate assessment for both officers 
and maintenance personnel will vary with rank, authority, and experience; will vary 
for maintenance personnel by organizational work center and workday shift; and will 
vary based upon command location and type.   
Hypothesis One is confirmed. 
Senior officers, senior maintenance personnel, and persons in positions of 
authority were found to have a higher assessment of organizational safety climate 
while aviators with higher flight experience correlated directly with a higher 
assessment of command safety climate.  Mid-grade PettyOfficers (E-4 to E-5) had a 
lower climate assessment mean compared to junior and senior enlisted categories.   
Maintenance personnel assigned to the Maintenance Control (MC) and Quality 
Assurance (QA) work centers had a higher climate assessment than the production 
work centers while day check personnel revealed a higher climate assessment than 
night check personnel.  Training organizations like the Fleet R placement Squadron 
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(FRS) had a lower assessment of squadron climate than their operational counterparts 
and units assigned overseas showed a lower assessment of climate than their 
embarked or ashore based counterparts.   
II.  The second Phase 1 research question investigated if there were certain 
organizational variables (leadership best practices) that correlated with an 
individual’s assessment of unit safety climate.  Hypothesis Two states that 
individuals who favorably view the efficacy of certain leadership best practices will 
also give a higher rating to their organization’s safety climate, leadership practices 
that facilitate or encourage open communication regarding operational schedule, 
organizational mission, safety concerns, personnel management policies, and daily 
job performance will predict higher levels of individual safety climate assessment; 
leadership practices that express concern for subordinate development and indivi ual 
welfare will predict higher levels of individual safety climate ssessment; and 
leadership practices based primarily on exchange relationships, will predict lower 
levels of safety climate assessment.   
Hypothesis Two is confirmed.   
Statistical analysis revealed several leadership best prac ices for both the Navy 
and Marine Corps officer cohort that correlated positively with elevated safety 
climate assessment.  Two dealt directly with personnel management policy and 
subordinate welfare (human factor boards and flight violations), three were 
communication specific (safety violations, safety goals, nd operational schedule), 
one dealt with concern for subordinates (unexpected changes), one dealt with leaders 
who consider safety issues during the formation and execution of operational and 
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training plans, and the final best practice dealt with methods designed to increase 
morale and motivation. 
The enlisted cohort (both Navy and Marine Corps) revealed similar results 
dealing primarily with subordinate care and safety concerns (review and update of 
safety procedures, intolerance for unprofessional behavior, and effective safety 
education and training programs, well respected quality assurance and safety 
members, and supervisors who recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards 
associated with maintenance and the flight-line).  Unfortunately, the FRP did not 
stress these leadership best practices and therefore the safety climate in the units 
under study did not change.  
Hypothesis Two predicted that the components of an effective leadership best 
practice (i.e. elevate safety climate) would be grounded in one of the transformational 
leadership principles outlined by Bernard Bass in Chapter 3 (e.g. concern for 
subordinate development and individual welfare).  When considering the results, it is 
clear that several of the organizational variables that correlated with elevated safety 
climate assessment for both the officer and enlisted cohort have both transformational 
and transactional elements.  Specifically, best practices designed to encourage the 
reporting of safety violations, although clearly designed to protect worker safety and 
well being, are based primarily on transactional exchange relationships.  Workers 
who report violations expect to be rewarded for their efforts and the focus is typically 
on maintaining the daily status quo.  Programs designed to identify poor or unsafe 
performers are also based upon a quid pro quo arrangement between the general 
workforce and management.  Despite the altruistic motivations of a concerned 
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follower, often the impetus to report an unsafe worker is the potential for supervisory 
acknowledgement or reward. 
This is not inconsistent with the leadership models introduced in Chapter 3.  
The transactional model depicted in Figure 3.1 is actually a component of the larger 
transformational model that predicts extra follower effort (Figure 3.2).  While certain 
elements of a leader action may contribute to the transactional component, other 
transformational elements may be contributed simultaneously by the same or other 
leaders.  Ultimately, all leader influence is processed and the resultant follower 
behavior either: fails to meet, meets, or exceeds performance expectations.      
    Assessing how the Secretary of the Navy’s leadership best practices 
initiative improved safety climate was the focus of research question three.  
Hypothesis Three states that those leadership best practice designed to emphasize 
goals and/or means, orient effective rewards, support individuals in their tasks or 
provide socio-emotional support to unit’s members will elevate safety climate.   
Hypothesis Three is partially confirmed 
Pre and post-policy analysis of Phase 1 data reveals no increase in safety 
climate assessment among the survey group because none of the c horts targeted by 
the FRP policy demonstrated a measurable climate increase.  Only the Marine Corps 
officer group, a survey cohort not under the FRP directive, showed a significant 
increase in climate assessment means. 
Hypothesis 3 design measures represent the five climate dimens ons that 
Schneider (1990) suggests can be influenced by leader action (human resource 
management practices) as outlined in his model in Figure 2.1.  These six practices 
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(hiring, placing, rewarding, monitoring, developing, and promoting) primarily shape 
what workers perceive (climate) and according to his model, can ultimately influence 
employee decision-making.  Theoretically, elevating one f the aforementioned 
climate dimensions (goal emphasis, means emphasis, reward orientation, task support 
and socio-emotional support) could elevate (positively shape) worker behavior and 
ultimately improve safety output. 
Unfortunately, only four of the sixteen FRP best practices for the Navy and 
only two of the sixteen for the Marine Corps showed any statistically significant 
correlation with safety climate assessment.  Of those Navy and Marine Corps FRP 
factors that did correlate, only one factor seems to targe  the above mentioned climate 
dimensions.  Communication_1 (Navy only) identifies those respondents who think 
their leaders are successful in communicating their safety goals to unit personnel 
(goal emphasis).  Despite the significance, this one factor was probably not enough to 
elevate safety climate perception for the entire cohort.   
For the MCAS cohort, the results were similar.  Of the fourteen FRP policy 
intervention modeled, only 3 correlated for the Navy and two for the Marine Corps.  
Planning_1 and training could both be considered leader actions designed to target 
the means emphasis climate dimension.  Each intervention strives to improve the 
means (updated procedures, education, and training) workers have to ccomplish their 
jobs safely and effectively.  Perhaps these FRP best prac ices were not enough to 
cause a detectable increase in safety climate assessment during the policy 
implementation period.   
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The first Phase 2 research question focused on determining if certain 
leadership best practices that are commonly considered outsi e the scope of the 
organizational safety program might improve an individual’s s essment of unit 
safety climate.  Hypothesis Four states that certain personal and professional 
development programs will predict higher levels of safety climate ass ssment. 
Hypothesis Four is confirmed. 
 Several safety programs were statistically shown to correlate positively with 
safety climate assessment including effective safety award programs, operational risk 
management, effective safety stand downs, and the measurement and publication of 
safety statistics.  Phase 2 analyses revealed certain p ograms that are typically 
considered to be outside the construct of traditional safety improvement programs, 
positively correlated with safety climate assessment.  Both the officer and enlisted 
cohort revealed a highly positive and statistically signif cant correlation between an 
effective personnel mentor program and safety climate ass ssment.  This correlation 
was validated through both individual and group interviews.  For the enlisted cohort, 
respondent’s who received helpful counseling sessions from their supervisors 
predicted higher safety climate assessment along with reward programs (non-safety 
specific) that acknowledged meritorious effort, vice routine performance.  Finally, 
members who reported being assigned to a unit that created an nvironment free of 
race/gender bias positively predicted an elevated individual safety climate 
assessment.  
The Phase 2 survey instrument also provided the researcher wit  data on other 
policy preferences regarding elevated safety climate.  For both Navy cohorts (officers 
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and enlisted personnel), policy measures designed to eliminate poor performers along 
with effective mentoring programs were identified as the top two measures that would 
potentially improve safety climate in a respondent’s unit.  Neither of these 
interventions were a part of the FRP policy.  
III.  The second Phase 2 research question investigated the correlation between the 
leadership style of a respondent’s supervisor and safety climate assessment and 
whether safety priority influences this assessment.  Hypothesis Five stated that 
transformational leadership will predict the highest level of safety climate assessment 
followed by transactional leaders; laissez-faire leadership will predict the lowest 
level of safety climate assessment; safety climate assessment will increase under 
transformational leadership during high safety priority conditions; safety climate 
assessment will remain unchanged for transactional and laissez-faire leaders during 
high safety priority conditions.  
Hypothesis Five is confirmed. 
Of the 18 survey statements used to place the leadership style of each survey 
respondent, two factors positively correlated for each of t e cohorts.  For officer 
respondents, two transformational qualities of their leaders emerged as positive 
predictors of safety climate assessment to include leaders who take a stand on 
controversial issues and consider the moral consequences of their decisions, and 
leaders who seem to know what is “really going on”.  For the enlisted group, two 
different yet equally transformational qualities emerged which are supervisors who 
are inspirational, and leaders who ensure command goals are known (i.e. updated, 
shared and published).  None of the transactional qualities predicted an elevated level 
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of safety climate assessment with any level of statistical significance.  There were an 
insignificant number of respondents who identified their leaders as laissez-faire, 
making that leadership style hypothesis unverifiable.  This finding means that 
respondents, who identify their leaders as having either of the two transformational 
qualities identified above, are more likely to assess their safety climate as higher than 
those respondents who do not place their leaders in this tran formational style 
category.     
None of the factors in the survey that were designed to measure safety priority 
under certain operational conditions (i.e. combat, stand down, work-ups, schedule 
change, etc.) revealed any statistical correlation betwe n leadership style and safety 
climate assessment.  
IV.  The third Phase 2 research question endeavored to determine if an individual’s 
safety climate assessment mediates behavior-dependent injury a d accidents.  
Hypothesis Six states that higher levels of safety climate assessment will predict 
lower injury and accident rates. 
Hypothesis Six is confirmed. 
Given the research limitations on collecting performance data, certain 
performance measures were included in the survey instrument that indicated a 
respondent’s assessment of a variety of operational and s fety performance 
parameters.  A preliminary causal relationship was identifi d between safety climate 
assessment and certain safety performance indicators such a  a respondent’s 
assessment of organizational safety performance, operational performance, and 
mishap frequency.   
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Limitations of Research 
 Several limitations to this research effort exist which are outlined in no 
particular order below: 
1. Use of secondary data for Phase 1 research:  Phase 1 reli d on a secondary use 
data base that was not designed to model the particular org nizational policies, 
practices and procedures under evaluation.  Because of this fact, proxies were used to 
most closely model the factors under investigation for statistical analysis.  This 
methodology introduces potential analytical errors because the survey statements 
were not specifically framed for policy analysis.  Also, because this was a secondary 
data source, this researcher was unable to interview Phase 1 participants to refine 
conclusions regarding organizational practices and safety climate assessment. 
2. The use of aggregated data for safety climate assessment:  M asuring safety 
climate is a challenge for social science researchers.  Evaluating unit climate relies on 
the aggregation of individual climate perceptions which maynot always be an 
accurate reflection of the safety climate in place at the time of organizational data 
collection.  Despite this potential inaccuracy, this method as garnered broad support 
among scholars as an approved method for analysis. 
3. Lack of longitudinal data:  Policy evaluation relied on data collected from 
different units and different respondents in the pre and post- licy cohorts.  This 
introduces many variables outside the control of the resarcher.  A longitudinal study 
would have been more effective.  Again however, the secondary data was the only 
source available for analysis. 
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4. Survey bias:  Regardless of the survey measures in place to ensure 
participation anonymity, the CSCAS process still retains  certain survey bias that 
most likely inflates some organizational assessment score .  This is probably most 
profound for the officer cohort.  Participants are never completely assured their 
personal scores could not, or would not, be attributed to them and are therefore 
sometimes influenced to moderate their assessment scores. 
5. Difficulty of modeling cause and effect relationships in human systems:  
Policy making and analysis would be easier if cause and effect could always be 
clearly linked and understood in human systems.  Small changes would have small 
effects, large changes would have large effects, what worked in the past would work 
in the future, and so on (Gulden, 2006).  This researcher recognizes organizations are 
much more complicated than the linear model that underlies th  majority of the policy 
analysis in this dissertation.  This study lacks: the quantification of strategic behavior, 
the assessment of non-linear feedback systems, and the observation of heterogeneous 
actors in these high risk organizations. 
6. The size of the Phase 2 cohort.  The size of the Phase 2 cohort is small, 
particularly among officer respondents.  In light of this fact, conditions are placed on 
Phase 2 findings although the interview sessions add confidence to Phase 2 
conclusions. 
7. The limitations of Phase 2 performance data:  Establishing confidence in the 
cause and effect relationship between safety climate and performance remains 
questionable due to the lack of empirical and respondent attributable performance 
data although some preliminary progress was made.  Two significant obstacles faced 
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the researcher in Phase 2.  First, specific performance data for each unit (i.e. safety 
data, mishap rates, injury data, lost workdays, etc.) was not made available due to the 
privileged nature of this data.  The researcher had a general sense of the unit’s 
performance based upon community reputation.  This information was purely 
anecdotal however, and could not be used for statistical modeling purposes.   
The second obstacle was designing a survey instrument that could collect self-
reported safety performance data that would be accurate enough t  be used in 
statistical modeling.  There is a certain institutional reluctance for survey respondents 
to accurately report accident or injury data due to some common biases or 
misperceptions such as: surveys are never anonymous, the non-attribution policy is 
deceptive, fear of reprisal, surveys present an opportunity to voice discontent, and/or 
surveys never lead to affirmative action or organizationl change.  The validity of the 
performance data used in Phase 2 must be viewed cautiously while considering it an 
investigative first step in a more robust and comprehensive research effort.    
Contribution to Current Practice 
 Despite tremendous supervisory involvement at all levels within the military 
services, uniformed personnel continue to injure themselves at alarming rates.  The 
majority of these incidences occur during non-operational events such as driving to 
and from work or during recreational events such as boating or skiing.  For example, 
four times as many Navy Sailors are killed annually in private motor vehicle crashes 
than are fatally injured during operational training events.  Simply, the most 
dangerous time for a member of the military is “off-duty” time.  Limitations to duty, 
lost work days, and medical costs are just some of the metrics used to document the 
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impact non-operational accidents are having on the readiness of our military 
operating forces.  While managing risk “on-the-job” remains  viable and appropriate 
mishap reduction strategy, the fact remains that the majority of injuries and fatalities 
sustained by U.S. military members occur during non-operational events.     
This dissertation contributes to the current practice of mishap reduction 
(policy formulation and implementation) in a way not ini ially envisioned in the 
research design.  While this research project interviewed participants and collected 
opinion data during the operational workday, the findings reveal some insights 
relevant to non-operational worker behavior.  A worker’s attitude regarding safety 
climate within the workplace environment undoubtedly influences non-workplace 
attitudes.  How a member feels when they leave work inevitably shapes in some 
measure how they act and feel the rest of the day.  While the magnitude, direction, 
and duration of this influence was not determined in this study, participant interviews 
revealed that certain workplace attitudes can remain with individuals long after they 
leave the job.  For example, an elated worker might feel happy the rest of the day 
while a disgruntled member might continue to be distraught or bitter at home.  This 
correlation offers exciting potential.  A Sailor with a c reless or reckless attitude 
while working on an airplane at the squadron might fail to wear safety goggles while 
repairing a neighbor’s lawnmower at home.  Conversely, a soldier in a transportation 
battalion known for his or her safety acumen might drive with due diligence on the 
freeway home.   Recognizing this relationship, the potential ex sts for positive 
organizational interventions to elevate non-operational safety attitudes.  Positive 
leader influence at work could quite possibly improve safety bhavior outside of the 
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workplace.  In essence, the interventions suggested in this report for improving 
workplace safety attitudes and workplace safety performance during the workday 
might additionally enhance a worker’s attitude and behavior during the most 
hazardous phase of the day, “off-duty” time.   
As military organizations modernize and transform, care must be taken to 
assess and retain those leadership best practices that can be empirically proven to 
improve organizational safety productivity and efficiency.  Unknowingly, several of 
these best practices might be critical contributors t elevating safety climate and serve 
as moderators of individual decision-making and safety behavior.  Recognizing that 
accident prevention and mishap mitigation requires creative intervention, this 
dissertation research suggests certain leadership interve ions could improve both 
operational and non-operational safety performance.  Several organizational practices 
and programs traditionally considered outside the realm of ishap and accident 
mitigation correlate positively with safety climate assessment and therefore present an 
area for safety improvement.   
In addition to the challenge of reducing non-operational accidents and 
injuries, the operational military environment remains inherently high-risk.  Some 
high level policy-makers within the uniformed military services and the Department 
of Defense might conclude that preventable accident and mishap rates have bottomed 
out and that further reductions would take an unreasonable and cost-ineffective 
commitment of resources to achieve modest improvements.  Two mishaps per 
100,000 flight hours remains the annual Class A mishap rate that seems almost 
impossible for military aviation safety managers and unit leaders to break.   
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Safety data is over analyzed and often misunderstood, particul ly at the 
strategic level of assessment.  Like mishap investigations, safety analysts (particularly 
at the senior staffs) evaluate performance data at the macro level and attribute success 
or failure to macro level intervention strategies.  Without dismissing the importance 
of this analysis, this research highlights the potential advantage that might be gained 
by training and placing either a full-time or collateral duty safety analyst at the unit 
level of operation.  Mishap reduction is all about infinites mal corrections over an 
infinite amount of time and the environment may be ready to acknowledge that a 
“unit-level” professional analyst is needed to assist command leadership in not only 
recognizing, but also developing and measuring, appropriate interve ions to mitigate 
today’s safety trends.  This recommendation recognizes the lack of highly skilled 
safety analysts in the uniformed services.  Perhaps there exists an outsourcing 
opportunity for these services. 
 More specifically, this research confirms that adequate d a existed prior to 
the FRP implementation date of April 2004 to enable safety policy makers to 
accomplish several very important objectives.  First, a preliminary analysis of 
historical safety climate data would have shown that certain demographic cohorts 
have a higher propensity to assess their organizational safety climate as higher 
compared to their unit colleagues (all else being equal).  Also, there are specific 
leadership interventions that can be empirically shown to elevate safety climate 
assessment and others that show no correlation with a member’s perception of their 
organizational safety climate.  These findings could have been helpful in developing 
the FRP.  Finally, and perhaps most important, the policy presumption upon which 
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the entire mishap reduction strategy was based (i.e. elevat d safety climate will 
predict improved safety performance), was verifiable given th  historical safety 
climate data available from NPS Monterey.  Given this rich source of historical 
climate data, the FRP could have been crafted along the following guidelines: 
1. The FRP should have identified specific intervention policies for specific 
treatment groups rather than the unilateral application of a mishap reduction plan 
to an entire unit.  For example, it is clear that the mid-grade enlisted cohort 
requires a different policy treatment than the senior officer cohort.  This 
dissertation shows that there are several identifiable demographics (rank, marital 
status, work shift, etc.) that predict comparatively lower safety climate assessment 
scores and that it is within these organizational sub-groups that a targeted 
intervention strategy might be most effective in reducing preventable mishaps. 
2. The FRP should have been more specific regarding the efficacy of certain 
intervention best practices so that policy implementers (COs, leaders, supervisors) 
could have been more selective (and efficient) in customizing a mishap reduction 
strategy for their unit.  The list of leadership best practices promulgated in the 
FRP should have been prioritized based upon statistical analysis so that unit 
leaders had a way of evaluating the cost and benefit of each intervention given 
their operational schedule and unit needs.  Because certain leadership best 
practices did not correlate statistically with elevated safety climate assessment 
does not mean they are unimportant practices, rather it means they were less 
likely to accomplish the policy objective which was to elevate the safety climate 
in these high-risk units.  Undoubtedly these best practices serve a variety of 
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valuable organizational purposes despite their lack of correlation with the policy 
objective. 
3. The FRP should have included a mechanism for unit leaders to baseline their own 
unit’s organizational safety climate and a method for monitori g the progress of 
their intervention strategy.  A mishap reduction strategy should not be based upon 
the single accident metric (pass or fail based upon one catastrophic event); rather 
a leader should be most concerned with small attitudinal changes and subtle 
degradations or improvements in individual and group perceptions.  This should 
be done incrementally during the course of the treatment phase and not deferred 
until the end of the two year period.  Random samples (both written polls and 
interviews) taken periodically can be extremely accurate and highly predictive of 
even small shifts in attitudes and behavior.  It seems this tool would have been a 
valuable addition to the FRP and would have empowered unit leaders to be more 
in control of their efforts to reduce preventable accidents and mishaps. 
4. In addition to base lining and measuring safety attitudes, th  FRP should have 
included a method for obtaining and evaluating safety performance data.  This 
data should have included both operational and non-operational safety 
performance metrics.  The non-operational component should be emphasized 
because it continues to contribute the highest percentage of pr ventable accidents 
and injuries.  
Beyond the operational implications, this dissertation represents one practical 
extension of the military leadership education that is taught in the classroom for 
example at the three U.S. military service academies.  Building upon a core classroom 
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pedagogy, each academy endeavors to synthesize the entire expe ience of student 
activity into a leadership component that prepares the young adult for subsequent 
service as a commissioned military officer.  The experience of officer formation is 
different for each student although each academy endeavors to control this variation 
through standardized training and adherence to strict performance requirements.  
Variance occurs due to differences in student background, culture, trait personalities, 
intelligence, motivation, interests, activities and a whole host of other variables that 
cannot be controlled for in the officer development model.  Simply, students have 
different traits and experiences that may profoundly effect how they ultimately lead.  
What does remain constant for each cohort group, however, are the core academic 
courses taught on the subject of military leadership.  Understanding this one constant 
is an important first step in a broader research investigation into how leadership 
manifests in individuals in the operational service components of the U.S. Army, 
Navy and Marine Corps. 
This dissertation research has the potential to feed into the organizing concept 
of leader development systems such as the Cadet Leader Dev lopment System 
(CLDS) at West Point.  The CLDS lays out the concept for cadet development in 
several broad domains of growth.  “The central idea is that we intend to educate and 
train cadets to be effective professional officers.  The CLDS can be thought of as a 
conceptual framework—a theory, if you will—of professional development that 
provides the basis for the design and implementation of the curriculum and the 
assessment of students and programs.  All cadet development rograms, including our 
undergraduate academic curriculum, flow from this broad framework of student 
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growth” (Forsyth 2004).  The core military leadership course (PL300) includes a 
content area on leadership systems (leader-follower intractions as well as situational 
factors) and organizational systems (macro-level factors including climate and 
culture).  Mission relating the classroom academic theory to practical field application 
relies not just on instructor anecdote, but also on the introduction of innovative and 
current applied scientific research.  This doctoral research potentially represents a 
direct link between the theories of leadership taught in the classroom, and the 
understandable and measurable implications of leadership applied in the field. 
This research on safety climate reveals the potential of crafting leadership 
intervention strategies designed to influence organization l perceptions or to improve 
or elevate other (non safety related) climate parameters.  While designing a 
preliminary methodology for assessing these leadership–safety climate–behavior 
relationships, this dissertation unveils the potential of understanding (and 
empowering) leaders to improve other climate dimensions within their organizations 
such as a climate for service, character, honesty, cordiality or profit.  While 
reiterating the difficulty of modeling perceptions and behavior in human systems, this 
dissertation reveals a methodology designed to evaluate: how certain leader actions 
might influence follower perceptions, and how changes in perce tions might predict 
subsequent follower behavior.  While the military’s recent focus has been on reducing 
preventable mishaps, there is ample evidence to suggest that many of the best 
practices modeled in this research (and undoubtedly others) might favorably influence 
a member’s climate perception of other important organization l parameters such as a 
climate for fairness, equity or justice.  Making leadrs aware of these connections 
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could improve organizational quality and performance and could represent a 
significant advance in leader development and leadership education. 
This dissertation identifies two significant organizational programs that are 
extremely correlative with elevated safety climate and highly predictive of positive 
safety performance.  Recognizing that formal mentor programs and sophisticated 
performance appraisal programs are integral to today’s military management rubric, 
this research indicates that these programs are not optimized to deliver a critical 
service.  Equally important is the fact that with an appro riate level of improvement 
to these two programs, military leaders have an almost i mediate opportunity to 
improve the safety performance of their units.  Although evaluating these programs is 
beyond the scope of this research project, the discovery that two very specific 
personnel management programs have the potential to improve o ganizational safety 
performance should be valued as an important opportunity for leadership to 
implement timely and effective change.   
These two programs have the potential to legitimately “transform” personnel 
in very salient ways.  A robust mentor program can extract individual potential and 
turn it into commendable military performance, while a sophisticated performance 
appraisal program can shape the most efficient fighting force.  In addition to 
improving military operational performance, these programs have the added benefit 
of elevating workers’ attitudes outside of the work environmet r sulting in 
potentially fewer non-operational accidents and injuries. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 To confidently validate the preliminary conclusions of thisdissertation, a 
longitudinal study of a naval aviation unit could be conducted with a policy treatment 
group and a study control group.  The policy treatment would be esigned specifically 
to assess if certain leadership best practices influence safety climate and safety 
behavior in positive and predictable ways.  Ethnographic research augmented with 
time sequenced surveys and interviews could potentially quantify the behavioral 
influence of specific leadership best practices on safety climate assessment.  In 
addition, collecting specific performance data (both on and off the job) over time 
would be required to establish confidence in the climate/performance, cause and 
effect relationship.  Most importantly, observing and collecting data on the 
antecedents to accident-prone decision-making and behavior would add enormous 
clarification and insight to understanding how leaders influence the behavior of 
followers in these high-risk organizations. 
 The current CSCAS safety climate survey process should collect more 
demographic data in their survey instrument.  While recognizing the purpose of the 
process is to provide unit leaders with important organization l insight for safety 
decision-making purposes, there is potentially more leaders can do to customize 
interventions for specific cohorts (given they are made ware of the data).  Also, this 
researcher understands how demographic questions can bias participants.  Care 
should be given to introduce demographic survey measures in an ordered or 
systematic way so that this new collection focus is transparent to new and repeat 
respondents. 
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 More specifically, two important programs emerge in this study that give this 
researcher optimism that that opportunity to significantly reduce preventable mishaps 
is well within our reach.  Navy leadership must consider forming a blue-ribbon study 
group to evaluate the content, consistency and efficacy of urrent performance 
evaluation programs for both officers and enlisted personnel.  This study should 
include an unbiased assessment of performance appraisal programs and promotion 
programs currently in effect, with a significant focus on assessing institutional 
competence in identifying, improving and/or eliminating poor performers.  This 
dissertation verifies the proposition that working with a poor performer (or the 
perception of working with a poor performer) significantly reduces a member’s safety 
climate assessment and is subsequently highly predictive of accident or mishap 
propensity.  This is a change in paradigm for program evaluators as the historical 
focus of most performance reviews has been on ensuring the best performers are 
retained, not the worst performers are separated. 
 Mentoring programs should be subject to the same formal and objective 
scrutiny.  There is ample statistical and anecdotal evidence to suggest that despite a 
high-level of focus, program formality, and implementation urgency, the current 
mentor program is letting many protégés down.  Like formal entoring programs, 
poor professional development programs, particularly for junior officers and junior 
enlisted personnel are highly correlated with low safety climate assessment and are 
predictive of elevated accident or injury propensity.  The information, resources and 
talent to improve these programs exists today.  This resea ch r concludes that it is in 
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these above mentioned areas where leaders can have the gr at st impact on elevating 
safety climate in high-risk military units.  
 Researchers in other HROs like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or 
NASA might consider collecting and analyzing safety climate data for the purposes of 
evaluating leadership effectiveness and to validate or discover other leadership 
interventions (safety or non-safety related) that might have an influence on worker’s 
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Appendix A 
Command Safety Assessment (CSA) Survey 




Your current model aircraft: 
Your total flight hours: 
Your total hours in model: 
Are you currently a department head? 
Your status: 
Your service: 
Your parent command: 
Your unit’s location 
 
Part II.  Take Survey  
Select one of the following choices:  
Strongly Disagree--Disagree--Neutral--Agree--Strongly Agree--N/A--Don’t Know  
 
1.   My command conducts adequate reviews and updates of safety t ndards and 
operating procedures. (PA)  
2.   My command uses an internal audit and hazard reporting system to catch any 
problems that may lead to a mishap. (PA)  
3.   My command has a defined process to set training goals and to review 
performance. (PA)  
4.   My command closely monitors proficiency and currency standards to ensure 
aircrew are qualified to fly. (PA)  
5.   Command leadership is actively involved in the safety program and management 
of safety matters. (PA)  
6.   My command has a defined process to effectively manage the hig -risk 
aviator. (PA)  
7.   Human Factors Councils have been successful in identifying aircrew members 
who pose a risk to safety. (PA)  
8.   Human Factors Boards have been successful reducing chances of an aircraft 
mishap due to high-risk aviator. (PA)  
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9.   My command makes effective use of the flight surgeon to help identify and 
manage high-risk personnel. (PA)  
10.   Command leadership encourages reporting safety discrepancies without the fear 
of negative repercussions. (RS/SC)  
11.   Individuals in my command are willing to report safety violati ns, unsafe 
behaviors or hazardous conditions. (RS/SC)  
12.   In my command, peer influence is effective at discouraging violations of 
standard operating procedures, or safety rules. (RS/SC)  
13.   In my command, we believe safety is an integral part of all flight 
operations. (RS/SC)  
14.   In my command, anyone who intentionally violates standard procedures, or 
safety rules, is swiftly corrected. (RS/SC)  
15.   In my command, violations of operating procedures, flying regulations, or 
general flight discipline are rare. (RS/SC)  
16.   Leaders in my command encourage everyone to be safety conscious and to 
follow the rules. (RS/SC)  
17.   In this command, an aviator who persistently violates flight standards and rules 
will seriously jeopardize his/her career. (RS/SC)  
18.   I am not comfortable reporting a safety violation, because people in my 
command would react negatively toward me. (RS/SC)  
19.   My command has a reputation for high-quality performance. (QA)  
20.   My command sets high quality standards and strives to maintain quality 
control. (QA)  
21.   My command closely monitors quality and corrects any deviations from 
established quality standards. (QA)  
22.   Quality standards in my command are clearly stated in formal publications and 
procedural guides. (QA)  
23.   Command leaders permit cutting corners to get a job done. (RM)  
24.   Lack of experienced personnel has adversely affected my co mand's ability to 
operate safely.  (RM)  
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25.   Safety decisions are made at the proper levels, by the most qualified people in 
my command. (RM)  
26.   Command leaders consider safety issues during the formatin and execution of 
operational and training plans. (RM)  
27.   Command leadership has a clear picture of the risks associ ted with its flight 
operations. (RM)  
28.   My command takes the time to identify and assess risks a sociated with its flight 
operations. (RM)  
29.   My command does a good job managing risks associated with its flight 
operations. (RM)  
30.   My command has increased the chances of a mishap due to inadequate or 
incorrect risk assessment. (RM)  
31.   I am provided adequate resources (time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to 
accomplish my job. (RM)  
32.   My command provides the right number of flight hours per month for me to fly 
safely. (RM)  
33.   I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my flights. (RM)  
34.   Based upon my command's personnel and other assets, the command is over-
committed. (RM)  
35.   My command has incorporated Operational Risk Management processes in 
decision-making at all levels. (RM)  
36.   My supervisor can be relied on to keep his/her word. (CC)  
37.   Our command leaders and supervisors can be trusted. (CC)  
38.   My command's Safety Officer is highly regarded. (CC)  
39.   Our Safety Officer is influential in promoting safety. (CC)  
40.   My command is genuinely concerned about safety. (CC)  
41.   Command leadership is successful in communicating its safety goals to unit 
personnel. (CC)  
42.   My command provides a positive command climate that promotes safe flight 
operations. (CC)  
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43.   Command leadership is actively involved in the safety program and management 
of safety matters. (CC)  
44.   Command leadership sets the example for compliance with flight standards. (CC)  
45.   My command ensures that all unit members are responsible and accountable for 
safe flight operations. (CC)  
46.   Command leadership willingly assists in providing advice concer ing safety 
matters. (CC)  
47.   Command leadership reacts well to unexpected changes to its plans. (CC)  
48.   My command does not hesitate to temporarily restrict from flying individuals 
who are under high personal stress. (CC)  
49.   I am adequately trained to safely conduct all of my flights. (CC)  
50.   Morale and motivation in my command are high. (CC)  
51.   My command ensures the uniform enforcement of all operating s andards among 
unit members. (CC)  
52.   Crew rest standards are enforced in my command. (CC)  
53.   In my command, NATOPS tests and check rides are conducted as intended, to 
candidly assess aircrew qualifications. (CC)  
54.   My command provides adequate safety backups to catch possible human errors 
during high-risk missions. (CC)  
55.   Within my command, good communications flow exists up and down the chain 
of command. (CC)  
56.   My command has good two-way communication with external commands. (CC)  
57.   Safety education and training are adequate in my command. (CC)  
58.   The Safety Department is a well-respected element of my co mand. (CC)  
59.   The Aviation Safety Officer position is a sought after billet in my 
command. (CC)  
60.   My command's Safety Department keeps me well informed regarding important 
safety information. (CC)  
61.   My command's Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is helping to 
improve mission performance and safety.  (CC)  
62. The most hazardous activity I perform is... (200 words max.) 
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63. The most significant action(s) my unit can take to improve safety is/are... (200 
words max.)  
 
Code: 
PA: Process Auditing 
RA: Reward System 
QC: Quality Control 
RM: Risk Management 
CC Command and Control 
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Appendix B 
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) 
Part I.  Demographic Information 
 
Your rank: 
Total years aviation maintenance experience: 
Your work center: 
Your primary shift: 
Your current model aircraft: 
Your status: 
Your service: 
Your parent command: 
Your unit’s location 
 
Part II.  Take Survey  
Select one of the following choices:  
Strongly Disagree--Disagree--Neutral--Agree--Strongly Agree--N/A--Don’t Know  
 
1.   The command adequately reviews and updates safety procedures. (PA)  
2.   The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a program that targets 
training deficiencies. (PA)  
3.   The command uses safety and medical staff to identify/manage personnel at 
risk. (PA)  
4.   CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions. (PA)  
5.   Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely monitored. (PA)  
6.   Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously. (PA)  
7.   Our command climate promotes safe maintenance. (RS/SC)  
8.   Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other procedure violations and encourage 
reporting safety concerns. (RS/SC)  
9.   Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other violations and individuals feel 
free to report them. (RS/SC)  
10.   Procedural violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are not common in this 
command. (RS/SC)  
11.   The command recognizes individual safety achievement throug  rewards and 
incentives. (RS/SC)  
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12.   Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal 
problems/illness. (RS/SC)  
13.   Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets. (RS/SC)  
14.   Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the command. (RS/SC)  
15.   The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and set standards to 
maintain quality control. (QA)  
16.   QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential to mission 
accomplishment. (QA)  
17.   QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete and are not pressured by 
supervisors to sign-off. (QA)  
18.   Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as that at home station. (QA)  
19.   Required publications/tools/equipment are available, current/serviceable, and 
used. (QA)  
20.   QARs are helpful, and QA is not 'feared' in my unit. (QA)  
21.   Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect 
maintenance. (RM)  
22.   Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training/support is 
provided as needed. (RM)  
23.   Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards ssociated with 
maintenance and the flight-line. (RM)  
24.   I am provided adequate resources, time, and personnel to accomplish my 
job. (RM)  
25.   Personnel turnover does not currently impact the command's bility to operate 
safely. (RM)  
26.   Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance than the flight schedule, 
and do not permit cutting corners. (RM)  
27.   Day/Night Check has equal workloads. Staffing is sufficient on each shift. (RM)  
28.   Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and are aw r  of individual 
workload. (RM)  
29.   Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is not over-
committed. (RM)  
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30.   My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having problems. (CC)  
31.   Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work center supervisor 
decisions are respected. (CC)  
32.   Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are activ ly engaged in the 
safety program. (CC)  
33.   Supervisors set the example for following maintenance standards and ensure 
compliance.  (CC)  
34.   In my command, safety is a key part of all maintenance operations and all are 
responsible/accountable for safety. (CC)  
35.   Safety education and training are comprehensive and effective. (CC)  
36.   All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, supervisd and staffed by 
qualified personnel. (CC)  
37.   Maintenance Control is effective in managing all maintenance activities. (CC)  
38.   Effective communication exists up/down the chain of command. (C/FR)  
39.   I get all the information I need to do my job safely. (C/FR)  
40.   Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with other work centers and 
Maintenance. (C/FR)  
41.   My command has effective pass-down between shifts. (C/FR)  
42.   Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes before flight. (C/FR)  
43.   Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated wi h maintenance 
activities. (C/FR)  
44. The next quality defect will be caused by... (200 words max.) 
45. The next quality defect can be prevented by... (200 words max.) 
Code: 
PA: Process Auditing 
RS: Reward System 
QA: Quality Control 
RM: Risk Management 
CC: Command and Control 
C/FR: Communications 
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Appendix C 
Leadership and Safety Climate Research Project (Officer Survey) 
My name is Mark Adamshick and I am conducting a research project at the University of Maryland, College 
Park.  I am inviting you to participate in this research because you are at least 18 years of age and a member of a U.S.
Navy or Marine Corps Strike Fighter squadron.  The purpose of this research is to determine if certain leadership 
interventions influence safety climate in high-risk military aviation units.  I am asking you to complete a confidential 
survey.  The questions in the survey will require you to assess the current safety climate of your unit.  I ask for your 
truthful responses to questions asking you to assess how certain command policies, programs and procedures influence 
safety climate.  To help protect your confidentiality, your name will not be included on the survey and no person or 
unit identifiable data will be collected.  The study is voluntary and anonymous.    
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help me learn more about how certain 
command policies and procedures might improve a command’s safety performance.  I hope that in the future, other 
people might benefit from this study through improved understanding of how specific leadership interventions might 
positively influence the safety climate of similar military organizations. Your participation in this research is 
voluntary.  You may choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop 
participating at any time.  If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Mark Adamshick at 
the University of Maryland, 2101 Van Munching Hall at (301) 405-6226 or madamshi@umd.edu. 
 This research has been reviewed and approved according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB 
procedures for research involving human subjects and complies with DOD regulations regarding the same. 
 
Circle all choices that apply (Pen or pencil is fine): 
1. Demographic Data 
 
       
1. My rank is......................................... 
 
O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 CWO  
2. My service is......................................... USN USMC 
 
     
 









   
 






     
 








    
 
















7. My designation is.................................. 
 
Pilot NFO Admin Maint Intel Medical Other 
8. Flight experience (total hrs/all models). < 500 500-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 2001-2500 >2500 N/A 
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13. My spouse is in the military………… Yes  No N/A     
 







    
 
 





















16. My highest level of education is.......... 
 
2 yr college 
 





   
 














































   
 








    
21. I have been in this command………... < 1 yr 1-2 yrs 2-3 yrs 3-4 yrs > 4 yrs   
 
22. Over the past year, I have been 




















23. Over the past year, I have been 


























24. Over the past year, I have been 











> 3 times 
 
25. Over the past year, this command has 










> 3 times 
 
 
26. Number of people I have seen injured 
























27. On average, I get the following 
amount of sleep each 24 hr cycle.............. 
 
 















> 9 hrs 
 
28.  My assessment of this command’s 
operational performance  


























29. My assessment of this command’s 
safety performance 


























30. My job satisfaction is: 




















31. The promotion recommendation on 
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31a. The promotion recommendation on 
my last FITREP was (for USMC)............. 
Rec Not-Rec Don’t know 
 
32. I have served in the Safety 







    
 
2. Safety Climate 
This section addresses your perception of the safety climate in your unit.  Safety climate is how you interpret the safety 
















33. I consider the safety climate in this command 








































35. Most people share my assessment of this unit’s 























36. Safe operations are more important than fixing 
















37. Safety climate improves as the operational 
demand increases (e.g. workups, deployment or 






























38. I would recommend this command to a friend.. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
39. Morale in this command is high....................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 
















41. I am surprised we do not have more accidents 























42. People are willing to take unsafe risks when 
the operational tempo increases (e.g. work-ups, 






























43. Mandatory safety stand downs are effective in 























3. Safety Program 















44. Individuals in my command are willing to 
























45. Human Factors Boards have been successful in 























46. Leadership considers safety issues during the 
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47. People who intentionally violate standard 























48. Leaders communicate safety goals in relevant 




































49. My command reacts well to unexpected 
















50. My command measures safety statistics and 
















51. My command uses safety data to implement 























52. My fitness report includes a fair assessment of 















































54. I am empowered to stop squadron operations if 

































56. The best people in this command are assigned 
























4. Squadron Programs 








































































60. Someone in my organization has taken me 























61. People are rewarded for meritorious work, not 
















62. My command considers the impact on my 
















63. My boss helped me form a personal plan for 
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64. People are assigned jobs based upon 























































5. Leadership Style 
















67. My supervisor instills pride in me and others.... 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 








































































72. My supervisor challenges me intellectually to 
















73. My supervisor takes a stand on controversial 
























74. The goals of this command are known 















































76. This command closely monitors individual 







































































79. People in my chain of command avoid 















































81. My supervisor’s leadership style changes as 















































  322 
 
 
83. My boss micro-manages more when 









































6.  Program Assessment 
85. Consider the following options as potential ways to improve your unit’s safety climate.  What interventions would 
improve how people perceive their work environment and/or imp ove safety performance?  Choose the three options you 
think would improve safety climate the most and rank them by placing a 1, 2 and 3 next to those choices.  Please 
comment on these choices in section 7. 
 
___ Establish a functional mentor program  ___ Institute a merit-based ranking system 
 
___ Publish safety statistics ___ Improve squadron communications 
 
___ Improve squadron resources ($$$$$) 
 
___ Increase my pay and benefits 
 
___ Reduce operational tempo 
 
___ Increase tour length/reduce turnover 
 
___ Give out more awards 
 
 
___ Improve technical training 
___ Take better care of my family ___ Make decision-making more participatory 
 
___ More objective and concrete feedback 
 
___ More individual autonomy, less micromanagement 
 
___ Better hardware (aircraft, tools, parts) 
 
___ Improve workspaces (equipment, habitability) 
 
___ Improve base housing 
 
___ Improved medical care for my family 
 
___ Increase unit diversity (race, gender 
 
___ Improve family advocacy programs  
 
___ More medical personnel (e.g. flight surgeon) 
 
___ Get rid of poor performers (officer and enlisted) 
 





7. Free response 
86. Comment on any dimension of safety climate you consider important or relevant.  Of particular interest to this researcher 
might be any supervisory policy, organizational program or leadership dimension that might influence safety climate that you 
consider to be overlooked or ignored.  These observations or comments could be either positive or negative.  Pl ase comment 
on behavioral influences that might have potential safety implications.  What are the things leaders do that improve the safety 
environment and make you want to perform your job safely? 
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Appendix D 
Leadership and Safety Climate Research Project (Enlisted Survey) 
My name is Mark Adamshick and I am conducting a research project at the University of Maryland, College 
Park.  I am inviting you to participate in this research because you are at least 18 years of age and a member of a U.S.
Navy or Marine Corps Strike Fighter squadron.  The purpose of this research is to determine if certain leadership 
interventions influence safety climate in high-risk military aviation units.  I am asking you to complete a confidential 
survey.  The questions in the survey will require you to assess the current safety climate of your unit.  I ask for your 
truthful responses.  To help protect your confidentiality, your name will not be included on the survey and no person 
or unit identifiable data will be collected.  The study is voluntary and anonymous.    
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help me learn more about how certain 
command policies and procedures might improve a command’s safety performance.  I hope that in the future, other 
people might benefit from this study through improved understanding of how specific leadership interventions might 
positively influence the safety climate of similar military organizations. Your participation in this research is 
voluntary.  You may choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop 
participating at any time.  If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Mark Adamshick at 
the University of Maryland, 2101 Van Munching Hall at (301) 405-6226 or madamshi@umd.edu. 
 This research has been reviewed and approved according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB 
procedures for research involving human subjects and complies with DOD regulations regarding the same. 
 
Circle all choices that apply (pen or pencil is fine): 
1. Demographic Data 
 
       
1. My rank is............................................. 
 
E-1/2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8/9 
2. My service is.............................................. USN USMC 
 
     
 










   
4. I am………........................................... 
 
Male Female      
 








    
 




















Intel Medical Services Disbursing Other 
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21. I have been in this command…………... 
 








> 4 yrs 
  
 
22. Over the past year, I have been injured 















> 3 times 
  
 
23. Over the past year, I have been injured 













3 times  
 
 
> 3 times 
  
24. Over the past year, I have been involved 











> 3 times 
  
25. Over the past year, this command has 










> 3 times 
 
 
26. On average, I get the following amount 
of sleep each 24 hr cycle.............................. 
 
 















> 9 hrs 
 
27. Number of people I have seen injured at 


















28.  My assessment of this command’s 
operational performance  


























29. My assessment of this command’s 
safety performance 


























30. My job satisfaction is: 




















31. The promotion recommendation on my 
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31a. The promotion recommendation on my 
last evaluation was (USMC).......................... 
Rec Not-Rec Don’t 
know 
 
32. I have served in the Safety Department 







    
 
 
2. Safety Climate 
Your perception of the safety climate in your unit.  Safety climate is how you interpret the safety conditions of your work 
















33. I consider the safety climate in this command 
to be very high................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 
























35. Most people share my assessment of this unit’s 
















36. Safe operations are more important than fixing 























37. Safety climate improves as the operational 







































39. Morale in this command is high…………........ 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 
















41. I am surprised we do not have more accidents 























42. People are willing to take unsafe risks when 























43. Mandatory safety stand downs are effective in 
























3. Safety Programs 















44. Individuals in my command are willing to 
















45. Leadership considers safety issues during the 
















46. Anyone who intentionally violates standard 
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47. Safety goals are clear and relevant................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 
48. My command reacts well to unexpected 























49. My command measures safety statistics and 
















50. My command uses safety data to implement 























51. My performance evaluation fairly assesses my 















































53. I am empowered to stop squadron operations if 
















54. I have sufficient time to do my job done safely. 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 
55. The best people in this command are assigned 








































4. Squadron Programs 








































































60. Someone in my organization has taken me 























61. People are rewarded for meritorious work, not 
















62. My command considers the impact on my 
















63. This command helped me form a personal plan 























64. People are assigned jobs based upon 
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5. Leadership Style 















67. My supervisor instills pride in me and others.... 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
 








































































72. My supervisor challenges me intellectually to 
















73. My supervisor takes a stand on controversial 
























74. The goals of this command are known 















































76. This command closely monitors individual 







































































79. People in my chain of command avoid 















































81. My supervisor’s leadership style changes as 















































83. My supervisor micro-manages more when 
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6.  Program Assessment 
85. Consider the following options as potential ways to improve your unit’s safety climate.  What interventions would 
improve how people perceive their work environment and/or imp ove safety performance?  Choose the three options you 
think would improve safety climate the most and rank them by placing a 1, 2 and 3 next to those choices.  Please 
comment on these choices in section 7. 
 
___ Establish a functional mentor program  ___ Institute a merit-based ranking system 
 
___ Publish safety statistics ___ Improve squadron communications 
 
___ Improve squadron resources ($$$$$) 
 
___ Increase my pay and benefits 
 
___ Reduce operational tempo 
 
___ Increase tour length/reduce turnover 
 
___ Give out more awards 
 
 
___ Improve technical training 
___ Take better care of my family ___ Make decision-making more participatory 
 
___ More objective and concrete feedback 
 
___ More individual autonomy, less micromanagement 
 
___ Better hardware (aircraft, tools, parts) 
 
___ Improve workspaces (equipment, habitability) 
 
___ Improve base housing 
 
___ Improved medical care for my family 
 
___ Increase unit diversity (race, gender 
 
___ Improve family advocacy programs  
 
___ More medical personnel (e.g. flight surgeon) 
 
___ Get rid of poor performers (officer and enlisted) 
 





7. Free response 
86. Comment on any dimension of safety climate you consider important or relevant.  Of particular interest to this researcher 
might be any supervisory policy, organizational program or leadership dimension that might influence safety climate that you 
consider to be overlooked or ignored.  These observations or comments could be either positive or negative.  Pl ase comment 
on behavioral influences that might have potential safety implications.  What are the things leaders do that improve the safety 
environment and make you want to perform your job safely? 
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Appendix E 
Mishap/Injury Summary Data, Unit Distribution (Oceana Survey) 
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Figure E.7 injury2 Summary by Unit (Enlisted) 
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Appendix F 
Safety Climate Improvement Choices (Oceana Survey) 
 



































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Question 85 (second choice)
 
 
































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Question 85 (third choice)
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Figure F.3 Safety Climate Improvement Choices, Officer (First Choice by Unit) 
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Figure F.8 Safety Climate Improvement Choices, Enlisted (First Choice by Unit) 
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Figure F.10 Safety Climate Improvement Choices, Enlisted (Third Choice by Unit) 
 























4 2 2 3
6
2 3 2 2
6 5
2







































  339 
 
Appendix G 
Safety Climate Assessment by Demographic Category (CSA/MCAS Survey) 
Table G.1 Favorable Safety Climate CSA survey responses (USN/VFA) 
 
Demographic variables Favorable response to “safety climate” survey 
statement, population percentage % 
 SC1* SC2* SC3* SC11** SC21** SC31** 
Rank       
Junior Off (O-1 to O-3) 




























Total flight hours       
Flight Hours < 500 
Flight Hours ≥500 ; <1000 
Flight Hours ≥1000; <2000 






































































































































n=1783.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
*   respondent answered agree or strongly agree with positive safety climate statement 
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Table G.2 Favorable Safety Climate CSA survey responses (USMC/VMFA) 
 
Demographic variables Favorable response to “ safety climate” survey 
statement population percentage % 
 SC1* SC2* SC3* SC11** SC21** SC31** 
Rank       
Junior Officer (O-1 to O-3) 




























Total flight hours       
Flight Hours < 500 
Flight Hours ≥500 ; <1000 
Flight Hours ≥1000; <2000 
























































































































n=1160.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
*   respondent answered agree or strongly agree with positive safety climate statement 
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Table G.3 Favorable Safety Climate MCAS survey responses (USN/VFA) 
 
Favorable response to “safety climate” survey statement 
population percentage %  
Demographic variables 
SC1* SC2* SC3* SC11** SC21** SC31** 
Rank       
E-1 to E-3 78.2 77.7 76.5 22.6 26.2 19.5 
E-4 to E-5 72.4 75.6 72.7 18.2 23.0 13.9 
E-6 to E-7 81.7 83.3 81.5 25.2 31.8 16.9 
E-8 to E-9 91.4 92.8 89.4 44.5 49.7 25.3 
WO-1 to CWO-5 85.9 82.8 82.8 45.3 37.5 39.1 
O-1 to O-3 93.1 90.8 91.8 47.6 51.5 27.3 
O-4 to O-6 97.2 97.2 97.2 69.4 50.0 41.7 
Work center       
Airframes 73.1 76.7 73.1 17.6 23.2 13.9 
Avionics 70.9 74.5 71.9 16.3 22.9 12.6 
Flight line 78.1 77.4 76.5 22.3 25.3 19.6 
Ordnance 80.2 81.5 80.3 24.9 27.6 20.2 
Power plants  75.2 78.2 75.2 20.8 25.6 16.0 
Quality assurance 81.3 84.3 79.5 27.3 33.2 15.5 
Survival 75.6 79.0 75.6 21.2 28.3 14.1 
Maintenance Control 85.9 86.8 86.3 33.8 37.3 21.3 
Other 76.6 75.2 73.6 23.2 27.6 17.1 
Primary shift       
Day check 79.3 80.0 78.7 24.6 28.6 18.3 
Night check 73.1 76.0 72.6 18.5 24.1 14.7 
Status       
Regular 77.1 78.6 76.5 22.3 27.0 16.8 
Active reserve 71.7 73.9 71.6 20.9 23.6 16.5 
Drilling reserve 79.5 83.8 80.3 24.0 28.2 21.4 
Parent Command       
CNAL 77.7 78.5 77.6 20.8 24.8 15.0 
CNAP 77.8 79.3 77.6 24.1 29.5 18.6 
CNARF 74.8 78.2 75.4 20.1 23.8 15.0 
CNATRA 83.1 91.5 79.7 23.7 35.6 22.0 
NAVAIR 75.7 77.6 74.3 21.0 25.5 16.2 
Other 75.0 76.8 74.3 22.2 26.2 16.8 
Unit’s location       
Afloat 77.4 79.9 77.1 20.5 26.9 16.5 
Ashore 77.0 78.0 76.2 22.7 26.5 17.1 
FRS 77.4 75.1 79.5 24.2 26.5 17.3 
Overseas 74.7 80.3 74.7 20.9 29.8 15.3 
n=14,242.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
*   respondent answered agree or strongly agree with positive safety climate statement 
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Table G.4 Favorable Safety Climate MCAS survey responses (USMC/VMFA) 
 
Favorable response to “safety climate” survey statement 
population percentage %  
Demographic variables 
SC1* SC2* SC3* SC11** SC21** SC31** 
Rank       
E-1 to E-3 80.8 80.1 79.2 29.2 30.3 21.5 
E-4 to E-5 71.7 73.2 71.5 20.1 21.9 13.5 
E-6 to E-7 73.4 75.1 75.1 22.3 25.0 16.1 
E-8 to E-9 93.2 85.7 88.0 45.1 42.1 30.1 
WO-1 to CWO-5 94.8 84.4 90.6 52.1 43.8 30.2 
O-1 to O-3 95.0 88.3 81.7 41.7 45.0 18.3 
O-4 to O-6 100.0 94.1 94.1 64.7 64.7 47.1 
Work center       
Airframes 76.6 76.8 73.4 21.1 24.5 14.6 
Avionics 76.5 78.3 78.6 24.8 26.8 17.9 
Flight line 72.6 72.6 71.2 24.4 27.7 18.8 
Ordnance 81.2 79.3 81.4 28.3 28.0 19.9 
Power plants  70.4 71.5 70.2 22.5 23.9 15.3 
Quality assurance 67.3 73.4 67.6 21.7 21.4 11.9 
Survival 75.9 74.2 73.2 23.7 25.0 15.4 
Maintenance Control 83.5 81.5 81.2 29.9 31.2 20.8 
Other 73.9 74.6 71.5 24.5 25.6 17.6 
Primary shift       
Day check 77.7 77.1 76.5 25.6 26.7 18.0 
Night check 73.0 75.1 73.4 23.1 25.2 16.0 
Status       
Regular 75.5 76.1 75.0 24.1 26.0 16.6 
Active reserve 74.7 74.5 74.5 25.3 24.6 18.3 
Drilling reserve 87.2 83.2 83.5 34.1 30.4 27.0 
Parent Command       
1 MAW 80.8 80.0 83.3 27.8 27.2 18.7 
2 MAW 76.8 81.3 77.5 25.1 30.3 17.6 
3 MAW 73.6 73.1 71.9 23.5 24.1 16.2 
4 MAW 78.7 73.7 76.5 24.3 22.0 18.0 
Other 66.7 68.5 63.0 34.3 25.9 24.1 
Unit’s location       
Afloat 88.9 82.2 84.4 33.3 31.1 22.2 
Ashore 75.6 75.6 74.5 24.6 25.8 17.2 
FRS 77.9 81.4 78.7 24.5 24.5 19.8 
Overseas 77.0 78.3 77.8 25.2 27.1 16.9 
n=7,134.  Survey conducted between November 2000 and June 2005. 
*   respondent answered agree or strongly agree with positive safety climate statement 
** respondent answered strongly agree with positive safety climate statement 
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Appendix H 
Safety Climate Assessment by Demographic Category (Oceana Survey) 
Table H.1 Safety Climate Assessment by Demographic Category (Officer) 
 
Demographic variables Response to Q33, “Safety Climate assessment” 
 4 or 5 on Likert Scale 
n/population % 
5 on Likert scale 
n/population % 

































































Total flight hours    
Flight Hours: < 500 
Flight Hours: 500-1000 
Flight Hours: 1001-1500 
Flight Hours: 1501-2000 
Flight Hours: 2001-2500 























   
 









Spouse’s living arrangements   
Spouse lives with member 








Spouse’s work    
Works full time 











Spouse’s occupation    
Serves in military  





















Education   
2 year degree 











Commissioning Source   
U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) 
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Promotion recommendation   
Promotable (P) 
Must Promote (MP) 
Early promote (EP) 
Don’t Know 
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Table H.2 Safety Climate Assessment by Demographic Category (Enlisted) 
 
Demographic variables Response to Q33, “Safety Climate assessment” 
 4 or 5 on Likert Scale 
n/population % 
5 on Likert scale 
n/population % 





54 / 79.4% 
92 / 75.5% 
57 / 81.4% 
154 / 54.2% 
17 / 25.0% 
33 / 27.1% 
22 / 31.4% 
21 / 7.4% 








39 / 63.9% 
105 / 71.7% 
66 / 58.9% 
81 / 59.6% 
52 / 72.2% 
4 / 80.0% 
6 / 100.0% 
10 / 16.4% 
32 / 21.1% 
18 / 16.1% 
17 / 12.5% 
15 / 20.8% 
0 / 0.0% 
1 / 16.7% 
Gender   
Male 
Female 
300 / 66.7% 
57 /  36.6% 
77 / 17.1% 
16 / 17.0% 
Citizenship   
U.S. born 
U.S. naturalized 
Non U.S. citizen 
322 / 64.8% 
28 / 71.8% 
7 / 87.5% 
84 / 16.9% 
5 / 12.8 
4 / 50.0% 





 329 / 65.5% 
23 / 69.7% 
3 / 60.0% 
2 / 50.0% 
86 / 17.1% 
5 / 15.2% 
2 / 40.0% 
0 / 0.00% 








231 / 66.2% 
60 / 66.7% 
36 / 66.7% 
0 / 0.0% 
5 / 50.0% 
5 / 71.4% 
20 / 69.5% 
57 / 16.3% 
22 / 24.4% 
6 / 11.1% 
0 / 0.0% 
2 / 20.0% 
0 / 0.0% 
6 / 20.7% 








30 / 71.43% 
17 / 80.95% 
37 / 64.9% 
39 / 63.9% 
68 / 62.4% 
27 / 62.8% 
82 / 70.1% 
7 / 16.7 
5 / 23.8% 
7 / 12.3% 
10 / 16.4% 
18 / 16.5% 
9 / 20.9% 
18 / 15.4% 
 







9 / 42.9% 
26 / 72.2% 
3 / 50.0% 
1 / 33.3% 
18 / 64.3 
4 / 19.1% 
7 / 19.4% 
1 / 16.7% 
0 / 0.0% 
7 / 25.0% 




198 / 68.3% 
123 / 69.5% 
36 / 46.8% 
55 / 19.0% 
35 / 19.8% 
3 / 3.9% 





168 / 68.3% 
159 / 63.6% 
15 / 60.0% 
15 / 65.2% 
42 / 17.1% 
42 / 16.8% 
4 / 16.0% 
5 / 21.7% 
Spouse’s living arrangements   
Spouse lives with member 
Spouse lives elsewhere 
N/A 
145 / 66.5% 
39 / 70.9% 
173 / 63.8% 
35 / 16.1% 
11 / 20.0% 
47 / 17.3% 
Spouse’s work    
Works full time 
Works part time 
Not employed 
N/A 
98 / 67.6% 
26 / 61.9% 
58 / 68.2% 
175 / 64.3% 
23 / 15.9% 
8 / 19.1% 
13 / 15.3% 
49 / 18.01% 
Spouse’s occupation    
Serves in military  
Does not serve in military 
N/A 
25 / 54.3% 
158 / 69.3% 
174 / 64.5% 
6 / 13.0% 
40 / 17.5% 
47 / 17.4% 





215 / 66.0% 
112 / 65.1% 
29 / 67.4% 
1 / 33.3% 
60 / 18.4% 
26 / 15.1% 
7 / 16.3% 
0 / 0.0% 
Education   
Some High School 






4 / 57.15% 
177 / 67.6% 
12 / 57.2% 
135 / 62.5% 
26 / 78.8% 
2 / 100.0% 
1 / 33.3% 
1 / 14.3% 
46 / 17.6% 
4 / 19.1% 
38 / 17.6% 
3 / 9.1% 
0 / 0.0% 
1 / 33.3% 
Authority   
Worker 
Leading Petty Officer 
Shift supervisor 
Work center supervisor 
Branch Chief Petty Officer 
250 / 64.6% 
24 / 77.4% 
57 / 64.1% 
19 / 63.3% 
2 / 100.0% 
68 / 17.6% 
8 / 25.8% 
13 / 14.6% 
4 / 13.3% 
0 / 0.0% 
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Division Chief Petty Officer 5 / 100.0% 0 / 0.0% 








79 / 59.9% 
18 / 69.2% 
108 / 68.4% 
37 / 64.9% 
82 / 64.6% 
3 / 75.0% 
30 / 75.0% 
24 / 18.2% 
3 / 11.5% 
25 / 15.8% 
10 / 17.5% 
21 / 16.5% 
1 / 25.0% 
9 / 22.5% 





92 / 73.6% 
145 / 62.8% 
110 / 62.9% 
10 / 76.9% 
27 / 21.6% 
40 / 17.3% 
23 / 13.1% 
3 / 23.1% 




18 / 69.2% 
126 / 66.7% 
213 / 64.8% 
5 / 19.3% 
31 / 16.4% 
57 / 17.3% 






120 / 65.6% 
119 / 61.7% 
78 / 72.9% 
31 / 67.4% 
9 / 60.0% 
28 / 15.3% 
29 / 15.0% 
25 / 23.4% 
9 / 19.6% 
2 / 13.3% 









40 / 54.1% 
121 / 61.4% 
112 / 68.3% 
68 / 79.1% 
12 / 66.7% 
4 / 80.0% 
5 / 6.8% 
32 / 16.2% 
31 / 18.9% 
22 / 25.6% 
1 / 5.6% 
2 / 40.0% 
Promotion recommendation   
Promotable (P) 
Must Promote (MP) 
Early promote (EP) 
Don’t Know 
40 / 67.8% 
198 / 68.5% 
93 / 63.7% 
22 / 52.4% 
9 / 15.3% 
55 / 19.0% 
22 / 15.1% 
5 / 11.9% 
Served in Safety Department   
Yes 
No 
20 / 71.4% 
337 / 65.3% 
6 / 21.4% 
87 / 16.9% 
n=544.  Survey data collected August 2006. 
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Appendix I 
Sample Interview Question (Oceana Survey) 
1) Describe the squadron’s work environment/climate. 
2) Describe the squadron’s safety climate. 
3) Do most people feel the same way? 
4) Do you feel satisfied in your job? 
5) What has worked well to make the squadron safer? 
6) What improvements could be made for safety? 
7) What would stand in the way of such improvements? 
8) How do you tell whether your safety performance is good? 
9) What happens if there is an accident? 
10) What happens if someone gets hurt? 
11) Are injuries reported? 
12) What one thing could your superiors do to most improve safety? 
13) What is the most important thing you could do to improve safty? 
14) Who has the authority to shut down an unsafe operation? 
15) Can you refuse to do unsafe work without fear of reprisal or repercussion? 
16) Are you asked to take greater risks during high-tempo operations? 
17) Do you feel obliged to take greater risks during high tempo operations? 
18) Do you feel personally satisfied when you complete a tough job safely? 
19) Do you feel personally responsible for the safety of junior personnel working 
under your supervision? 
20) Do you ever perform unsafe acts? Why? 
21) Are there other things happening in the organization that distract you during your 
work? What are they? 
22) What drives the safety effort here? 
23) Are there certain supervisors that you like working for?Why? 
24) What are some of the qualities in your supervisor you find particularly admirable? 
25) Who talks to you about safety; under what circumstances? 
26) How much of your time is devoted to safety? 
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27) Is production viewed as being more important than safety? 
28) Do safety awards make you more diligent in your work? 
29) Do you trust your superiors to make your personal safety a priority? 
30) Do the workers get recognized for their commitment to safety? 
31) When a supervisor takes an interest in your personal developm nt, does it 
improve your attitude about your job? 
32) Does this change in attitude make you work more safely? 
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Appendix J 
Safety Climate ANOVA Means Comparison (Oceana Survey) 
Table J.1 ANOVA Means Comparison by Demographic Category (Officer) 
 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate in unit (Q33) (1-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic 
Variables 
n Mean  SD means comparison/statistical significance1 
Unit    a b c    
e. Squadron 1 
f. Squadron 2 
g. Squadron 3 








































































































    
Race    a b     
a. Caucasian 




















   












































































































Job          
a. Branch Officer 
b. Phase Head 
c. Division Officer 






































































    
Spouse’s living 
arrangements 
   a b     
a. Spouse lives w/ mbr 36 4.44 .50 - -     
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Spouse’s work     a b c    
a. Works full time 
b. Works part time 


























   
Spouse’s occupation     a b     
a. Serves in military  


















    





























   
Education    a b c    
a. 2 year degree 



























   





























   
Geographic Region     a b c d   
a. North East 
b. North West 
c. South East 
d. South West 




























































































   
Tenure in Squadron 
(yrs) 










































Sleep (Avg. hrs per 
night) 
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k. >9 1 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 .53 .50 
Promotion 
recommendation 
   a b c d e  
a. Promotable (P) 
b. Must Promote (MP) 
c. Early Promote (EP) 
d. Don’t Know  






















































     
Individual injuries 
past year (on the job) 
   a      
a. None 









     
Individual injuries 
past year (during 
leisure) 
   a b     
a. None 
b. 1 time 
















    
Number of people seen 
injured past year  





























   
Involvement in 
workplace mishap over 
the past year 
   a      
a. None 









     
Command mishaps 
over the past year 
   a b c d   
a. None 
b. 1 time 
c. 2 times  
d. 3 times 
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e. 6 21 4.76 .44 .24 .76 .51 .52**  
























































1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Scheffe’s multiple comparison test 
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Table J.2 ANOVA Means Comparison by Demographic Category (Enlisted) 
 
Respondent’s assessment of safety climate (Q33) (0-5 Likert scale) 
Demographic Variables n Mean SD means comparison / statistical significance1 
Organization    a b c     
e. Squadron 1 
f. Squadron 2 
g. Squadron 3 

























   



















































































      
Citizenship    a b      
a. U.S. born 
b. U.S. naturalized 
















     





























    
Race    a b c d e f  
a. Caucasian 
b. African American 
c. Hispanic 
d. Native American 
e. Asian 


































































Work center     a b c d e f g 
a. Maintenance Control 
b. Quality Assurance 
c. Power Plants 

































































































































      h i j k  
    H  Corrosion 
i.   Survival 
j.   Para Rigger 
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l.   N/A .45 .24 .10 .74  
Work Shift n Mean SD a b      
d. Day check 
e. Night check 
















     





























    
Spouse’s living 
arrangements 
   a b      
d. Spouse lives w/ mbr 

















     
Spouse’s work     a b c     
e. Works full time 
f. Works part time 


























    
Spouse’s occupation     a b      
d. Serves in military  
e. Does not serve in mil 
















     





























    
Education    a b c d e f  
e. Some High School 
f. High School diploma 
g. GED 
h. Some College 
i. College degree 


































































Authority    a b c d e   
e. Worker 
f. Leading Petty Officer 
g. Shift supervisor 
h. Work center supervisor 
i. Br Chief Petty Officer 


















































Geographic Region     a b c d e f  
f. North East 
g. North West 
h. South East 
i. South West 
j. Mid West 
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h. Other 13 3.92 .86 .03 .14 .21 



















     









































   


























































   a b c     
f. Promotable (P) 
g. Must Promote (MP) 
h. Early promote (EP) 

























    











      
Individual injuries past 
year (on the job) 
   a b c d    
c. None 
d. 1 time 
e. 2 times  
f. 3 times 




































   
Individual injuries past 
year (during leisure) 
   a b c d    
d. None 
e. 1 time 
f. 2 times  
g. 3 times 




































   
Number of people seen 
injured past year  









































   
Involvement in workplace 
mishap over the past year 
   a b c d    
a. None 
b. 1 time 
c. 2 times  
d. 3 times 
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Command mishaps over 
the past year 
a b  d 
f. None 
g. 1 time 
h. 2 times  
i. 3 times 




































   
Assessment of command’s 
operational performance 
























































Assessment of command’s 
safety performance 
















































































































1 absolute value of means difference 
*= p≤ 0.05, **= p≤ 0.01, ***= p≤ 0.001 
STATA 8.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Scheffe’s multiple comparison test 
Bartlett’s test for equal variance 
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Appendix K 
Regression Results (Oceana Survey) 
Table K.1 Regression Results, Principal Factors (Officer) 
 Model (1) 

































# of variables 16 
Respondents 52 
Pseudo R2 .51 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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Table K.2 Regression Results, Demographic Factors (Officer) 
 
 Model (1) 
 safetyclimate1 







































# of variables 20 
Respondents 52 
Pseudo R2 .47 
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Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses 




Table K.3 Regression Results, Performance Factors (Officer) 
 
 Model (1) 
 safetyclimate1 





























# of variables 14 
Respondents 52 
Pseudo R2 .35 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate survey statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses 
Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%; dprobit results. Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
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Table K.4 Regression Results, Unit Factors (Officer) 
 
 Model (1) 
 safetyclimate1 






















































# of variables 25 
Respondents 46 
Pseudo R2 .48 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
Safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
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Table K.5 Regression Results, Principal Factors (Enlisted) 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
Principal Factor Variables 
SC1 0.207 0.104 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** 
SC2 -0.160 -0.044 
 (0.000)** (0.003)** 
SP1 0.104 0.068 
 (0.000)** (0.001)** 
SP2 0.013 0.020 
 (0.598) (0.158) 
UP1 -0.052 -0.056 
 (0.100) (0.007)** 
UP2 0.049 0.042 
 (0.066) (0.041)* 
LS1 -0.008 -0.013 
 (0.802) (0.558) 
LS2 -0.034 -0.012 
 (0.179) (0.447) 
LS3 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.751) (0.497) 
# of variables 9 9 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .27 .23 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
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Table K.6 Regression Results, Demographic Factors (Enlisted) 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
Independent Demographic Variables* 
E1orE2 0.061 0.053 
 (0.497) (0.452) 
E3 0.090 0.061 
 (0.161) (0.222) 
E5 -0.061 -0.034 
 (0.400) (0.475) 
E6 -0.085 0.034 
 (0.424) (0.588) 
male 0.042 0.024 
 (0.524) (0.593) 
noncitizen 0.216 0.444 
 (0.215) (0.014)* 
naturalized 0.067 -0.062 
 (0.482) (0.312) 
africanamerican 0.014 0.102 
 (0.833) (0.035)* 
hispanic 0.022 -0.075 
 (0.794) (0.147) 
asian -0.260 0.096 
 (0.148) (0.466) 
airframes -0.044 0.011 
 (0.678) (0.878) 
avionics -0.067 0.025 
 (0.490) (0.717) 
corrosion -0.391 0.039 
 (0.009)** (0.715) 
line -0.037 -0.052 
 (0.707) (0.372) 
wcnone -0.069 0.089 
 (0.594) (0.366) 
ord -0.071 0.050 
 (0.538) (0.550) 
pp -0.016 0.011 
 (0.882) (0.883) 
pr -0.221 -0.019 
 (0.303) (0.882) 
qa 0.091 0.057 
 (0.545) (0.582) 
survival -0.016 0.013 
 (0.898) (0.876) 
daycheck 0.198 0.185 
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 (0.002)** (0.003)** 
nightcheck 0.212 0.254 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** 
single -0.091 -0.071 
 (0.162) (0.101) 
divorced -0.009 0.074 
 (0.935) (0.412) 
separated 0.017 -0.020 
 (0.876) (0.771) 
milspouse -0.158 -0.047 
 (0.084) (0.436) 
basehousing -0.041 0.016 
 (0.534) (0.730) 
kids0 0.060 0.077 
 (0.332) (0.057) 
kids3or4 -0.046 -0.025 
 (0.618) (0.691) 
somehs -0.274 -0.098 
 (0.203) (0.213) 
ged -0.137 -0.007 
 (0.255) (0.930) 
somecollege -0.039 -0.002 
 (0.418) (0.954) 
college 0.086 -0.084 
 (0.395) (0.164) 
eduother -0.260 0.157 
 (0.342) (0.421) 
worker -0.280 -0.050 
 (0.009)** (0.518) 
shiftsup -0.225 -0.031 
 (0.075) (0.645) 
workcentersup -0.293 -0.031 
 (0.053) (0.727) 
northwest 0.103 -0.045 
 (0.331) (0.546) 
southeast 0.061 -0.026 
 (0.303) (0.549) 
southwest 0.056 -0.000 
 (0.482) (0.994) 
midwest 0.044 0.010 
 (0.468) (0.827) 
pacisland 0.131 0.054 
 (0.611) (0.767) 
regionnone 0.143 0.028 
 (0.118) (0.687) 
rural -0.121 -0.077 
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 (0.049)* (0.042)* 
urban -0.150 -0.039 
 (0.011)* (0.300) 
milparent1 0.033 0.011 
 (0.482) (0.734) 
milparent2 0.044 0.026 
 (0.640) (0.722) 
tenurelessthan1 0.086 0.016 
 (0.126) (0.690) 
tenure2to3 0.127 0.065 
 (0.032)* (0.159) 
tenure3to4 0.059 0.053 
 (0.503) (0.410) 
tenuremorethan4 0.041 0.017 
 (0.748) (0.862) 
mp 0.115 0.044 
 (0.016)* (0.196) 
p 0.130 0.035 
 (0.063) (0.554) 
nonsafetydept -0.015 -0.045 
 (0.890) (0.552) 
# of variables 54 54 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .11 .11 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; dprobit results.  Coefficients 
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Table K.7 Regression Results, Unit Factors (Enlisted) 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
Safety and Unit Program Variables 
safetypriority 0.103 0.072 
 (0.042)* (0.002)** 
recommendtofriend 0.129 -0.058 
 (0.044)* (0.007)** 
morale -0.024 0.045 
 (0.722) (0.090) 
myopinion 0.049 0.046 
 (0.448) (0.090) 
expectedaccidents -0.206 0.002 
 (0.000)** (0.937) 
standdowns 0.166 0.038 
 (0.001)** (0.119) 
orm 0.034 0.021 
 (0.580) (0.518) 
handleschange 0.105 0.055 
 (0.062) (0.048)* 
safetystats 0.002 -0.037 
 (0.977) (0.147) 
safetydata 0.025 0.003 
 (0.698) (0.913) 
fairassessment 0.075 -0.039 
 (0.218) (0.135) 
safetyawards 0.007 0.012 
 (0.903) (0.628) 
empowered 0.061 0.016 
 (0.214) (0.548) 
sufficienttime -0.008 0.031 
 (0.884) (0.231) 
bestpeoplesafety -0.043 0.030 
 (0.489) (0.252) 
injuriesreported 0.082 0.017 
 (0.129) (0.471) 
counselingguidlines 0.035 -0.128 
 (0.577) (0.001)** 
counselinghelpful 0.103 0.182 
 (0.099) (0.000)** 
evaluation 0.014 -0.014 
 (0.790) (0.568) 
mentoring 0.079 0.084 
 (0.152) (0.001)** 
meaningfulreward 0.001 -0.058 
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 (0.986) (0.018)* 
familyimpact 0.037 -0.001 
 (0.626) (0.979) 
prodevplan 0.012 0.032 
 (0.850) (0.243) 
perfjobassignment -0.008 -0.032 
 (0.898) (0.185) 
racebias 0.119 0.022 
 (0.029)* (0.364) 
leaderdevelopment -0.044 0.036 
 (0.430) (0.151) 
leaderpride -0.099 -0.085 
 (0.155) (0.008)** 
leaderinspiration 0.065 0.097 
 (0.316) (0.002)** 
leadersacrifice 0.104 0.020 
 (0.086) (0.450) 
leadermoralstand -0.068 0.003 
 (0.269) (0.905) 
goalsknown 0.140 0.067 
 (0.008)** (0.012)* 
leaderawardrec -0.071 -0.011 
 (0.230) (0.699) 
leaderperfawareness 0.010 -0.059 
 (0.865) (0.036)* 
leaderdecide -0.006 0.000 
 (0.909) (0.987) 
leadermicro 0.021 0.018 
 (0.719) (0.525) 
leadergetsit -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.913) (0.642) 
# of variables 36 36 
Respondents 544 544 
Pseudo R2 .39 .33 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table K.8 Regression Results, Performance Factors (Enlisted) 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 safetyclimate safetyclimate1 
Performance Variables 
jobinjury1 0.061 0.137 
 (0.344) (0.048)* 
jobinjury2 -0.101 0.007 
 (0.383) (0.943) 
jobinjury3 -0.307 # 
 (0.328)  
jobinjury4 0.244 0.120 
 (0.213) (0.538) 
leisureinjury1 -0.006 0.051 
 (0.932) (0.334) 
leisureinjury2 0.100 -0.113 
 (0.276) (0.250) 
leisureinjury3 -0.304 # 
 (0.232)  
leisureinjury4 -0.127 -0.060 
 (0.560) (0.624) 
mymishap1 0.078 -0.082 
 (0.460) (0.267) 
mymishap2 -0.378 0.163 
 (0.272) (0.482) 
unitmishap1 -0.066 -0.050 
 (0.259) (0.250) 
unitmishap2 -0.107 -0.105 
 (0.173) (0.068) 
unitmishap3 -0.227 # 
 (0.055)  
unitmishap4 -0.323 # 
 (0.113)  
unitinjury2 -0.015 -0.000 
 (0.775) (0.999) 
unitinjury4 0.071 0.041 
 (0.289) (0.531) 
unitinjury6 -0.036 0.068 
 (0.832) (0.630) 
unitinjury8 -0.105 # 
 (0.532)  
opperf1 -0.172 # 
 (0.373)  
opperf2 -0.300 -0.130 
 (0.055) (0.102) 
opperf3 -0.538 -0.236 
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 (0.000)** (0.000)** 
opperf4 -0.264 -0.215 
 (0.007)** (0.000)** 
opperf5 -0.084 -0.162 
 (0.375) (0.002)** 
safetyperf1 -0.586 # 
 (0.008)**  
safetyperf2 -0.389 -0.123 
 (0.013)* (0.131) 
safetyperf4 -0.002 -0.175 
 (0.976) (0.001)** 
safetyperf5 0.174 -0.144 
 (0.004)** (0.003)** 
jobsat1 -0.173 -0.054 
 (0.119) (0.490) 
jobsat2 -0.113 # 
 (0.299)  
jobsat3 -0.161 -0.064 
 (0.086) (0.316) 
jobsat4 0.020 -0.039 
 (0.807) (0.507) 
jobsat5 0.092 0.015 
 (0.259) (0.777) 
# of variables 32 24 
Respondents 541 439 
Pseudo R2 .26 .25 
Survey conducted August 2006. 
safetyclimate: respondents either ag eed or strongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
safetyclimate1: respondents s rongly agreed to safety climate statement (Q33) 
# predicts failure perfectly, observations dropped. 
Robust p values in parentheses, significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
dprobit results.  Coefficients indicate marginal effects. 
  
 




AIMD    Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department 
AO    Aviation Ordnanceman 
AMRAAM   Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile 
AE    Aviation Electrician 
CAIB    Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CC    Command and Control 
CDI    Collateral Duty Inspector 
C/FR    Communications 
CMC    Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CNA    Center for Naval Analyses 
CNO    Chief of Naval Operations 
CO    Commanding Officer 
COMNAVAIRFOR  Commander Naval Air Forces 
CSA    Command Safety Assessment 
CSCAS   Command Safety Climate Assessment Survey 
DCI    Detailed Claim Information 
DEA    Drug Enforcement Agency 
DH    Department Head 
DOD    Department of Defense 
DON    Department of the Navy 
DSOC    Defense Safety Oversight Council 
FEMA    Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FRP    Fleet Response Plan 
FRS    Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) 
FM    Flight Mishap 
FNAEB   Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board 
FYDP    Future Years Defense Plan 
GPWS    Ground Proximity Warning System 
HRO    High Reliability Organization 
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JDAM    Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
JSOW    Joint Stand-Off Weapon 
MC    Maintenance Control 
MCAS    Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey 
MFOQA   Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
N/A    Not Applicable 
NAS     Naval Air Station 
NASA    National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCCI    National Council on Compensation Insurance 
NCO    Non-Commissioned Officer 
NMCSC   Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council 
NSC    National Safety Council 
ORM    Operational Risk Management 
OSHA    Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PA     Process Auditing 
PMV    Private Motor Vehicle 
QA    Quality Control 
QAR    Quality Assurance Representative 
RM    Risk Management 
RS    Reward System 
SECDEF   Secretary of Defense 
SECNAV   Secretary of the Navy 
SES    Senior Executive Service 
TAWS    Target Acquisition Weapons Software 
TMS    Type/Model/Series 
NPGS    Naval Post Graduate School 
USN    United States Navy 
USMC    United States Marine Corps 
VFA    Fixed-Wing Fighter-Attack Squadron (Navy) 
VMFA    Fixed-Wing Fighter-Attack Squadron (Marine Corps) 
VPP    Voluntary Protection Program 
 
  374 
 
XO    Executive Officer 
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